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One simple way to handle interpersonal conflict is to use accounts to explain 
one’s behaviors. Although accounts play a significant role in managing conflict, 
relatively little research has explored the processes offenders use to determin  the 
accounts selected in conflict situations. The goal of this dissertation is t investigate the 
attributional processes offenders use that determine their accounts in conflict. Ten 
hypotheses were proposed about how the severity of the conflict outcome and the 
closeness between the parties involved in the conflict influence offenders’ choice of 
accounts. A structural equation model was developed and tested based on the proposed 
hypotheses.  
An experiment was conducted, with two levels of outcome severity and three 
levels of relational closeness. Offenders’ attributions (i.e., the degree of internal 
attribution, the degree of external attribution, controllability, and uncontrollability), 
anticipated consequences (i.e., expected responsibility and expected anger), and 
offenders’ expected choice of accounts (i.e., the likelihood of selecting concessions, 
justifications, excuses, and refusals) were measured.  
Two hundred thirty-eight participants were recruited and randomly assigned to 
one of the six experimental conditions. Participants read a hypothetical conflict scenario, 
 
 
imagined that they were the offender in the scenario, and completed a questionnaire that 
had the dependent measures.  
Results indicated that outcome severity influenced offenders’ choice of accounts 
directly and indirectly. Offenders tended to choose a more defensive account when they 
perceived the outcome to be severe than when the outcome was not severe. The influenc
of outcome severity on offenders’ choice of accounts was also mediated by the 
attributions offenders made, the responsibility expected to be assigned to offenders, a  
anger expected to be felt by victims. When offenders perceived the outcome to be severe, 
offenders made more attributions, expected more responsibility to be assigned to th m, 
and expected that victims felt angrier about offenders’ behavior than when the outcome 
was not severe. Consequently, when offenders expected more anger from victims, they 
tended to be less defensive. Interpretations and implications of results, the limitations of 
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Person A: You are supposed to cover this training session with me together but 
you never showed up! How many times are you going to leave me to 
work this group by myself? 
Person B: My other job has had me working sixty hours a week for the past few 
     weeks to  close out an important project! (Pause) 
 Person B: But it will end soon. By that time I can be back to work with you 
     regularly. I understand where you are coming from. 
 (Extract from a self-report conflict scenario in Pilot Study 1 of the current 
research). 
 Despite growing interest in behavioral strategies for conflict management, little 
attention has been given to a simple way to handle conflicts: the use of accounts. 
Accounts are statements made by offenders to explain their unanticipated or norm-
contradictive behaviors (Scott & Lyman, 1968). As shown in the above example, when 
an interpersonal conflict occurs, communication plays a significant role in theconflict 
process (Putnam & Poole, 1987). People often use accounts to try to influence the 
affected party’s perception of the conflict, to avoid further escalation of the conflict or to 
maintain their relationship with the affected party. Verbal explanation is especially 
important for offenders whose behavior has a negative influence on victims in conflict 
situations. What offenders say to explain their behaviors directly influences a victim’s 
perceptions of (1) the responsibility assigned to the offender, (2) the offenders’ 
intentions, and (3) the way that the conflict can be handled (Sitkin & Bies, 1993).  
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Studying communication that occurs in conflict situations, especially accounts 
offenders use to explain their behaviors, provides a foundation for conflict management 
research because accounts often set the tone for how a conflict can be resolved. Furth r, 
examining offenders’ choice of accounts in a conflict situation can provide insight to the 
account literature. Past research on accounts has focused on developing differenttyp s of 
accounts and examining their functions in interpersonal situations (e.g., Jellison, 1990; 
Tedeschi & Reiss, 1981). Relatively little work has explored how people construct their 
accounts (for exceptions see Read, 1992; Rest, 1984). Read argued that offenders 
construct accounts based on a typical form, such as information about the goals of 
offenders, factors that stimulate those goals, behaviors or strategies to achieve those 
goals, outcomes (e.g., whether those goals are satisfied), and “the physical and social 
situations in which the action occurred” (Read, 1992, p. 6). Rest looked into how 
offenders reconstruct the definition of situations to mitigate the consequences of th ir
actions. Rest pointed out that the d fensive reinterpretation, a process to reframe 
offenders’ understanding about the causes of their actions and their judgments of 
responsibility, was used by offenders to protect them in the course of a negative event. 
Read’s (1992) and Rest’s (1984) studies are examples of research examining the 
cognitive processes offenders use to determine their accounts. 
McLaughlin, Cody, and Read (1992) suggested that more attention should be 
given to understanding how people create accounts. The current research answersthe call 
from McLaughlin et al. (1992) by focusing on one specific process, the attributional 
process, to understand the accounts that offenders use in conflict situations. The question
addressed by this research is: What attributional processes do offenders use to determine 
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their accounts in a conflict?  
Attribution theories provide a framework for understanding how people make 
sense of their world (e.g., Weiner, 1986, 1992). Causal inferences organize people’s 
perceptions of reality and make the experiential world more understandable and 
predicable (Kelley, 1971). By using attribution theories, this study can test the cognitive 
and emotional processes that offenders engage in after their behavior leads to an 
interpersonal conflict.  
Weiner’s (1986, 1995, 2006) attribution theory of motivation and emotion 
provides the theoretical background for this research. Weiner argued that to explain a 
norm-contradictive behavior, offenders often start by examining antecedent conditions 
that lead to the behavior. In a conflict situation, the antecedent conditions could be the 
relationship between the offender and the victim or the severity of the situation. 
According to Weiner, once offenders have analyzed the antecedent conditions, they will 
make causal inferences about why the behavior has occurred. The behavior could have 
happened because of environmental reasons or because of the offenders’ personal trait . 
Weiner further argued that based on the causal inferences made, offenders will have 
expectations about consequences if such inferences were presented to the victim. 
Expected consequences refer to the level of responsibility to be assigned to offenders and 
the level of the victim’s anger. Offenders then will decide the accounts to be conv yed to 
victims based on the expected consequences.    
The current research examined offenders’ account-giving processes by focusing 
on two antecedent conditions—outcome severity and relational closeness—and causal 
inferences associated with the offending behavior. Outcome severity refers to the level of 
 4
 
severity in consequences caused by offenders’ behavior. Attribution studies have 
suggested that people are “motivate[d] to be highly engaged in an attributional search in 
response to more threatening or unusual events because there is a greater need to explain
such events” than events that have a less severe outcome (Robbenolt, 2000, p. 2576). 
Research also indicated that different levels of outcome severity lead to a ifferent 
amount of responsibility to be assigned to offenders (Walster, 1960). When the outcome 
of a conflict is severe, offenders expect victims to assign more responsibility to offenders. 
To reduce offenders’ negative feelings about themselves, offenders may blame 
themselves and use an account to comfort victims, such as by offering compensation or 
showing regret. When the outcome of a conflict is not severe, offenders expect victims to 
assign less responsibility to offenders; thus, offenders will be more likelyto defend 
themselves, compared to the situation in which the outcome is severe.     
The current research also posits that people’s perception about conflict and 
managing conflict varies, depending on with whom they are in conflict. Relational 
closeness, the level of closeness between the offender and the victim, influences the 
choice of accounts. Fitzpatrick and Winke (1979) pointed out that when a conflict occurs 
between close friends, people perceive that they have a lower risk of relati nship 
termination than if the conflict is between people who are not close. Offenders may then 
take a defensive stand to handle the conflict. If the conflict occurs between 
acquaintances, given the desire to maintain the relationship with the victim, offenders 
often will be mitigating to cope with the conflict. However, when a conflict oc urs 
between strangers, with a low possibility of future interaction, offenders will try to 
defend themselves and, as a result, will be aggressive.  
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The current research focuses on these two contextual variables (i.e., outcome 
severity and relational closeness between offenders and victims) of interpersonal conflicts 
and examines the cognitive and emotional processes involved in the provision of 
accounts. An experiment that manipulated three levels of relational closeness (high vs. 
moderate vs. low) and two levels of outcome severity (high vs. low) in a hypothetical 
conflict scenario was conducted to further our understanding of the offenders’ choice of 




Attributional Processes in Accounting for Conflict Behaviors 
Interpersonal Conflict and Conflict Management 
Although no definition of conflict is universally agreed upon, the central 
characteristic of conflict is generally viewed as incompatibility of goals (Roloff & Soule, 
2002). For example, Mack and Snyder (1957) defined conflict as a “particular kind of 
social interaction process or ‘interaction relationship’ between parties who have mutually 
exclusive or incompatible values” (cited in Fink, 1968, p. 432). Similarly, Wilmot and 
Hocker (2005) defined conflict as “an expressed struggle between at least two 
interdependent parties who perceive incompatible goals, scarce resources, and 
interference from others in achieving their goals” (p. 9). Conflicts can occur under 
different circumstances, such as when two parties’ behavioral preferences are 
inconsistent, when there are not enough resources to fulfill each party’s desire, or when 
there is a conflict of values or goals (Rahim, 1992; Rahim & Bonoma, 1979).  
The primary focus of conflict research has been the examination of people’s 
preference for conflict management styles (Thomas, 1992). Rahim’s (1983) typolog  of 
conflict management styles has been widely studied. These styles are dominating, 
integrating, compromising, obliging, and avoiding. Although different versions of 
Rahim’s five conflict management styles have been used in conflict research (.g., 
Ohbuchi, Fukushima & Tedeschi, 1999), a majority of conflict management styles can be 
categorized based on the dual-concern model (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992; Pruitt & Rubin, 
1986). Based on Blake and Mouton’s (1964) and Thomas’ (1976) research on conflict, 
Pruitt and Rubin (1986) developed the dual-concern model to represent different conflict
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styles. The dual concerns refer to concerns for one’s own outcomes and for the outcome 
of others involved in the conflict. The dual-concern model suggests that dominating 
involves a high concern for one’s own outcome and a low concern for the other’s 
outcome; integrating reflects a high concern for both own and other’s outcome; 
compromising represents a moderate concern for one’s own and the other’s outcome; 
obliging involves a low concern for one’s own outcome but a high concern for the other’s 
outcome; and avoiding reflects a low concern for both own and other’s outcome.  
Although conflict management style preferences have been widely studied (e.g., 
Ohbuchi et al., 1999), relatively little work has explicated the communication aspects of 
conflict management—accounts offenders use to explain the behaviors that have led to a
conflict. Conflict management styles have been studied as a general way to handle 
conflict; for example, Cai and Fink (2002) found that compromising and integrating are 
preferred more by collectivists than by individualists. This result suggested that someone 
high on collectivism is more likely to use compromising or integrating to handle a 
conflict than those high on individualism.  
Accounts are different from conflict management styles in that accounts depen  
on specific contexts. For example, McLaughlin, O’Hair, and Cody (1983) studied 
contextual determinants of accounts and found that when there was a reproach, when te 
offense was severe, and when the offender felt guilty, offenders were more likely to use 
concessions to explain their behaviors. Contexts play an important role in determining the 
accounts that will be used in conflict situations. The use of a particular account is not 
necessarily connected to individuals’ dispositional characteristics and not necessarily 




Accounts have been recognized as one impression management strategy. For 
example, Goffman (1971) discussed accounts as a remedial strategy to protect an 
offender from attacks to his or her social identity (Goffman, 1971). This theoretical 
orientation is also found in Scott and Lyman’s (1968) typology of accounts. According to 
Scott and Lyman, an account is “a statement made by a social actor to explain
unanticipated or untoward behavior” (p. 46). Offenders use accounts to influence victims’ 
perception of themselves or of the causes of the conduct in a specific incident (Mills, 
1940). As argued by Mills, “When an agent vocalizes or imputes motives, he is not trying 
to describe his experienced social action. He is not merely stating ‘reasons.’ He i  
influencing others—and himself” (p. 907).  
Most early studies of accounts were descriptive and focused on the development 
of account taxonomies (e.g., Scott & Lyman, 1968; Tedeschi & Reiss, 1981). For 
example, in a classic study on accounts (Sykes & Matza, 1957), the authors examined the 
techniques (i.e., techniques of neutralization) that juvenile delinquents used to justify 
their deviant behaviors and to protect themselves from self-blame or blame from others. 
Sykes and Matza (1957) classified the techniques of neutralization that juvenile 
delinquents used to provide explanations for their behaviors into five categories: denial of 
responsibility (i.e., a claim that something happened due to uncontrollable forces), denial
of injury (i.e., a claim that no harm has been caused), denial of victim (i.e., a claim that 
the victim deserved the treatment given), condemnation of the condemners (i.e., a claim 
that condemners are reacting out of personal spite), or appeal to higher loyalties (i.e., a 
claim that loyalty to important others requires such behaviors). By using the above 
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techniques, juvenile delinquents could adjust their understanding of social norms to be 
consistent with their behaviors, thus avoiding self-blame and disregarding blame from 
others.  
Inspired by Sykes and Matza’s (1957) research, Scott and Lyman (1968) 
distinguished two types of accounts: excuses and justifications. An excuse refers to an 
explanation in which people admit the inappropriateness of the behavior in question but 
cite some external reasons to deny their full responsibility. In the example cited at the 
beginning of the current research, Person B used having another job as an excuse for why 
he or she did not fulfill the commitment to Person A. By doing so, Person B 
acknowledged that the behavior (i.e., not showing up to the training session) was not 
appropriate; however, the other job for an important project was seemingly more ti e-
consuming and demanding, which excused Person B’s misconduct (i.e., not showing up 
to the training session). Thus, Person B would not take full responsibility for missing the 
training session.  
The other type of account, justification, is defined as an explanation that denies 
the behavior in question is wrong but admits responsibility for it. Often people who use 
this account claim that their conduct fulfills a superordinate goal. Scott and Lyman 
(1968) offered the following example of a justification: A soldier could assert that killing 
in a war is for a superordinate goal—fighting for the cause of freedom. Therefore, 
although the solider should take the responsibility for killing, he or she does not think the 
behavior is inappropriate because killing in a war is necessary and perhaps even 
desirable.   
Scholars have extended Scott and Lyman’s (1968) account taxonomy (e.g., Bies, 
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1987; Schlenker, 1980; Schönbach, 1990; Sitkin & Bies, 1993; Tedeschi & Reiss, 1981). 
Much work has focused on clarifying the distinction between excuses and justifications 
(e.g., Schlenker, 1980). Schönbach expanded the account taxonomy by developing two 
additional categories: concession and refusal. Concession is defined as an explanation 
that admits the inappropriateness of the behavior in question and also admits partial or 
total responsibility for the behavior. Concessions are often accompanied with a 
confession, expression of regret or guilt, or an offer of restitution (Fincham, 1992). In the 
example cited at the beginning of the current research, if a concession were to b  used, 
Person B would probably say something like this: “I am sorry for being absent from all 
those training sessions. It’s my fault. Maybe I can cover the next two sessi ns by myself 
so you can have some time to do your work.” In this concession, Person B admits that hi  
or her behavior (i.e., not showing up to the training session) was not appropriate and 
offered compensation. On the other hand, when people choose refu als, they deny guilt or 
responsibility, claim that the behavior in question has not occurred, deny personal 
involvement with the behavior in question, or attribute guilt to others, even to the accuser 
(Konovsky & Jaster, 1989; Schönbach, 1980). If a refusal would be used in the above 
example, Person B probably would argue like this: “You did not tell me I had to be there 
for the training session. If you wanted me to be there, you should have let me know ahead 
of time, rather than complaining afterwards.” By attributing the guilt to Person A (i.e., 
not informing Person B about his or her duty), Person B used a refusal to deny his or her 
responsibility.  
Although a few more types of accounts have been discussed in the account 
literature, the majority of the new types of accounts are similar to Scott and Lyman’s 
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(1968) and Schönbach’s (1980) conceptualizations (e.g., Bies, 1987; Hamilton & 
Hagiwara, 1992; McLaughlin, O’Hair et al., 1983). See Table 1 for definitions of maj r 
types of accounts as proposed by various authors. For example, Bies (1987) described 
four different types of accounts: causal accounts, ideological accounts, referential 
accounts, and penitential accounts. Bie’s framework is relatively similar to Schönbach’s 
taxonomy. Causal accounts are in essence excuses; ideological accounts are simil r to 
justifications; and penitential accounts consist of apology and remorse, which often are 
used in concessions. The only difference between Bies’ framework and Schönba’s 
taxonomy is that Bies de-emphasized refusals but highlighted referential accounts (i.e., 
when social comparison and consensus information are used to explain the behavior in 
question). Scholars perceived apology as another type of account (e.g., Hamilton & 
Hagiwara, 1992). Apology admits that harm was done but does not necessarily remove or 
reduce responsibility. Using an apology assuages negative emotions aroused by the 
behavior in question. Apologies can be identified as a part of concessions (Fincham, 
1992).  
McLaughlin, O’Hair et al. (1983) argued that under certain circumstances (for 
instance, when the embarrassment associated with the behavior in question is severe) th  
best choice to deal with the conflict may be silence. Sil nce is defined as avoiding any 
reference to or verbal explanation about the untoward behavior. Although silence or 
avoidance sometimes may be the best way to prevent interpersonal conflicts from 
escalating, it is not a type of accounts because it does not provide any verbal explanation 
about the behaviors in question. Because concessions, justifications, excuses, and refusls 




Major Types of Accounts, Sources, and Definitions 
Types of accounts Sources   Definition 
Excuse               Scott & Lyman (1968) Explanations in which people admit the 
inappropriateness of the behavior in 
question but cite external reasons to deny 
their full responsibility.  
Justification       Scott & Lyman (1968) Explanations in which people admit full 
responsibility for what has happened but 
indicate that the behavior in question is to 
fulfill a superordinate goal; thus, the 
behavior is not inappropriate.  
Concession    Schönbach (1980)  Explanations in which people admit partial 
or total responsibility or guilt, express regret 
concerning the behavior in question, and 
offer compensation.  
Refusal                Schönbach (1980) Explanations in which people deny guilt or 
responsibility, claim that the behavior in 
question has not occurred, and attribute guilt 
to others.  
Causal                  Bies (1987) Explanations in which people use a reason 
to mitigate offenders’ responsibility, or 
explanations that are more commonly 
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referred to as excuses.  
Ideological           Bies (1987) Explanations in which the actor attempts to 
invoke a superordinate goal or to place a 
positive label on the deed. 
Referential           Bies (1987) Explanations in which social comparison 
and consensus information is presented.  
Penitential            Bies (1987) Explanations that consist of apology and 
remorse.  
Consensus            Hamilton & Hagiwara Explanations that use social comparison and 
                 (1992)   declare that “everybody’s doing it.”  
External excuse   Hamilton & Hagiwara Explanations that include a broad range of 
                             (1992)  circumstances and interventions by human 
or natural causes.      
Internal excuse    Hamilton & Hagiwara Explanations that refers to something inside 
                            (1992)  the person that caused the outcome, whether 
or not it was controllable by that person.  
Apology               Hamilton & Hagiwara Explanations that admit the wrong-doing                                          
                             (1992)    and the responsibility; an apology is 




of accounts will be examined in the current research.   
More than developing account taxonomies, McLaughlin, Cody, and Rosenstein 
(1983) and Schönbach (1990) advanced the study of accounts by using a continuum to 
lay out the underlying dimension for the four types of accounts (i.e., concessions, 
justifications, excuses, and refusals). McLaughlin, Cody et al. used an aggravating-
mitigating continuum whereas Schönbach investigated each type of accounts in terms of 
its defensiveness, that is, to the extent to which using each type of accounts helps 
offenders to defend themselves. Regardless of the terminology, the continua proposed by 
these two groups of researchers are similar.  
According to Schönbach (1990), refusals, which deny the connection between 
offenders and the behavior in question, are most defensive. Further, excuses are less 
defensive than refusals because when excuses are used, offenders admit that the r
behavior is wrong and point to external reasons to reduce some responsibility. Schönbach 
argued that justifications are less defensive than excuses because offenders admit partial 
or full responsibility for their behavior, although they claim their behaviors are not 
inappropriate. According to Schönbach, concessions, which admit offenders’ 
responsibility or guilt for the behavior in question, are the least defensive type of 
accounts. On McLaughlin, Cody et al.’s aggravating-mitigating continuum, concessions 
and excuses are mitigating types of accounts whereas refusals and justifications are 
aggravating types of accounts. In particular, McLaughlin, Cody et al. argued that 
concessions are most mitigating and excuses are next to most mitigating type of accounts. 
Refusals are most aggravating and justifications are less aggravating, compared to 
refusals.    
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McLaughlin, Cody et al.’s (1983) assumed that aggravating accounts and 
mitigating accounts are different and exclusive: When one type of accounts is mi igating, 
it will not be considered as an aggravating type of accounts, and vice versa. For example, 
according to McLaughlin, Cody et al., excuses are a type of mitigating ccounts, not an 
aggravating account. And justifications are a type of aggravating accounts, not a 
mitigating account. However, the definitions of these two types of accounts do not 
necessarily suggest this interpretation. By using a justification, an offe der could mitigate 
the conflict to some extent because a justification admits the offender’s responsibility for 
what has happened. On the other hand, an excuse could aggregate the conflict because a 
victim may regard an offender’s using excuses as being dishonest and therefore think that 
the offenders is not willing to take his or her responsibility. A type of account may be 
both mitigating and aggravating at the same time. There was no empirical support to both 
the mitigating-aggravating continuum proposed by McLaughlin, Cody et al. and the 
defensiveness continuum proposed by Schönbach. Given the unclear distinction between 
mitigating and aggravating accounts, the current research decided to follow Schönbach’s 
defensiveness continuum to study accounts. Figure 1 indicates the possible ranking of 
four types of accounts on a defensiveness continuum as proposed by Schönbach.  
The use of accounts is associated with the personal responsibility assigned to 
offenders (McLaughlin, Cody, & French, 1990). For example, justifications and excuses 
are more likely to be connected with personal responsibility than concessions because 
justifications and excuses often “call attention to the character and motives of the 
defendant” (McLaughlin et al., 1990, p. 252). One factor that influences people’s 
judgment of responsibility is outcome severity. 
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             Low Defensiveness                          High Defensiveness 
 
         Concession                        Justification           Excuse                        Refusal 
Figure 1. Types of accounts on the defensiveness continuum, as proposed by Schönbach 
(1990).  
Outcome Severity 
Outcome severity determines the amount of responsibility assigned to a 
potentially responsible actor (Tennen & Affleck, 1990). For example, in Walster’s (1966) 
study, participants listened to a story about a car accident and rated the rsponsibility of 
offenders. Walster found a positive relationship between outcome severity and 
responsibility assigned to the offender; that is, when the outcome was severe, participants 
attributed more responsibility to the offender than when the outcome was not severe.
However, later research provided mixed support for this proposition (Robbennolt, 2000). 
A number of studies have replicated Walters’s findings (e.g., Gleason & Harris, 1976; 
Tennen & Affleck, 1990; Wilson & Jonah, 1988), but other studies have either failed to 
find a relationship between outcome severity and expected responsibility (e.g., Thomas & 
Parpal, 1987) or have found their relationship to be negative (e.g., Shaver, 1970).  
Robbennolt (2000) conducted a meta-analysis to further understand the 
relationship between outcome severity and judgment of responsibility. Seventy-five 
studies were collected for the meta-analysis. Although the strength of correlati n varied 
in terms of types of judgment that participants were asked to make (e.g., the correlation 
was smallest for liability judgments and largest for assessments of punishment), 
Robbenolt’s meta-analysis supported Walster's hypothesis that, overall, people assign 
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more responsibility to offenders when an outcome of a negative event is more severe than 
when the outcome is less severe. Robbenolt reported that the effect sizes of all studies 
that she examined ranged from -.26 (Shaver, 1970) to .75 (Mitchell & Kalb, 1981). The 
overall effect size was positive and significantly different from zero (r = .08, p < .01).1 
The majority of studies on outcome severity and responsibility focus on the 
observer’s perspective: having a third person assign responsibility to the offender. 
Relatively little research has been conducted from the offender’s perspective. The 
question is whether offenders understand the violation the same way that observers do. 
When the outcome of a conflict is severe, does the offender expect more responsibility to 
be assigned to themselves than when the outcome is not severe? McLaughlin et al. (1990) 
pointed out that severe outcomes often include distinct damage to victims, such as bodily 
harm or loss of a large sum of money. With evidence of damage, those offenses are less 
deniable and offenders perceive a greater chance that they would be held responsible by 
others. Thus, it is hypothesized that offenders will expect more responsibility ass gned to 
them in a severe outcome situation than a not severe outcome situation. 
H1: Offenders expect more responsibility to be assigned to them when the 
outcome is severe than when the outcome is not severe.  
McLaughlin et al. (1990) argued that in a severe outcome situation, an offender 
holds out little hope that he or she will not be found guilty for his or her behaviors. An 
offender will then “direct all of his or her efforts toward mitigation” (McLaughlin et al., 
1990, p. 266). A less defensive account is more likely to be used by the offender to 
                                                
1 According to Robbennolt (2000), the results for each study she examined “were converted into correlation 
coefficients (r) describing the relationship between outcome severity and the responsibility-related 
judgment” (p. 2586).  A weighted average based on sample size was calculated if more than one effect 
between outcome severity and responsibility judgment was reported.     
 18
 
achieve his or her goal of mitigation when the outcome is severe than when the outcome 
is not severe. McLaughlin, O’Hair et al.’s (1983) study provided support for this 
hypothesis. McLaughlin, O’Hair et al. had participants report an incident in which their 
behavior led to a negative event. Participants provided the actual accounts they u ed in 
the situation and rated the severity of the negative event. The results sugge ted that 
offenders were likely to use concessions when the negative event was severe than when it 
was not severe.  
However, McLaughlin, O’Hair et al.’s (1983) results may only provide one side 
of the story. Schönbach (1990) argued that the self-reported incidents in McLaughlin, 
O’Hair et al.’s study were incidents that only had minor consequences, such as being late 
for a meeting. Schönbach argued that if the offense were extremely severe, such as 
causing bodily harm, the pressure on offenders for taking full responsibility becomes 
unbearable. To direct some responsibility to factors other than themselves, offenders are 
expected to use defensive accounts, such as justifications. Schönbach cited studies from 
criminal justice to support this idea. For example, Henderson and Hewstone (1984) coded 
explanations provided by inmates about their current convictions. They found offenders 
overwhelmingly pointed to external reasons, such as characteristics of victims or 
something about the environment, to explain their criminal behaviors. Justifications and 
excuses were identified as the most frequently used types of accounts in those imates’ 
explanations than concessions. In the case of a severe outcome, there is a poss bility that 
offenders will use a more defensive strategy to take some responsibility off their 
shoulders than when the outcome is not severe.  
Schönbach (1990) argued that there are two possibilities about the influence of 
 19
 
outcome severity on the defensiveness of accounts. On one hand, defensiveness of the 
chosen account may be negatively associated with outcome severity. McLaughlin, O’Hair 
et al.’s (1983) study provided support for this idea. When the outcome of a conflict is 
severe, offenders expect negative responses from victims: Victims will be angry and will 
assign more responsibility to offenders, compared to when the outcome of the conflict is 
not severe. To reduce those negative responses, offenders are more likely to use a less 
defensive account to amend the possible damages offenders’ behavior has brought to 
victims. On the other hand, the increase in outcome severity leads to a higher level of 
defensiveness, which results in a more defensive account. When the outcome is severe, 
taking full responsibility becomes a greater burden for offenders. For example, admitting 
the wrong-doing fully to one self should damage offenders’ self image and make 
offenders look immoral. Offenders will try to defend themselves against the damages to 
their face by attributing their behavior to situational rather than dispositional causes, or 
justify their behavior by linking it to a superordinate goal. Results from Henderson and 
Hewstone’s (1984) study provide support to the idea that offenders use defensive 
accounts to reduce the responsibility assigned to offenders when the outcome is severe. 
Schönbach called for more work to examine the influence of outcome severity on the 
level of defensiveness for a chosen account. Thus, a research question is proposed in the 
current research: 
RQ1: How does outcome severity influence the defensiveness of an account 
chosen by offenders?  
The direction of the effect of outcome severity on accounts is unclear and may be 
clarified by understanding the relational closeness between offenders and victims 
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(McLaughlin, O’Hair et al. 1983).  
Relational Closeness 
 Research on aggression and the relationship between friends provides indirect 
support for the influence of relational closeness on choice of accounts. Richardson an  
Green (2006) found that in a conflict, people tend to use direct aggression in response to 
anger from their romantic partners but use indirect aggression toward their friends, who 
are less close to them than their romantic partners. According to Richardson and Green, 
direct aggression “confronts the target face to face, delivering harm through direct verbal 
or physical means” (p. 2493) whereas indirect aggression refers to when people involved 
in a conflict “[deliver] harm circuitously, through another person or object” (p. 2493). 
Richardson and Green’s finding is consistent with Fitzpatrick and Winke’s (1979) 
argument that in a close relationship offenders are less concerned with the threat of 
relationship termination than when the relationship is not close. As a result, offenders are 
likely to express their opinions directly to their close friends and defend their own 
behaviors, believing that their close friends will not be offended or they can compensate 
to their close friends at a later time. Following this logic, if a reltionship is not so close, 
offenders need to be cautious when they choose an account to explain their behavior 
because a defensive account may escalate the conflict and ultimately led to the 
dissolution of the relationship. For example, when a conflict occurs between 
acquaintances, offenders realize that their relationship with victims is much less stable 
and more likely to be dissolved than if the conflict were with close friends. When a 
conflict occurs between parties that have a moderately close relationship, compared to the 
conflict that occurs between close friends, offenders will use a less defensive account, 
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hoping it will reduce the possibility for relationship termination. On the other hand, if 
there is no established relationship, such as when a conflict occurs between stranger , 
offenders will be likely to defend or justify their behaviors by using a defensiv  account 
because they do not perceive a high possibility of future interaction with the victim. 
Based on the above arguments, it is hypothesized that:     
H2: Relational closeness has a curvilinear effect on the defensiveness of accounts 
used in a conflict situation. In particular, less defensive accounts are used when a 
conflict occurs between two parties that have a moderately close relationship a d 
more defensive accounts are used when a conflict occurs between parties tht are
more distant or are closer.   
When discussing the influence of relational closeness on conflict strategies, 
neither Richard and Green (2006) nor Fitzpatrick and Winke (1979) took outcome 
severity into consideration. The findings from Richard and Green’s study may be valid 
only when the outcome of a conflict is not very severe. When the outcome of a conflict 
between close friends is not severe, offenders may feel that they can compensate their 
victims later. Thus, at the moment of the conflict, offenders could justify their behaviors 
or defend themselves. However, if the outcome is severe enough to possibly damage the 
relationship, offenders will be likely to admit responsibility and use a less d fensive 
account than when the outcome is not severe. When offenders and victims are 
acquaintances, the risk of relationship termination and the desire to preserve a good 
image causes offenders to be willing to use a less defensive account regardless of severity 
of the outcome. Furthermore, when facing a stranger, with whom one has a small chance 
of future interaction, offenders will be more likely to use a defensive account if the 
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outcome is severe than if the outcome is not severe. Thus, the current research predicts 
the following relationship:     
H3: The relational closeness and the severity of outcome interact to influence the 
defensiveness of the account used in a conflict situation.  (H3a) When a severe 
conflict occurs between close friends, offenders are more likely to use a less 
defensive account than when the conflict is not severe. (H3b) When the conflict is 
between parties that are moderately close, offenders are more likely to use a less 
defensive account than when the conflict is between parties that are more distant 
or closer, regardless of the severity of outcome.  (H3c) When a severe conflict 
occurs between strangers, offenders are more likely to use a more defensive 
account than when the conflict is not severe.   
The above hypothesis predicts that the defensiveness of the account used in a 
conflict situation depends on outcome severity and relational closeness. But the
hypothesis does not explain the process by which offenders choose certain accounts to 
explain their behaviors. Weiner’s (1986, 1992, 2006) attribution theory of motivation and 
emotions provides the framework to examine the cognitive and emotional processes that 
offenders engage in to determine the accounts used in conflict situations.   
Attribution Theory 
Research on accounts is closely related to attribution theory (Fiske & Taylor, 
1991; Harvey & Weary, 1984; Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965). Attribution theory 
has focused on the process by which people create explanations for their own or others’ 
actions (Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1986). These explanations allow 
offenders in a conflict situation to interpret their behaviors and decide an account to use 
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(Orbuch, 1997). Offenders can attribute their behaviors in terms of locus (internal vs. 
external) and controllability (controllable vs. uncontrollable). Causal inferec s influence 
what tactics people choose to handle conflict. For example, Sillar (1980) found that when 
people attributed the causes of conflict to others (e.g., their roommates), they used more 
distributive acts (e.g., explicitly expressing negative evaluations of the other party) to 
handle conflict than integrative acts (e.g., using neutral or positive statements to describe 
the other party involved in conflict). How offenders make attributions can also influence 
their choice of accounts.  
Weiner’s Attribution Theory of Motivation and Emotion 
 Weiner (1986, 2000) identified three dimensions of causality—locus, stability, 
and controllability—to explain attribution processes. Locus refers to whether a cause is 
internal or external to the person. Stability refers to whether a cause is relatively enduring 
across situations or is situation-specific. Controllability refers to whether a cause can be 
subject to volitional influence. For example, if a meeting is cancelled because of a 
hurricane, the cause of the scheduling conflict is considered external, unstable, and 
uncontrollable. Weiner’s (1986, 1992, 2006) work has focused on using locus and 
controllability to explain people’s account-giving processes.  
According to Weiner (1995), when a social contract has been broken, offenders 
often first consider the antecedent conditions about what happened and why the social 
contract was broken. Furthermore, offenders make causal inferences, such as whether the 
reasons for the violation of the social contract are related to offenders or related to 
environmental factors. Weiner argued that based on the causal inferences, offenders 
imagine the consequences if the reasons were communicated to victims. Perceptions of 
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the causes of the behavior, such as offenders’ ability, effort, and luck, lead to inferences 
about responsibility, which in turn generate emotional responses, such as anger, from 
victims.2 With the anticipated consequences in their mind, offenders will decide on the 
explanations that they want to communicate to victims or to other people.   
There could be many antecedent conditions that lead to a conflict. Here the focus 
is on two contextual factors: outcome severity and relational closeness. People tend to 
attribute their own success or positive behaviors to internal reasons and failure or 
negative behaviors to external reasons (i.e., the ego-protective bias; Kelley,1986). When 
offenders’ behavior leads to a conflict, offenders are likely to make external attributions 
about their behavior in question. The more severe the outcome of the conflict is, the more 
likely offenders will tend to explain their behaviors by pointing to factors outside of them 
or factors that are not in their control. This attribution may change depending on how 
close offenders are with the victim. Specifically, when offenders and victims are 
relationally close, offenders understand the importance of keeping the relationship with 
victims and also offenders understand that victims may know them very well to figure out 
why the behavior in question has occurred. When the outcome of the conflict between 
close friends is severe, offenders tend to attribute their behavior to internal and 
controllable reasons, as a sign to show sincerity and honesty to their friends and as a sign 
to show their desire to maintain the relationship. When a conflict occurs between 
strangers, the concern for the relationship is minimal. Offenders are likely to xperience 
ego-protective bias, especially when the outcome of conflict is severe. Thus, the 
following prediction is made: 
                                                
2 Weiner (1986, 2000) discussed two emotions: anger and sympathy. The current research will only 
examine anger because the study is placed in a conflict context, within which the arousal of negative 
emotions is more likely.  
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H4: The relational closeness and outcome severity interact to affect offnders’ 
attributions. When a severe conflict occurs between close friends, offenders will 
make more internal attribution (H4a) and more controllable attribution (H4b) than 
when the conflict is not severe. When a severe conflict occurs between strangers, 
offenders will make more external attribution (H4c) and more uncontrollable 
attribution (H4d) than when the conflict is not severe.  
Perceptions of causes, such as internal or external causes and controllable or 
uncontrollable causes, lead to judgment of responsibility, which in turn generates 
emotional responses such as anger from victims. When causes are perceived as internal or 
controllable, offenders often are judged personally responsible for their behavior because 
they could have done otherwise to prevent the negative event. On the contrary, when 
causes are perceived to be external or uncontrollable, offenders often are judged as 
having little or no personal responsibility for their behavior because there was not much 
they could have done to prevent what had happened. The judgment of responsibility is 
associated with expected anger. When offenders expect more responsibility to be 
assigned to them, they will expect victims to feel angrier about the behavior in question.  
 Weiner and his associates studied the influence of attributions on expected 
responsibility assigned to offenders and expected anger felt by victims (Weiner, 
Amirkhan, Folkes, & Verette, 1987; Weiner, Figueroa-Muñoz, & Kakihara, 1991; 
Weiner & Handel, 1985; Yirmiya & Weiner, 1986). For example, Graham, Weiner, and 
Benesh-Weiner (1995) found that when victims perceived causes of a negative event as 
controllable, victims held offenders more personally responsible for their behavior and 
more anger was elicited, as compared to when victims perceived the causes as 
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uncontrollable. When victims assign more responsibility to offenders and feel angrier 
about offenders’ behavior, they tend to evaluate offenders negatively and show little 
interest in future interaction with the offenders (Weiner et al., 1987). Weiner’s research 
suggested that attributing causes of actions to external and uncontrollable reasons
benefits offenders because victims are likely to forgive offenders’ behavior and assign 
less responsibility to them and victims also will feel less angry about the offenders’ 
behavior, compared to the situation when offenders attribute causes of actions to internal
and controllable reasons.   
Although Weiner’s (1986, 2000) attribution theory of motivation and emotions 
was mainly applied to the excuse-giving process, his framework has provided insights 
into understanding offenders’ choice of other types of accounts, such as concession, 
refusal, and justification. When offenders perceive the causes of their actions as internal 
or controllable, they expect that victims assign more responsibility to them.A less 
defensive account acknowledges offenders’ wrong-doing and their desire to take full or 
partial responsibility, which helps to make victims believe that the offenders’ b haviors 
were not intentional, and consequently, decreases the possible punishment directed 
towards offenders. Thus, a less defensive type of accounts, such as concessions, is a 
better choice than a more defensive type of accounts, such as refusals. On the other hand, 
when causes are perceived as external or uncontrollable, there is not much that offenders 
can do to prevent what has already occurred; offenders will be judged as having little or
no personal responsibility for their behaviors (Liu & Yao, 2007). Thus, offenders are 
more likely to use a more defensive account when they perceive the causesof conflict as 
external or uncontrollable than when they perceive the causes of conflict to be internal or 
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controllable.   
According to Weiner (1995), assignment of responsibility is associated with 
emotional reactions toward the behavior in question. Specifically, the assignment of 
personal responsibility is associated with anger and a tendency to attack or punish.
Inspired by Weiner’s theory, Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, and Raia (1997) investigated the 
influence of anger and compassion on negotiation performance. Their findings supported 
Weiner’s (1995) argument: Participants who attributed a higher level of responsibility to 
their partners reported feeling more angry than participants who attributed a lower level 
of responsibility to their partners. Liu and Yao’s (2007) study of cultural differences in 
the association between emotional arousal and attribution of personal responsibility had 
similar findings.  
Averill’s (1983) study on anger provided further support to the proposition 
regarding the relationship between attributions and emotional response. Averill asked 
participants to report recent events that made them angry. Nearly 80% of the reportd 
incidents that elicited anger involved controllable behaviors. On the contrary, when 
victims perceived that the causes of a conflict were not controllable, victims were more 
likely to forgive offenders’ behaviors because victims perceived that the behaviors in 
question were not intentional. In this case, responsibility was less likely to be assigned to 
offenders and less anger was aroused than when the causes were believed to be 
controllable. Based on the above arguments, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
H5:  When offenders make more internal attributions about their behavior in a 
conflict situation, offenders expect more responsibility to be assigned to them 
(H5a) and expect more anger to be felt by victims (H5b).  
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H6:  When offenders perceive the causes of a conflict as more controllable, 
offenders expect more responsibility to be assigned to them (H6a) and expect 
more anger to be felt by victims (H6b). 
H7:  When offenders make more external attributions in a conflict situation, 
offenders expect less responsibility to be assigned to them (H7a) and expect less 
anger to be felt by victims (H7b).  
H8:  When offenders perceive the causes of a conflict as more uncontrollable, 
offenders expect less responsibility to be assigned to them (H8a) and expect l ss 
anger to be felt by victims (H8b).  
H9: When offenders expect more responsibility to be assigned to them, they 
expect more anger to be felt by victims.  
H10: When more anger is expected, a less defensive account is used.  
A causal model is established to explain the attributional processes offenders use 
to determine the accounts selected in conflict situations (see Figure 2). The rationale of 
all links has been presented in the research question and the ten hypotheses discussed in 




Figure 2. Structural relations based on the hypotheses.  
Note. All exogenous variables are allowed to covary and ζs are also allowed to 
covary (errors in equations). OS (i.e., ξ1) refers to outcome severity manipulation (low 
outcome severity was coded as -1 and high outcome severity was coded 1) and RC (i.e., 
ξ2) is relational closeness manipulation (quadratic coding: low relational closenes  was 
coded as 1, moderate relational closeness was coded as -2, and high relational close ess 
was coded as 1). Inter1 (i.e., ξ3), Inter2 (i.e., ξ4), and Inter 3 (i.e., ξ5) are the interactions 
between outcome severity and relational closeness. In the model testing, ξ3 was 
calculated by multiplying the outcome severity manipulation (coded as 1, -1) and 























1, moderate relational closeness was coded as 0, and high relational closeness was coded 
as 1). ξ4 refers to the coding of the high severity and close relationship condition (coded 
as 1) versus all other five conditions (coded as 0). ξ5 refers to the coding of the interaction 
between outcome severity and relational closeness: The high severity and low relational 
closeness condition is coded as 1 and other five conditions are coded as 0. POS (i.e., η1) 
is perceived outcome severity, with six indicators. PRC (i.e., η2) refers to perceived 
quadratic relation closeness, the manipulation check for the quadratic coding of relati nal 
closeness. η2 was created by squaring the first component score of the six items that 
measured relational closeness. η2 only has one indicator in the model. IA (i.e., η3) is the 
degree of internal attribution, measured by four of seven items (three items were deleted 
based on confirmatory factor analysis and principal components analysis results; see 
details in the result section for the formal study). CON (i.e., η 4) is controllability, with 
five indicators. EA (i.e., η5) is the degree of external attribution, measured by seven 
items. Uncon (i.e., η6) is uncontrollability, with five indicators. Eresp (i.e., η7) refers to 
expected responsibility assigned to the offender, measured by six items. Eanger(i.e., η8) 
is expected anger, measured by six items. And LDA (i.e., η9) refers to the measure of the 
likelihood of selecting a defensive account. η 9 only has one indicator and the detail for 






This chapter describes the proposed stimulus message and instruments, the pilot 
studies that tested these proposed materials, and the methods of the formal study. Scales 
used in the current research were created by the researcher, and pilot studies were 
conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of the inductions and the measurements to b  
used in the final study. The formal study tested the causal model (see Figur 2) and the 
hypotheses. The pilot studies and the formal study were approved by the University of 
Maryland Institutional Review Board on May 28, 2007 (for the first two pilot studies) 
and on February 12, 2008 (Pilot Study 3 to Pilot Study 6 and the formal study). Data for 
Pilot Study 5 were collected at Villanova University and all other studies were conducted 
at University of Maryland. Approvals for conducting Pilot Study 5 at Villanova 
University were obtained from the University of Maryland and the Villanova University 
Institutional Review Boards on April 10 and April 15, 2008, respectively. Data were 
collected during the summer of 2007 and between March and June, 2008.   
Overall Design, Stimulus Message, and Instruments 
Overall Design 
 An experiment was conducted to test the causal model, research question, and the 
hypotheses. Outcome severity and relational closeness were manipulated in  
hypothetical scenario that described an interpersonal conflict in a group project at school. 
Two levels of outcome severity and three levels of relational closeness (high vs. moderate 
vs. low) were created in the hypothetical scenario. Six experimental conditions were 
developed. Attributions (the degree of internal attribution, the degree of external 
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attribution, controllability, and uncontrollability), anticipated consequences (expected 
responsibility assigned to offenders and expected anger from victims), the defensiveness 
level of each type of accounts (concession, justification, excuse, and refusal), and the
likelihood of selecting each account were measured.3 Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of six conditions. They read a hypothetical conflict scenario, were told to 
imagine they were the offender in the scenario, and answered questions afterwards f om 
the offender’s perspective.  
Hypothetical Interpersonal Conflict Scenario 
 Two criteria need to be fulfilled to create a hypothetical conflict scenario. First, 
the conflict incident used in the scenario should be familiar to participants so that 
participants can easily relate to the situation and answer questions without diffic lty. 
Second, the current research focuses on the accounts offenders use to explain their 
behaviors. However, not every incident invites an explanation. Participants may use 
avoidance to handle conflicts, but avoidance is not the focus of the current research. To 
ensure an account is offered, the need to explain a wrong-doing should be clearly 
demonstrated in the scenario.  
 Pilots Studies 1 and 2 were used to create a hypothetical scenario that meet the 
above two criteria. Details are provided in the section on pilot studies. Based on the 
results of Pilot Studies 1 and 2, a scenario about a conflict between group members for a 
class project was chosen to be developed as the stimulus message in the proposed study. 
Group work is a familiar practice for college students. Because college students were the 
                                                
3 Pilot Study 5 measured the defensiveness level of ach account and the formal study measured the 
likelihood of selecting each account. Results from Pilot Study 5 and the formal study were combined to 
create the composite measure of choosing accounts as the dependent measure in model testing. Details can 
be found in the discussion of Pilot Study 5.  
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major source of participants in the studies, using a hypothetical scenario that involves a 
conflict between group members is easily understood by participants.   
To ensure that an account would be necessary, the hypothetical conflict scenario 
clearly specified an offense conducted by the offender. In particular, the hypothetical 
scenario described a group project between two classmates: writing a review paper 
together. One wrote his or her portion of the review paper based on the wrong readings, 
which reduced the grade for both group members. Participants were told to take the rol
of the offender and that an explanation is necessary when the scenario stated that he 
offender’s behavior brought negative consequences to the victim. The details of the 
hypothetical conflict scenario can be found in the section on Pilot Studies 1 and 2.    
Role Playing in a Hypothetical Conflict Scenario  
A hypothetical conflict scenario was used for several reasons. First, Martin (2006) 
argued that a hypothetical scenario allows the researcher to systematically manipulate 
variables of interest, minimizing the influence of possible extraneous variables on 
dependent variables. Using a hypothetical conflict scenario, different levels of outcome 
severity and relational closeness may be manipulated and their influence on offnders’ 
choice of accounts can be examined. Second, a hypothetical scenario can present 
respondents with situations that they may actually encounter, allowing researchers to "tap 
into the expectations and reactions which they (respondents) would have in similar social 
circumstances" (Gerber, 1994, p. 4).  Third, as argued by Converse and Presser (1986), a 
hypothetical scenario can keep respondents’ focus on the variables intended by 
researchers. Given the above reasons, a hypothetical scenario was used in the current 
research and participants were asked to take the role of the offender in the scenario and 
 34
 
answer questions from the offender’s perspective.   
Naming the Hypothetical Other Party 
Participants were told to imagine that they were the offender in the group pject 
described in the hypothetical scenario; the scenario used “you” to refer to the participants. 
The teammate (i.e., the victim) in the scenario needs a name to ensure the flow of the 
story. Although participants may find it easier to relate to scenarios that use actual names 
(Wang, 2006), actual names often are associated with specific gender and raci l 
information, which may influence how participants process the stimulus message. For 
example, a labor market study by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) found that a very 
White-sounding name on a resume received significantly more callbacks for interviews 
than a very African-American-sounding name. Moreover, El-Sheikh, Buckhalt, and 
Reiter (2000) discovered that different degrees of emotional arousal are associated with 
gender in hypothetical scenarios. Men perceived more emotional arousal with a male
hypothetical character than women perceived with a female counterpart in a hypothetical 
situation (cited in Wang, 2006). To ensure that participants will not be influenced by the
gender and racial information attached with actual names, the current research d cided to 
use “Person B” instead of an actual name for the victim in the scenario.   
Instruments 
Perceived outcome severity. The hypothetical scenario varied two levels of 
outcome severity (high severity vs. low severity). A list of measures was develop d to 
assess whether the manipulation of outcome severity was successful (see Appendix A). 
An example item for outcome severity is, “how severely does your mistake affect Person 
B?” Magnitude scales were used in the study where 0 indicates not severe at all and 100 
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indicates a moderate level of severity. The items were tested and revised based on Pilot 
Study 3.  
Perceived relational closeness. Three levels of relational closeness were 
manipulated in the hypothetical scenario. A list of measures was developed to examin  
whether the manipulation of relational closeness was successful (see Appendix A). An 
example question is, “how familiar are you with Person B?” Magnitude scales wer  us d 
in the study where 0 indicates not familiar at all and 100 indicates a moderate level of
familiarity. The items were tested and revised based on Pilot Study 3.  
Attributions. Although studies (e.g., Ross, 1982) have examined attributions in 
terms of causal (i.e., the degree of internal attribution is at one end of the continuum a d 
the degree of external attribution is at the other end) and controllability (i.e., 
controllability and uncontrollability are at the two ends of the continuum) dimensions, 
whether internal attribution is opposite to external attribution and controllability is 
opposite to uncontrollability remains questionable (Harvey & Weary, 1984). The current 
research does not want to assume the relationships among the four types of attribution. 
Thus, these four types of attributions were measured separately: the degre of int rnal 
attribution, the degree of external attribution, controllability, and uncontrollability. 
Different attributions regarding the offender’s behavior were listed and partici nts 
indicated their belief about how likely each reason influenced his or her behavior (see 
Appendix B).   
Again, magnitude scales were used. Example questions include “how likely is that 
what has happened was due to your own carelessness?” for the degree of internal 
attribution; “how likely is that what has happened was due to the professor not giving 
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clear instructions for the assignment?” for the degree of external attribution; “how likely 
is that you could have prevented this mistake?” for controllability; and “how likely is that 
what has happened was out of your control?” for uncontrollability. In all magnitude 
scales, 0 = not likely at all, and 100 indicates a moderate level of likelihood.  
Anticipated consequences. Anticipated consequences referred to two variables: 
expected responsibility assigned to the offender and expected anger felt by victims. For 
expected responsibility, participants were asked to indicate their expectation about how 
much responsibility would be assigned to them. A magnitude scale was used with 0 
meaning not expected to be responsible at all and 100 indicating a moderate level of 
expected responsibility. A sample item is, “how much responsibility would Person B 
assign to you for what has happened?”   
For expected anger, participants indicated the level of expected anger felt by 
victims by a magnitude scale, where 0 means not angry at all and 100 indicates a 
moderate level of expected anger. An example item is, “how annoyed do you expect 
Person B to be?” The complete list of items that measure both expected responsibility and 
expected anger is included in Appendix C.  
Expected choice of accounts. Unlike traditional accounts research in which coders 
code actual accounts that participants provide to explain their behaviors into different 
types of accounts, a list of twenty accounts (5 concessions, 5 justifications, 5 excuses, and 
5 refusals) was developed in Pilot Studies 3 and 4. In the formal study participants were 
asked to indicate the likelihood that they would choose each account in the hypothetical 
conflict situation by using a magnitude scale (see Appendix D for the complete list of 
measures on choice of accounts). On that scale, zero means not likely at all and 100 
 37
 
indicates a moderate level of likelihood. The hypotheses proposed in the current research 
predicted that the influence of outcome severity and relational closeness was not only on 
the likelihood of selecting accounts but also on the defensiveness level of accounts. Fr 
example, Hypothesis 3a states that, “when a severe conflict occurs between clos  friends, 
offenders are more likely to use a less defensive account than when the conflict is ot 
severe.” Only using the likelihood of selecting accounts is not enough to test the 
hypotheses. To create a measure that incorporates both the likelihood and the 
defensiveness level of each account, Pilot Study 5 was conducted to determine the 
defensiveness of each type of accounts and the results of Pilot Study 5 were used with the 
results in the formal study to create the composite measure needed for hypothesis testing 
(i.e., LDA: the likelihood of selecting a defensive account). The details of creating the 
composite measure were presented in the discussion of Pilot Study 5 and the formal 
study.   
Summary.  
This section has introduced the overall experimental design and the 
operationalizations of the relevant constructs proposed in the study: the hypothetical 
scenario, the name choices in the hypothetical scenario, and the instruments—for 
manipulation checks, the attributional processes, anticipated consequences, and the 
choice of accounts. The realism of the experimental inductions and the effectiveness of 
the instruments proposed for the current research were tested in six pilot studies, which 
are described below.    
Pilot Studies 
Six pilot studies were conducted in the summer term (June to July, 2007) and 
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between March and June, 2008. The majority of participants in each pilot study were 
undergraduate students enrolled at the University of Maryland (except that Pilot Study 5 
was conducted at Villanova University). Participants received a small amount of extra 
credit from their course instructors in exchange for their participation. Students who 
participated in the summer term were informed not to participate in any other portions of 
this research that would take place later. Because all the participants had to sign up for 
the studies through an online participation pool program, students’ online identification 
numbers were used to ensure that they could only participate in one of the studies. All 
participants were debriefed in detail after they completed their partici tion.  
Pilot Study 1: Collecting Conflict Scenarios 
Purpose. The purpose of this pilot study was to collect self-reported conflict 
incidents to provide information for developing a hypothetical scenario that could be used 
in the formal study.   
Participants. Self-reported conflict scenarios were collected in the United States 
and China.4 Forty-nine participants were recruited from undergraduate communication 
courses at the University of Maryland. The age range for American respondents was 18 
                                                
4 National cultures (i.e., China vs. the U. S.) were considered as one independent variable in the prospectus 
for the current research. Data were collected in both the United States and China in Pilot Studies 1, 2, and 
3. Before the researcher could continue collecting data for the rest of the pilot studies and the formal study, 
two issues arose that interrupted the data collection process. First, it became apparent that the incentives 
were different for participants in each culture. Although obtaining extra credit in exchange of the 
participation is a common practice at the American university where the study was conducted, Chinese 
instructors would not give permission for their students to receive extra credit. Chinese students 
participated in the study voluntarily. Differences in incentives may be a factor that contributes to the 
differences in the results, making the conclusions problematic. Second, massive protests against media bias 
occurred in China after collecting data for Pilot Study 3, with college students being the major protesters. 
Given that this study measures perceptions in a hypot etical conflict situation, there is a concern that 
Chinese perceptions about conflict might be influenced by these protests. Consequently, the validity of he 
results may be questionable. Therefore, the research r decided not to include national culture as a variable 
in the formal study. Results for Pilot Studies 1 and 2 still included Chinese data to create a hypothetical 
conflict scenario that could be used in data collection in China in the future. Pilot Study 3 only analyzed 
data collected in the United States because the formal study would only recruited American participants; 
results based on Chinese data were not relevant.         
 39
 
to 39 (M = 21.73, SD = 3.38, Mdn = 21.00). Seventy-six percent of participants were 
female (n = 37). Forty-four Chinese participants were recruited from undergraduate and 
graduate courses in two Chinese northern cities (i.e., Beijing, the capital of China and 
Changchun, the capital of Ji Lin Province). The age range for Chinese participants was 19 
to 44 (M = 24.10, SD = 5.08, Mdn = 23.00). Fifty-seven percent of Chinese participants 
were female (n = 25). Self-reported conflicts were collected in both China and the United 
States to develop a hypothetical conflict scenario that could be used in different cultures 
for the future studies.  
Procedure. This pilot study was conducted as an online survey. American 
participants completed the survey through an online participation pool program and 
Chinese participants completed the survey through an online survey Web site. 
Information about the purpose of the study was provided, followed by a consent form. 
Participants were asked to read the consent form and provide their electronic signature if 
they agreed to participate in the study. Only after they agreed, participan s were allowed 
to continue with the questionnaire.  
The questionnaire had two sections. The first section asked participants to recall a
situation in which a conflict occurred recently between them and another person. 
Specifically, participants were asked to recall a conflict that happened du  to their 
behavior. Participants described the conflict in detail; for example, partici nts were 
asked to provide information about the relationship between them and the other person 
involved in the conflict, the cause of the conflict from participants’ perspective and from 
the other person’s perspective, the consequences of the conflict, the emotions par cipants 
experienced and they expected the other party to have experienced at the timeof the 
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conflict, etc.. In the second section, participants were instructed to recall in detail their 
explanation about the behavior that led to the conflict they described. All the questions 
were open-ended, allowing participants to provide details of a recent conflict they 
experienced. See Appendix E for the complete questionnaire.  
Results. A total of 93 different conflict scenarios were generated. A sorting task 
(Pilot Study 2) was conducted to sort the reported incidents based on the outcome 
severity and the relational closeness between the two parties involved in the conflict.    
Pilot Study 2: Developing a Hypothetical Conflict Scenario 
Purpose. The purpose of Pilot Study 2 was to develop a hypothetical conflict 
scenario based on the qualitative responses collected in Pilot Study 1.  
Participants. Seven Americans and six Chinese were recruited to participate in 
the second pilot study: sorting ninety-three conflict scenarios that were collected in Pilot 
Study 1. The ninety-three conflict scenarios included some incidents collected in China. 
Therefore, Chinese participants were recruited to ensure the sorting would be not iased 
by having only American participants. The age range for American sorter  was 17 to 21 
(M = 19.14, SD = 1.35, Mdn = 19.00), whereas Chinese sorters’ age range was 26 to 33 
(M = 29.33, SD = 2.50, Mdn = 29.00). Six of the American sorters were female and five 
of the Chinese sorters were female. American sorters were undergraduate students 
enrolled in communication courses at the University of Maryland. Due to the difficulty of 
locating Chinese natives in undergraduate courses, Chinese graduate students at th  same 
university were asked to participate in the sorting task.    
Procedure. Sorters arrived at a pre-arranged classroom alone. The researcher 
explained the purpose of the study and obtained the consent from participants that agreed 
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to be part of the study. Each sorter was provided with ninety-three numbered index car s. 
On each index card, there was one conflict scenario collected in Pilot Study 1. Sorters 
were instructed to first read over all ninety-three conflicts carefully and ask questions if 
they had difficulty understanding any scenario. After the researcher made sure that 
sorters fully understood the 93 scenarios, they were asked to sort the scenarios based on 
its outcome severity and relational closeness. Outcome severity was defined in the 
instructions as how serious the consequence of the conflict might be and relational 
closeness was the extent to which the people involved in the conflict were close to each
other. Based on the hypotheses, a sorting table with two levels of outcome severity (high 
vs. low) and three levels of relationship closeness (high vs. moderate vs. low) was 
presented to the sorters. Sorters were instructed to put the number of the card in the most 
appropriate cell in the sorting table. They were told that each conflict could be put in one 
and only one cell in the table. See Appendix F for the complete instructions and the 
sorting table used in the Pilot Study 2.  
Results. Looking at frequency of participants’ sorting of ninety-three scenarios 
indicated that five incidents were evenly sorted into six cells (see Appendix G for these 
five incidents reported by participants in Pilot Study 1), which allowed the resea cher to 
revise the incidents easily based on the independent variables. Among all five incidents, 
one scenario about a conflict in school projects was chosen for the hypothetical conflict 
scenario to be used in the formal study because participants in the formal study were to
be mainly undergraduate students. Working on a group project for a class is a famliar
practice to the participants.  
The selected incident was revised to reflect the variations of two independent 
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variables (outcome severity and relational closeness). Six versions of the hypothetical 
conflict scenario were generated, with two levels of outcome severity and three levels of 
relational closeness. All six versions had 12 sentences, with an average of 17 w rds per 
sentence and a Fresch reading ease rating of 74.5 (Microsoft Office, 2003).  
All scenarios started by defining relational closeness between an offender and a 
victim, followed by the description of a conflict between the offender and the victim and 
the consequence of the conflict. For example, in the high relational closeness co ditions, 
the relationship between the offender and the victim reads: “You and Person B grew up 
together and attended the same university. The two of you have been best friends for 
many years.” The moderate relational closeness condition says “You and Person B were 
in couple of classes together before. Although the two of you know each other, you only 
see each other in class.” When the relational closeness between the offender and the 
victim is low, the scenario reads “You and Person B do not really know each other. You 
happened to sit next to each other on the first day of class.” Similarly, the two l vels of 
outcome severity were manipulated in the scenarios. The details of the manipulations are 
discussed in the method section of the formal study; see Appendix H for all six versions 
of the hypothetical conflict scenario.  
Pilot Study 3: Manipulation Checks 
Purpose. The purpose of this pilot study was to test whether the manipulations of 
the two independent variables were effective. Although the hypothetical conflict scenario 
was created in a way to be suitable in both China and the United States, only data 
collected from Americans participants were analyzed because the formal study would not 
be conducted outside of the United States.  
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Participants. Participants (N = 80) were recruited from undergraduate 
communication courses at the University of Maryland. The age range was 18 to 25 (M = 
20.38, SD = 1.58, Mdn = 20.00). Eighty-one percent of participants were female (n = 65). 
Sixty-five percent of participants identified themselves as Caucasian.   
Study design and procedure. A 3 (relational closeness: high vs. moderate vs. low) 
X 2 (the severity of an outcome: high severity vs. low severity) independent groups 
experiment was conducted. Participants were recruited through a departmentl 
participation pool program, which connected participants to an external online survey
Web site to participate in the study.  
Participants were randomly assigned to read one of six hypothetical conflict 
scenarios and they were asked to imagine they were the offender in the scenario. After 
reading the stimulus message, each participant was first asked to provide an explanation 
about the behavior described in the scenario (i.e., wrote their portion of paper based on 
the wrong readings) from the perspective of the offender. After that, two questions that 
were not relevant to the hypothetical scenario were provided to participants for them to 
practice using magnitude scales before they answered the questions. Those two qu stions 
were: “How much do you like the food offered at the dining hall of your school?” and 
“How much do you like the service at the main library of your school?” Participants were 
told to continue with the questionnaire only when they felt ready to use the scale. The 
questionnaire had measures for perceived outcome severity and perceived relational 
closeness (see Appendix I for the instructions and measures used in Pilot Study 3). After 
participants completed the questionnaire, they were debriefed. The same two practice 
questions were used in Pilot Studies 5 and 6 and the formal study.  
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Data coding and data transformation. Outcome severity has two levels (high and 
low) and relational closeness has three levels (high, moderate, and low). When coding the 
data, high severity is coded as 1 and low severity is coded as 0. Three levels of 
relationship closeness (high, moderate, and low) were coded as 1, 0, and -1, respectively.  
Participants used any nonnegative number to indicate their views about the 
hypothetical conflict. Data collected in Pilot Study 3 were submitted to a descriptive 
analysis; the skewness and kurtosis were examined to see whether a transformation was 
necessary. The ratio of the skewness over the standard error for each item was calculated 
and if the ratio was greater than 1.96, the data were significantly positively skewed and if 
the ratio was smaller than -1.96, the data were significantly negatively skewed (Frey, 
Botan, & Kreps, 2000). Using the (-1.96, 1.96) cutoff rule, all eight indicators (four for 
perceived relational closeness and four for perceived outcome severity) resulted into 
positively skewed data. A data transformation was needed.  
A power transformation is considered one strategy to transform positively skewed 
data resulting from magnitude scales (Bauer & Fink, 1983). A transformati n can also 
helps with the assumption of homescedasticity that was used for testing the manipulation 
checks. When the variance of the residuals is not uniform across all levels of the 
independent variables, the homoscedasticity assumption is violated. Kline (2005) argued 
that a transformation “may remedy heteroscedasticity due to nonnormality” (p. 5). Before 
transformation, the data set was first trimmed at the 90th percentile to eliminate the 
extreme values (e.g., the 90th percentile for one item to measure outcome severity was 
500; thus, any score larger than 500 was converted to 500). The data after trimming were 
submitted to a power transformation using the following formula: 
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New indicator = (original indicator) λ,
different values of λ were tried in the power transformation and when λ = 0.40, the 
skewness of each indicator was not significant (p > .05). Therefore, 0.40 was used as the 
value of λ in this pilot study. For the power transformations conducted in the following 
pilot studies and the formal study, the same process was used: Different values of λ were 
tried and the one that ensured the non-significant skewness of all or the majority of 
indicators was selected.  
Instruments. A 4-item magnitude scale was used to assess the effectiveness of 
outcome severity manipulation (see Appendix I). An example item is “How much 
influence does your mistake have on Person B’s scholarship for the next year?” 
Magnitude scales were used in this pilot study where 0 indicated not severe at all and 100 
indicated a moderate level of outcome severity. Confirmative factor analyses (CFAs) 
were conducted using LISREL 8.70 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2004). The results indicated 
that the scale for perceived outcome severity was not unidimensional, χ²(2, N = 80) = 
7.01, p < .05; NFI = 0.97; CFI = 0.98; SRMR = 0.03. However, when a principal 
components analysis with no rotation was conducted on the four items for perceived 
outcome severity, only one eigenvalue was larger than 1 (eigenvalue = 3.10), which 
explained 76% of the variance in the items. The first component score was saved as th  
manipulation check. The Cronbach’s alpha for the sum of all four items testing perceived 
outcome severity was .71. 
Another 4-item magnitude scale measured the perceived relational closeness. 
Participants were asked questions such as “How familiar are you with Person B?” 
Magnitude scales were used in this pilot study where 0 indicated not close at all and 100 
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indicated a moderate level of perceived relational closeness. Confirmative factor analyses 
(CFAs) were conducted using LISREL 8.70 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2004). The results 
supported a one-factor structure for the perceived relational closeness, χ²(2, N = 90) = 
1.73, p > .05; NFI = 1.00; CFI = 1.00; SRMR = 0.00. A principal components analysis 
without rotation was conducted to obtain the first component score for perceived 
relational closeness, which was used as the manipulation check for relational closeness. 
The Cronbach’s alpha for the sum of all four items testing perceived relationa cl seness 
was .96.5  
Results. Two-way ANOVAs were performed to assess whether the manipulations 
of outcome severity and relational closeness were successful. In the first ANOVA, the 
dependent variable was perceived outcome severity and the independent variables were 
the manipulations of outcome severity and relational closeness. Results indicated that (a) 
the manipulation of outcome severity influenced perceived outcome severity 
significantly, F(1, 74) = 12.09, p < .01, η² = .14, (b) relational closeness did not have a 
significant influence on perceived outcome severity, F(2, 74) = 0.60, p = .55, η² = .02, 
and (c) no significant interaction between the manipulations of outcome severity and 
relational closeness was found, F(2, 74) = 0.11, p = .90, η² = .00. Participants in the high 
outcome-severity condition (M = .38, SD = 1.12) regarded the outcome to be more severe 
than those in the low outcome-severity condition (M = -.36, SD = .71). The manipulation 
                                                
5 In Pilot Study 3, both the scales for perceived outc me severity and perceived relational closeness had 
four items. The reliability for the scale of the perc ived outcome severity was acceptable but not very 
satisfactory. Additionally, CFA results did not yield a unidimensional factor structure for perceived 
outcome severity. Because only four items were used, dropping items from the scale was not appropriate (  
saturated measurement model would result if any item were dropped from the perceived outcome severity 
scale). To enhance the reliability of the scales for the formal study, additional items need to be added 
(Wrench, Thomas-Maddox, Richmond, & McCroskey, 2008), which also allows the researcher to drop one 
or more items if the factor structure were not unidimensional. Two items were added to the scale for 
perceived outcome severity, which were phrased similar to the other items. Two additional items were 
added to the scale for perceived relational closenes as well.  
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of outcome severity was successful. 
The second ANOVA had perceived relational closeness as the dependent variable 
and the manipulations of outcome severity and relational closeness as the independent 
variables. The results suggested that (a) relational closeness was manipulated effectively, 
F(2, 74) = 72.58, p < .01, η² = .60, (b) the manipulation of outcome severity did not have 
a significant effect on perceived relationship, F(1, 74) = 0.47, p = .50, η² = .01, and (c) no 
significant interaction was found between the manipulations of outcome severity and 
relational closeness, F(2, 74) = 0.33, p = .72, η² = .01. Participants in the high relational 
closeness condition (M = 1.19, SD = .86) reported being closest to Person B than those in 
the moderate closeness condition (M = -.43, SD = .47) and in the low relational closeness 
condition (M = -.64, SD = .34). A linear relationship between the three levels of relational 
closeness was established, F(1, 79) = 104.13, p < .01, η² = .56.  
Limitation and revision. The effect size for perceived outcome severity was only 
.14. According to Cohen (1988), the threshold for a small effect size is .20. Therefore, the 
hypothetical scenario needed to be revised to get a larger effect size for th outcome 
severity manipulation.  
To revise the scenario, five undergraduate students were interviewed on campus 
(4 were female). Two versions of the hypothetical scenarios (high vs. low outcome 
severity with relational closeness controlled) were read by these five interviewees. The 
researcher then interviewed the participants with questions such as whether the sto y was 
realistic, what the researcher intended to vary in two scenarios, and how to enlarge the 
difference between low and high level of outcome severity. Based on interviewees’ 
suggestions, appropriate revisions were made to the hypothetical conflict scenario and a 
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second test was conducted to specifically assess the manipulation of outcome severity. 
Two versions of the hypothetical conflict scenarios were used in the second test with 
relational closeness controlled at the high closeness level.  
In the second test, sixteen participants were recruited from an introductory 
communication course at the University of Maryland. Their age range was 18 to 19 (M = 
18.35, SD = 0.49, Mdn = 18.00). Seventy-one percent of participants were male (n = 12), 
and fifty-nine percent of participants identified themselves as Caucasian. Participants 
were randomly assigned to read one of two versions of the hypothetical conflict scenario 
(high vs. low outcome severity). Participants were not asked to provide explanations but 
simply completed the manipulation checks, imagining they were the offender in the 
scenario; the same four-item scale in the first test of Pilot Study 3 wasused.  
The data were positively skewed and a power transformation with λ = 0.50 was 
conducted to meet the assumption of normality for the analyses of the variance. A CFA 
was conducted using LISREL 8.70 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2004). The Chi-square value 
suggested a unidimensional factor structure although the fit indices were not satisfactory, 
χ²(2, N = 16) = 3.74, p > .05; NFI = 0.90; CFI = 0.93; SRMR = 0.05. The Cronbach’s 
alpha for the sum of all four items testing perceived outcome severity was .83. A
principal components analysis without rotation was conducted and the first principal 
component score was saved for the analysis of the variance. In the ANOVA, the 
dependent variable was perceived outcome severity and the independent variable was the 
manipulation of outcome severity. Results indicated a significant main effecto  ou come 
severity manipulation, F(1, 14) = 6.66, p < .05, η² = .32. Participants in the high 
outcome-severity condition (M = -.12, SD = .20) perceived the consequence of the 
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conflict to be more severe than participants in the low outcome-severity condition (M =   
-.36, SD = .17). Based on these results, the induction of outcome severity was successful. 
The revised scenarios were used in the later studies.    
Pilot Study 4: Creating the Measure of Accounts 
Purpose. Pilot Study 4 was conducted to develop a measure for accounts.  
Coders and procedure. In Pilot Study 3, participants were asked to imagine they 
were the offender and to provide an explanation about the behavior described in the 
hypothetical scenario presented to them. Eighty explanations were collected from 
participants. Two trained coders coded the eighty explanations into four types of accounts 
examined in the current research (i.e., concession, justification, excuse, and rfusal), and 
coders were also asked to select the five most frequently used explanations for each type 
of accounts. Coders used a coding scheme adapted from Fritsche's (2002) review of 
accounts (see Table 2). 
Results. Two undergraduate student coders (both females) were trained on the list 
of the twenty actual explanations collected in Pilot Study 3 until they obtained acc pt ble 
inter-coder reliability. They were instructed to code each explanation in terms of four 
types of accounts (i.e., concession, justification, excuse, and refusal). The overall initial 
agreement among two coders was 76% and intercoder reliability was calculated sing 
Cohen’s (1960) kappa. The kappa equaled .68. Differences in coding were then discussed 
and resolved by the two coders. The coders also listed the five most frequently us d 
explanations in each type of accounts, which created a list of twenty statements—five 
statements for each account type. Those statements were developed into a measure of 
accounts used in Pilot Studies 5 and 6 and in the formal study (Appendix D presents the 
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measure of accounts).   
Pilot Study 5: Testing the Defensiveness of Each Account 
Purpose. Schönbach (1990) argued that each type of accounts is associated with a 
certain defensiveness level. He arbitrarily placed the four types of accunts on a 
continuum of defensiveness (see Figure 1 in the section of literature review). However, 
little empirical research examined the location of each type of accounts on the  
defensiveness continuum. Pilot Study 5 served two purposes. First, the results would 
provide empirical evidence to support or disconfirm Schönbach’s (1990) ranking of the  
four types of accounts on the defensiveness continuum. Second, in the formal study,  
participants indicated their likelihood of using each type of accounts in a conflict  
situation. However, in the hypotheses, the likelihood of using a less or more defensive  
account was predicted. To be consistent with the hypotheses, a composite score  (LDA: 
the likelihood of selecting a defensive account) was developed by using the results on 
defensiveness of each type of accounts from Pilot Study 5 and the results on likelihood of 
selecting each type of accounts from the formal study. LDA, was used for the hypothesis 
testing.  The formula to calculate LDA is as follows:  
 LDA = Σ (Di • Li) / Σ Li   
where Di refers to the defensiveness level of each type of accounts and Li refers to the 
likelihood of selecting each type of accounts, where i = 4 to represent the four types of 
accounts (i.e., concession, justification, excuse, and refusal).    
Participants. Twenty-two participants were recruited from undergraduate 
communication students at Villanova University. Their age range was 20 to 21 (M = 




Coding Scheme for Four Types of Accounts, Adapted from Fritsche’s (2002) Review (pp. 
389-394) 
Types of accounts  Descriptions 
Refusal   An offender responds to a reproach that the behavior has 
been norm contradictive by questioning the legitimacy of 
the reproach. This is made possible by explicit refusal to 
deal with the reproach, by rejecting the validity of the 
salient social norm, by denying the behavior or relevance of 
the salience norm, or by attacking the reproaching instance.  
Excuse    An offender responds to a reproach that the behavior has 
been norm contradictive by denying the connection 
between self and the critical behavior. The offender points 
to a restricted freedom of decision, which can emerge from 
a lack of control, an absence of planning or missing an 
opportunity to plan the behavior, as well as from external 
constraints and incentives that are not under the offender’s 
control. 
Justification   An offender responds to a reproach that the behavior has 
been norm contradictive by denying that there is a 
connection between the behavior and the salient norm. The 
offender disputes that he or she has violated a salient norm. 
Concession   An offender neither denies the connection to the deed, nor 
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its norm-contradictive character, nor bypassing it. Instead 
the guilt is admitted and the behavior is regretted.  
 
and eighty-two percent of participants identified themselves as Caucasian (n = 18).  
Procedure. Participants completed the study through an online survey Web site. 
The link to the study was distributed to participants by an e-mail. Each partici nt was 
asked to provide an electronic signature, indicating their agreement to paricipate in the 
study, before completing the questionnaire. The questionnaire had two parts. The first 
part introduced a conflict scenario to participants. The purpose of this pilot study was to
examine the defensiveness level of each type of accounts, not to test the influence of 
outcome severity and relational closeness on how people account for their behaviors in 
conflict situations. Therefore, outcome severity and relational closeness were not varied 
in the hypothetical conflict scenario presented in this pilot study.  
The second part of the questionnaire had four types of accounts generated in Pilot 
Study 4. Each type (i.e., concession, justification, excuse, and refusal) had five ccounts. 
Twenty accounts were listed in total. For example, one of the refusals was, “I know the 
readings I read were the right material for the paper. I did not find anything wrong to 
what I contributed to the paper.” Participants indicated the defensiveness level of ach 
account by using a six-item magnitude scale, which generated a total of one hundrd a  
twenty questions (6 X 20) in the questionnaire. The six items for each account were the 
same. An example question reads, “To what extent were you being self-protective?” 
(Appendix J lists the scale measuring the defensiveness level of the accounts). To 
familiarize participants with using magnitude scales, the two practice questions in Pilot 
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Study 3 were used.  
Data transformation. Participants used nonnegative numbers to indicate their 
views about the defensiveness level of each account provided by the researcher. The data 
were submitted to the descriptive analysis for the skewness and kurtosis to see whether a 
transformation was needed. A (-1.96, 1.96) cutoff rule was used to determine whether t  
data were approximately normal (Kline, 2005). Based on the cutoff rule, fourteen of the 
one hundred and twenty items were approximately normal and the others were positively 
skewed. A data transformation was necessary to meet the assumption of normality for the 
later analyses. The data set was trimmed at the 90th percentile to eliminate the extreme 
values (e.g., the 90th percentile for one item to measure defensiveness was 400; thus, any 
score larger than 400 was converted to 400). A power transformation was used on the 
data set, with 0.40 selected as the value of λ that ensured the skewness of the majority of 
items after transformation was not significant (p > .05).  
Instruments. A list of twenty accounts was provided to participants. For each 
account, a 6-item magnitude scale was used to measure the defensiveness level of that 
account. For example, after reading one concession (e.g., “I am sorry that I 
misunderstood the instructions. Is there any way that I can make it up to you?”), 
participants were asked: “To what extent were you being self-protective?”, “To what 
extent were you guarded?”, “To what extent were you sticking out for yourself?”, “To 
what extent were you being assertive?”, “To what extent were you shifting 
responsibility?”, and “To what extent were you being defensive?” Correlations between 
the six items for each account were calculated (see Table 3). Four of the six items 
correlated with each other significantly across all twenty accounts (i.e., being self-
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protective, being guarded, sticking out for one self, and being defensive). Therefore, the 
other two items (i.e., being assertive and shifting responsibility) were dropped from the 
scales. Twenty reliabilities were calculated with the remaining four items of the 
defensiveness scales. The Cronbach’s alphas for the sum of the four items measuring the 
defensiveness of all twenty accounts were acceptable, ranging from .68 to .92 (see the 
complete list of reliability coefficients in Table 4). The averages of the four-item scales 
after transformation were calculated for the following analysis.  
Results. An ANOVA with a repeated measure was conducted with four factors 




Intercorrelations between Items for Defensiveness of Each Account 
Items    1       2  3       4  5    6 
      Concession 1 (n = 22) 
1. Self-protective  1       .84** .40       .35  .19    .36 
2. Guarded          1  .54**       .52** .37          .55** 
3. Sticking out for one self    1       .62** .56**    .59** 
4. Assertive             1  .35    .42 
5. Shifting responsibility              1    .59** 
6. Defensive             1 
Concession 2 (n = 22) 
1. Self-protective  1       .67** .64**       .20  .34    .46* 
2. Guarded          1  .73**       .45* .08          .54** 
3. Sticking out for one self    1       .70** .05    .67** 
4. Assertive             1  -.02    .34 
5. Shifting responsibility              1    .25 
6. Defensive             1 
Concession 3 (n = 22) 
1. Self-protective  1       .47* .33**       .39  .28    .37 
2. Guarded          1  .26       .12  .45*        .49* 
3. Sticking out for one self    1       .82** .19    .28 
4. Assertive             1  .17    .09 
5. Shifting responsibility              1    .56** 
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6. Defensive             1 
Concession 4 (n = 22) 
1. Self-protective  1       .79** .67**       .11  .38    .30 
2. Guarded          1  .57**       .46* .49          .37 
3. Sticking out for one self    1       .44* .52    .56** 
4. Assertive             1  .20    .56** 
5. Shifting responsibility              1    .23 
6. Defensive             1 
Concession 5 (n = 22) 
1. Self-protective  1       .21  .62**       .61** .37    .19 
2. Guarded          1  .61**       .14  .38          .81** 
3. Sticking out for one self    1       .38  .61**    .60** 
4. Assertive             1  .12    .11 
5. Shifting responsibility              1    .47* 
6. Defensive             1 
Justification 1 (n = 22) 
1. Self-protective  1       .33  .85**       .04  -.22    .41 
2. Guarded          1  .24       -.39 .24          .16 
3. Sticking out for one self    1       .21  -.13    .42* 
4. Assertive             1  .22    .30 
5. Shifting responsibility              1    .23 
6. Defensive             1 
Justification 2 (n = 22) 
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1. Self-protective  1       .35  .93**       .00  -.08    .60** 
2. Guarded          1  .33       -.00 .28          .14 
3. Sticking out for one self    1       .02  -.09    .59** 
4. Assertive             1  -.02    -.01 
5. Shifting responsibility              1    -.01 
6. Defensive             1 
Justification 3 (n = 22) 
1. Self-protective  1       .34  .91**       .35  -.04    .84** 
2. Guarded          1  .17       .21  .55**      .28 
3. Sticking out for one self    1       .35  -.18    .86** 
4. Assertive             1  .28    .30 
5. Shifting responsibility              1    -.04 
6. Defensive             1 
Justification 4 (n = 22) 
1. Self-protective  1       .44* .95**       .48* .56**    .86** 
2. Guarded          1  .45*       -.04 .20          .48* 
3. Sticking out for one self    1       .27  .55**    .82** 
4. Assertive             1  .42    .44* 
5. Shifting responsibility              1    .57** 
6. Defensive             1 
Justification 5 (n = 22) 
1. Self-protective  1       .32  .88**       .23  .17    .85** 
2. Guarded          1  .13       -.18 .82**      .23 
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3. Sticking out for one self    1       .32  -.03    .75** 
4. Assertive             1  -.11    .25 
5. Shifting responsibility              1    .08 
6. Defensive             1 
Excuse 1 (n = 22) 
1. Self-protective  1       .55** .66**       .23  .45*    .75** 
2. Guarded          1  .22       .03  .13          .44* 
3. Sticking out for one self    1       .27  .43*    .59** 
4. Assertive             1  .12    .35 
5. Shifting responsibility              1    .60** 
6. Defensive             1 
Excuse 2 (n = 22) 
1. Self-protective  1       .86** .74**       .15  .74**    .55* 
2. Guarded          1  .69*       .28  .76**      .54* 
3. Sticking out for one self    1       .24  .76**    .74** 
4. Assertive             1  .05    .20 
5. Shifting responsibility              1    .71** 
6. Defensive             1 
Excuse 3 (n = 22) 
1. Self-protective  1       .86** .71**       .46* .26    .46* 
2. Guarded          1  .50*       .41  .39          .75** 
3. Sticking out for one self    1       .65** .29    .37 
4. Assertive             1  .28    .38 
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5. Shifting responsibility              1    .14 
6. Defensive             1 
Excuse 4 (n = 22) 
1. Self-protective  1       .59** .71**       .46* .26    .46* 
2. Guarded          1  .50*       .41  .39          .75** 
3. Sticking out for one self    1       .65** .29    .37 
4. Assertive             1  .28    .38 
5. Shifting responsibility              1    .14 
6. Defensive             1 
Excuse 5 (n = 22) 
1. Self-protective  1       .77** .41       .49* .51*    .57** 
2. Guarded          1  .59**       .53* .34          .47* 
3. Sticking out for one self    1       .34  .43*    -.10 
4. Assertive             1  .14    .60** 
5. Shifting responsibility              1    .11 
6. Defensive             1 
Refusal 1 (n = 22) 
1. Self-protective  1       .53* .53*       .05  .17    .52* 
2. Guarded          1  .23       -.32 .30          .63** 
3. Sticking out for one self    1       .19  .16    .70** 
4. Assertive             1  .07    .05 
5. Shifting responsibility              1    .22 
6. Defensive             1 
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Refusal 2 (n = 22) 
1. Self-protective  1       .39  .82**       .78** .88**    .51* 
2. Guarded          1  .23       .15  .37          .65** 
3. Sticking out for one self    1       .94** .77**    .53* 
4. Assertive             1  .78**    .50* 
5. Shifting responsibility              1    .42 
6. Defensive             1 
Refusal 3 (n = 22) 
1. Self-protective  1       .83** .76**       .62** .69**    .71** 
2. Guarded          1  .76**       .49* .55**      .56** 
3. Sticking out for one self    1       .74** .79**    .86** 
4. Assertive             1  .87**    .90** 
5. Shifting responsibility              1    .94** 
6. Defensive             1 
Refusal 4 (n = 22) 
1. Self-protective  1       .42  .50*       .42* .68**    .56** 
2. Guarded          1  .48*       .21  .41          .44* 
3. Sticking out for one self    1       .60** .78**    .90** 
4. Assertive             1  .86**    .53* 
5. Shifting responsibility              1    .70** 
6. Defensive             1 
Refusal 5 (n = 22) 
1. Self-protective  1       .58** .56**       -.02 .80**    .84** 
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2. Guarded          1  .50*       -.20 .61**      .53* 
3. Sticking out for one self    1       .21  .79**    .59** 
4. Assertive             1  .08    -.01 
5. Shifting responsibility              1    .89** 
6. Defensive             1 
* p < .05; ** p < .01.  
Note. Each number refers to a single item that measures the defensiveness level of the 
accounts. See Appendix D for the complete list of accounts and labels of accounts 




The Cronbach’s Alpha for the Sum of Items that Measured Defensiveness Level of Each 
Account (N = 22) 
 Defensiveness      Cronbach’s α 
 Concession 1             .82 
 Concession 2              .87 
 Concession 3              .70 
 Concession 4              .81 
 Concession 5              .80 
 Justification 1              .68 
 Justification 2              .76 
 Justification 3              .82 
 Justification 4              .86 
 Justification 5              .77 
 Excuse 1              .81 
 Excuse 2              .84 
 Excuse 3              .88 
 Excuse 4              .83 
 Excuse 5              .78 
 Refusal 1              .77 
 Refusal 2              .79 
 Refusal 3              .92 
 Refusal 4              .81 
 63
 
 Refusal 5              .85 
Note. See Appendix D for the complete list of the accounts and labels of the accounts 
presented to participants.  
 
type of accounts was the between-subject variable and the within-subject variable was the  
defensiveness level of the accounts. A significant within-subject effect was found, F(1,  
21) = 30.14, p < .01, η² = .59. In addition, the results indicated a significant linear and a 
quadratic effect of the defensiveness level of the accounts, F(1, 21) = 33.42, p < .01, η² = 
.61 for the linear effect and F(1, 21) = 6.99, p < .05, η² = .25 for the quadratic effect 
(Figure 3 pictures the defensiveness level of four types of accounts).  
Consistent with Schönbach’s (1990) argument, concessions had the lowest 
defensiveness level (M = 4.58, SD = 1.77) and refusals’ defensiveness level was highest 
(M = 8.29, SD = 2.32). On the defensiveness continuum proposed by Schönbach, 
justifications and excuses had moderate levels of defensiveness and excuses had a hig er 
defensiveness level than justifications. The results indicated otherwise: Justifications’ 
defensiveness level (M = 7.63, SD = 1.95) was higher than the defensiveness level of 
excuses (M = 6.22, SD = 1.47). The difference was significant, t(21) = 4.53, p < .01.   
As discussed in Pilot Study 4, the defensiveness level of the accounts would be 
used with the likelihood of selecting each account in the formal study to constitute the 
composite measure (LDA) in the formal study.  The average defensiveness lv l of each 
type of accounts was used as the Di in the formula to calculate LDA (LDA = Σ [Di • Li] / 
Σ Li). Specifically, Di for concession, justification, excuse, and refusals was 4.58, 7.63, 


























Pilot Study 6: Pilot Testing Dependent Measures 
 Purpose. Pilot Study 6 was conducted to test the measures of all the dependent 
variables. 
 Participants. Sixty-three undergraduate students at the University of Maryland 
participated in this pilot study. The age range of participants was 18 to 22 (M = 19.40, SD 
= 1.06, Mdn = 19.00). Sixty percent of participants were female (n = 38). And 60% of 
participants identified themselves as Caucasian (n = 38).   
 Procedure. When participants arrived, the researcher explained the purpose of the 
study and asked them to sign the study’s consent form before they completed the 
questionnaire. The questionnaire had three parts: the stimulus message, all the dependent 
measures, and open-ended questions about the clarity of the dependent measures. Only 
two versions of the hypothetical conflict scenario were used in this pilot study: the 
scenario that induces a high outcome severity and a high level of relational closeness and 
the scenario that induces a low outcome severity and a low level of relational closeness.  
After reading the scenario, two practice questions were provided to participants to 
learn how to use magnitude scales. These two questions were the same ones used in Pilot 
Studies 3 and 5. After participants felt ready to use magnitude scales, they were asked to 
continue with the second part of the questionnaire: questions for the degree of internal
attribution (five indicators), the degree of external attribution (five indicators), 
controllability (five indicators), uncontrollability (five indicators), expected responsibility 
(five indicators), expected anger (six indicators), likelihood of using concessions (five 
indicators), likelihood of using justifications (five indicators), likelihood of using excuses 
(five indicators), and likelihood of using refusals (five indicators). A total of fifty-one 
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indicators were used. All the measures used magnitude scales. The third part of the 
questionnaire listed open-ended questions regarding participants’ opinions about the 
dependent measures. For example, participants were asked to explain any confusion i  
the questionnaire. Appendix K listed all questions regarding the clarity of the questions 
used in the Pilot Study 6.     
Data transformation. Participants used nonnegative numbers to answer the 
questions regarding the hypothetical conflict. The data were submitted to descriptive 
analysis to see whether a transformation was needed. Following the (-1.96, 1.96) cutoff 
rule, all fifty-one indicators were significantly positively skewed. A transformation was 
necessary. The data were trimmed at the 90th percentile to eliminate the extreme values 
(e.g., the 90th percentile for one item to measure defensiveness was 400; thus, any score 
larger than 400 was converted to 400). Power transformations were used with λ ranges 
from 0.30 to 0.50 for different variables.  
Instruments and results. The pilot study measured the following variables: the 
degree of internal attribution, the degree of external attribution, controllability, 
uncontrollability, expected responsibility, expected anger, and likelihood of selecting 
each account (four types of accounts were used and each type had five accounts; in total 
twenty accounts were listed in the questionnaire).  
Degree of internal attribution. To measure the degree of internal attribution, a 5-
item magnitude scale was used (e.g., “How likely is it that your mistake w s due to your 
own carelessness?”). A CFA was conducted using LISREL 8.70 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 
2004). The results supported a one-factor structure although the fit indices were not 
satisfactory, χ²(5, N = 63) = 10.24, p > .05; NFI = 0.87; CFI = 0.93; SRMR = 0.08. A 
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principal components analysis without rotation was conducted. The results indicated two 
components with eigenvalues larger than 1. The first component had an eigenvalue of 
2.27 and explained 45% of the variance. The second component’s eigenvalue equaled 
1.05 and 21% of the variance was explained by the second component. The Cronbach’s 
alpha for the sum of the five items was .68.  
The degree of external attributions was measured by a 5-item magnitude scale 
(e.g., one item was, “How likely is it that your mistake was due to the profss r not 
giving clear instructions for the assignment?”). CFA results did not support a one-f ctor 
structure, χ²(5, N = 63) = 14.22, p < .05; NFI = 0.89; CFI = 0.92; SRMR = 0.07. However, 
a principal components analysis yielded only one component with an eigenvalue great r 
than 1 (eigenvalue = 2.79). Fifty-five percent of the variance was explained by this 
component. The Cronbach’s alpha for the sum of the five items was .79.  
A 5-item magnitude scale was used to measure controllability (e.g., one item was, 
“how likely is it that you could have prevented this mistake?”). CFA results supported a 
one-factor structure, χ²(5, N = 63) = 9.89, p > .05; NFI = 0.96; CFI = 0.98; SRMR = 0.03. 
A principal components analysis without rotation yielded two components with 
eigenvalues larger than 1. The eigenvalue of the first component was 2.96, explaining 
59% of the variance and the second component’s eigenvalue equaled 1.00, explaining 
20% of the variance. The Cronbach’s alpha for the sum of the five items was .89.  
Uncontrollability was measured by a 5-item magnitude scale (e.g., one item was, 
“How likely is that what happened was out of your control?”). CFA results indicated a 
one-factor structure, χ²(5, N = 63) = 7.93, p > .05; NFI = 0.95; CFI = 0.98; SRMR = 0.05. 
A principal components analysis with no rotation indicated that only one component had 
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an eigenvalue larger than 1 (eigenvalue = 2.92) and 58% of the variance explained by this 
component. The Cronbach’s alpha for the sum of the five items was .83.  
Anticipated consequences. To measure participants’ expected responsibility, a 5-
item magnitude scale was used (e.g., one item was, “how much responsibility do you 
have if Person B did not achieve his or her goal of being awarded the fellowship?”). CFA 
results did not support a one-factor structure, χ²(5, N = 63) = 38.67, p < .05; NFI = 0.66; 
CFI = 0.67; SRMR = 0.13. A principal components analysis without rotation found two 
components with eigenvalue larger than 1. The first component had an eigenvalue of 2.91 
and explained 58% of the variance, and the second component had an eigenvalue of 1.32. 
Twenty-six percent of the variance was explained by the second component. The 
Cronbach’s alpha for the sum of the five items was .82.  
A 6-item magnitude scale was used to measure participants’ expected anger (e.g., 
“How mad do you expect Person B to be?”). CFA results did not support a one-factor 
structure, χ²(9, N = 63) = 45.64, p < .05; NFI = 0.90; CFI = 0.91; SRMR = 0.04. However, 
a principal components analysis without rotation indicated that only one component had 
an eigenvalue larger than 1. The first component had an eigenvalue of 5.12, explaining 
85% of the variance. The Cronbach’s alpha for the sum of the five items was .97.   
 Likelihood of selecting each account. Five accounts of concessions (developed in 
Pilot Study 4) were provided to participants. Participants were asked to ratehe likelihood 
of using each concession when explaining their behavior in the conflict scenario. A 
magnitude scale was used. CFA results did not support a one-factor structure, χ²(5, N = 
63) = 14.59, p < .05; NFI = 0.91; CFI = 0.94; SRMR = 0.07; however, the principal 
components analysis without rotation found only one component with an eigenvalue 
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greater than 1 (eigenvalue = 3.00), and 60% of the variance was explained by this 
component. The Cronbach’s alpha for the sum of the five items was .81.  
Participants were asked to rate the likelihood of using each of the five 
justifications when explaining their behavior in the conflict scenario by using a 
magnitude scale. A one-factor structure was not supported by CFA results, χ²(5, N = 63) 
= 27.57, p < .05; NFI = 0.88; CFI = 0.89; SRMR = 0.08. However, the principal 
components analysis without rotation found only one component with an eigenvalue 
larger than 1 (eigenvalue = 3.35) and 67% of the variance was explained by this 
component. The Cronbach’s alpha for the sum of the five items was .87.  
Participants also rated the likelihood of using each of the five excuses by using a 
magnitude scale. CFA results supported a one-factor structure marginally, χ²(5, N = 63) = 
11.04, p = .05; NFI = 1.00; CFI = 1.00; SRMR = 0.06. A principal components analysis 
with no rotation found only one component with an eigenvalue larger than 1 (eigenvalue 
= 2.80), explaining 56% of the variance. The Cronbach’s alpha for the sum of the five 
items was .78.  
Five refusals were presented to participants to indicate their likelihood of using 
each refusal in the conflict situation. CFA results did not support a one-factor structure, 
χ²(5, N = 63) = 27.21, p < .05; NFI = 1.00; CFI = 1.00; SRMR = 0.12. However, a 
principal components analysis without rotation found only one component with an 
eigenvalue larger than 1. The eigenvalue of the first component equaled 2.89, and 58% of 
the variance was explained by this component. The Cronbach’s alpha for the sum of the 
five items was .79.  
Revisions of the measures. Participants answered six open-ended questions 
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regarding the clarity of the questionnaire (see Appendix K). For example, participants 
were asked "What do you think the researchers want to measure?" Other questions 
examined the clarity and difficult levels of the questions. The researcher also interviewed 
sixteen participants about their perceptions of the items on the questionnaire.    
The majority of participants were able to identify three or four variables the 
researchers intended to measure, and most questions were perceived to be clearly stat d 
and easy to answer. Revisions were made based on participants’ comments. For example, 
to measure expected responsibility of the offender, one question was revised from "How 
much responsibility do you have for what has happened" to "How much responsibility 
would Person B assign to you for what has happened?"    
The Cronbach’s alphas for all dependent measures were acceptable, ranging from 
.68 to .97. The degree of internal attribution had the lowest reliability coefficient (α = 
.68). A principal components analysis with no rotation indicated two components with 
eigenvalue larger than 1 for the degree of internal attribution. Two items (i.e., item 4: 
"How likely is it that your mistake was because you did not care about what grade you 
and Person B could get for this assignment?" and item 5: "To what extent do you believe
what has happened was because you did not spend enough time on the assignment?") 
loaded highly on both the first and second components (.54 and .63 for item 4 and .50 and 
.47 for item 5). When eliminating both items, the Cronbach’s alpha for the sum of the 
remaining three items increased to .73; however, if these items were eliminated, the 
measurement model would be saturated and therefore fit perfectly, which is problematic. 
To ensure the measurement model for the degree of internal attribution was over-
identified, three new items, phrased similarly as the remaining three items, were added to 
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the scale, and all six items were used in the formal study.  
For the scale of expected responsibility, two items loaded high on both first and 
second components (.63 and .71 for item 4, and .70 and .64 for item 5). These two items 
were "How much responsibility can be assigned to others (e.g., the professor or Person B) 
if Person B did not achieve his or her goal?" (item 4), and "How accountable were others 
(e.g., the professor or Person B) if Person B did not achieve his or her goal?" (item 5). 
After eliminating the two items from the scale, the Cronbach’s alpha for the sum of the 
remaining three items increased to .87. The measurement model for the expect d 
responsibility with the remaining three items was saturated. Three new items were added 
to the scale and all six items were used in the formal study.  
CFA results indicated that the scales for the degree of external attribution, 
likelihood of using concessions, likelihood of using justifications, and likelihood of using 
refusals were not unidimensional. However, the principal components analyses found 
only one component with an eigenvalue greater than 1 for all four scales. The cales 
measuring the likelihood of using concessions, justifications, and refusals remained the 
same. However, based on participants’ comments, two more items were added to the 
scale for degree of external attribution.  
Based on the results of Pilot Study 3 and Pilot Study 6, in the formal study 
outcome severity and relational closeness manipulation checks were each measured by 6 
items. The degree of internal attribution was measured by a 7-item magnitude scale, as 
was the degree of external attribution. A 5-item scale was used to measure controllability. 
Uncontrollability also was measured by a 5-item scale. Expected responsibility and 
expected anger were each measured by a 6-item scale. And five accounts were li ted 
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under each type of accounts (i.e., concession, justification, excuse, and refusal). In total, 
20 accounts were provided to participants to investigate their likelihood of using those 
accounts.  
The Formal Study 
 Data collection for the formal study was conducted at the University of Maryland 
between May 6th and June 18th, 2008. This section presents the analytical strategy, the 
determination of the sample size and the sample description, the variables of intrest, the 
experimental design, and the data collection procedure.  
Analytical Strategy 
 The hypotheses and the proposed model were tested with analyses of variance and 
with structural equation modeling.  
 Analyses of variance (ANOVAs). ANOVAs were used mainly to examine the 
success of the manipulations. In particular, the statistical differenc  between two levels of 
outcome severity (high vs. low) and the statistical difference between thr e levels of 
relational closeness (high vs. moderate vs. low) were tested.   
 Structural equation modeling (SEM). SEM was used to test the causal 
relationships proposed by the hypotheses (see Figure 2). Severity of outcome (ξ1; high 
outcome severity was coded as 1 and low outcome severity was coded as -1), relational 
closeness (ξ2; quadratic coding: high relational closeness was coded as -1, moderate 
relational closeness as 2, and low relational closeness as -1), and the interactions (ξ3, ξ4, 
and ξ5) between outcome severity and relational closeness were the independent 
variables; manipulation checks for outcome severity (η1) and relational closeness (η2) 
were mediating variables; and the degree of internal attribution (η3), controllability (η4),  
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the degree of external attributions (η5), uncontrollability (η6), expected responsibility (η7), 
expected anger (η8), and LDA (η9) were outcome variables. See Figure 2 for labels and 
coding of each variable used in model testing. Two stages were used to test the struc ural 
equation model. First, confirmation factor analyses were conducted on each variable to 
determine the underlying dimensions. Second, the theoretical and the measurement model 
were tested together using LISREL 8.70 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2004).  
The influence of the outcome severity manipulation on expected responsibility 
and LDA was mediated by the outcome severity manipulation check (i.e., perceived 
outcome severity). The relational closeness manipulation (quadratic coding) and 
relational closeness manipulation check (i.e., perceived quadratic relational cl seness) 
were used to test the curvilinear relationship between relational closeness and offenders’ 
choice of accounts. A direct influence of the interaction between outcome severity (linear 
coding) and relational closeness (linear coding) on LDA was proposed by Hypothesis 3. 
According to Hypothesis 4, the interaction between outcome severity and relational 
closeness also indirectly influences the defensiveness of the accounts through the 
attributional process variables (e.g., degree of internal and external attribution). Both 
direct and indirect paths were tested using LISREL8.70 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2004). 
Confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs) were performed using LISREL 8.70 
(Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2004) to test measurement model fit. The goodness-of-fit criteria
was based mainly on Hu and Bentler’s (1998, 1999) recommendations. Hu and Bentler 
(1999) found variation of performance among the fit indices. They suggested that to 
distinguish good models from poor ones, a two-index presentation strategy needs to be 
used that the maximum likelihood (ML) based SRMR is supplemented with another ML-
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based fit index, such as TLI, RNI, CFI, Gamma Hat, Mc, or RMSEA. Hu and Bentler 
(1998) specified that a cutoff value close to .95 for CFI, a cutoff value close to .90 for Mc, 
a cutoff value close to .08 for SRMR, and a cutoff value close to .06 for RMSEA could 
“result in lower Type II error rates (with acceptable costs of Type-I error rates)” (p. 27). 
Hu and Bentler’s criteria have been largely accepted (e.g., Hancock, 2006).  
The above goodness-of-fit criteria also were used to show how well the data fit 
the proposed model. Testing total effects of the independent variables on the outcome 
variables indicated whether the hypotheses were supported. Significant coefficients from 
the independent variables to the outcome variables indicated the extent to which the 
independent variables influenced the dependent variables.  
Design 
 A 2 (Outcome severity: severe vs. not severe) X 3 (Relational closeness: high vs. 
moderate vs. low) independent groups experimental design was employed. A scenario 
describing an interpersonal conflict in a course project at school was used to induce 
different levels of outcome severity and relational closeness.  
All participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions formed by 
severity of an outcome and closeness of relationship. The cognitive (the degree of 
internal attribution, the degree of external attribution, controllability, uncontrollability, 
and expected responsibility) and emotional (expected anger) processes participants 
engaged in and the likelihood of selection of different accounts (concessions, 
justifications, excuses, and refusals) were measured.   
Sample 
 Proposed sample size. Structural equation modeling (SEM) was used in data 
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analysis. Different researchers recommend different ways to determine sample size (e.g., 
Bentler & Chou, 1987; Jackson, 2003). The current research adopted the recommendation 
from Gagné and Hancock (2006). Gagné and Hancock took into consideration the ratio of 
the number of indicators per factor (p/f) and their loading magnitudes when deciding 
whether a sample size is acceptable. The ratio of the number of indicators per factor for 
the current research was 3.86. Based on Gagné and Hancock’s guideline, an acceptable 
estimation of sample size for the current research was between 200 and 400.   
Sample. Participants were 238 students; they were undergraduates (32.8% 
freshmen, 25.6% sophomores, 28.2% juniors, 13.0% seniors, and 0.4% others) recruited 
from the University of Maryland. Their age range was 18 to 37 (M = 19.76, SD = 1.78, 
Mdn = 20.00). One hundred and twenty-nine of the participants were female (54.2%). 
The majority were Caucasian (58.8%), 17.6% were Asian Americans, 13.4% were 
African American, and 4.6% were Hispanic. Approximately 5.5% of the participants 
checked the category “other.” Participants received extra credit in exchange of their 
participation in the study.  
Procedure 
Participants arrived at a pre-assigned classroom, in a group of five or six. The 
researcher informed the participants the purpose and the procedure of the study and asked 
them to sign a consent form before they participated in the study. All peop e coming to 
the study agreed to participate. After the signed consent forms were collected, a package 
including a single conflict scenario and a questionnaire was distributed. Participants were 
randomly assigned to receive one of the six versions of the hypothetical conflict scenario 




Participants were told to imagine that the hypothetical situation happened between 
them and another person (i.e., “Person B”). The scenario described a class project 
between participants (“you”) and Person B. The participants’ behavior in thescenario 
(i.e., writing his or her portion of a review paper based on the wrong readings) resulted in 
a poor grade for both the offender (i.e., the role the participant took) and the victim (i.e., 
Person B in the scenario), which, they were told, influenced the awarding of Pers n B’s 
scholarship for the next year.  
To induce relational closeness, participants and Person B’s relationship was 
described as follow: (a) They grew up together and have been best friends for many years 
(high level of closeness), (b) they were in a couple of classes together b fore, and they 
know each other but only see each other in class (moderate level of closeness), or (3) they 
don’t really know each other and they happened to sit together on the first day of class 
(low level of closeness).  
Outcome severity was manipulated in several ways. First, in the high outcome- 
severity condition, the class project (i.e., writing a review paper) constituted a large 
portion of the class grade (i.e., 40%); the project was described as only counting for 10% 
of the grade in the low outcome-severity condition. Second, the influence of the class 
grade on Person B’s scholarship was different. In high outcome-severity condition, 
participants were told that “if the grade for this course was not good, his or her (i.e., 
Person B) scholarship for the next year would definitely be in jeopardy.” In the low 
outcome-severity condition, Person B told participants that “if the grade for this course 
was not good, there is a possibility that his or her scholarship for the next year will be 
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influenced.” Third, the consequence of the conflict was different. In the high outcome-
severity condition, after obtaining a poor grade for the class project, “Person B was very 
upset because such a low grade resulted in him or her not getting next year's scholarship,” 
compared to “Person B was not happy but he or she did great on other assignments and 
believed it would not influence his or her getting next year's scholarship” (low outcome-
severity).    
Each participant read one version of the hypothetical conflict scenario. 
Participants were asked to complete a questionnaire by taking the role of the of ender. 
The questionnaire had the manipulation checks (i.e., for perceived outcome severity and 
perceived relational closeness), measures of attributions (i.e., the degreof internal 
attribution, the degree of external attribution, controllability, and uncontrollability), 
measures of anticipated consequences (i.e., expected responsibility and expected anger), 
and measures of accounts (i.e., likelihood of selecting each account). Participants’ 
demographic information was collected at the end of the questionnaire. After completing 





This chapter consists of two parts. The first part presents data preparation for the 
primary analyses, reliability and confirmatory factor analyses for measurement models, 
and manipulation checks. The second part presents the primary data analyses and test of 
hypotheses.  
Preliminary Analyses 
Data Entry Checks 
Frequencies of all the variables were examined to minimize data entry erro . All 
frequencies fell in the preset range defined by the lower boundary and the upper 
boundary for each item. Furthermore, all the responses in the questionnaires were 
checked against the data entries. Out of 238 participants’ data (each participant answered 
72 question including demographic information), 6 errors were found, yielding an error 
rate of 6 ÷ (238 x 72) = .0004. The six incorrect inputs were corrected.  
Missing Data 
The completed questionnaires were numbered in the order of when they were 
turned in. Two participants had incomplete data. The missing data in both questionnaires 
did not show a systematic pattern. Kline (2005) suggested that non-systematic missing 
data can be ignored. He further argued that in statistical analyses such as principal 
components analyses and analyses of variance, pairwise deletion should be used to 
maintain the statistical power (Kline, 2005). However, pairwise deletion may pose a 
problem for confirmatory factor analyses and SEM; Kline suggested that when the 
number of cases with missing data is small, listwise deletion is preferable to pairwise 
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deletion for CFA and SEM. Thus, pairwise deletion was used when ANOVA was 
conducted for the manipulation checks and listwise deletion was used when CFA and 
SEM were conducted for testing the proposed model.  
Data Transformation 
Magnitude scales were used on the questionnaire for all dependent measures and 
manipulation checks. Participants used nonnegative numbers to answer the questions. 
Based on the results of the six pilot studies, perceived outcome severity, perceived 
relational closeness, expected responsibility, and expected anger each had six indicators; 
the degree of internal attribution and the degree of external attribution each had seven 
indicators; controllability and uncontrollability each had five indicators; and likelihood of 
selecting an account had five indicators for each of four types of accounts (20 items in 
total). Therefore, the total number of indicators for these measures was sixty-eight.  
The sixty-eight indicators were submitted to a descriptive analysis to see whether 
any data transformation would be needed. The skewness and kurtosis were examined. 
The ratio of skewness to its standard error was calculated, and an indicator’s distribution 
was considered approaching normality when the ratio ranged from -1.96 to 1.96 (see Frey 
et al., 2000).  
Following the |1.96| cutoff rule, all sixty-eight indicators were positively skewed. 
A data transformation was necessary. Before transformation, to eliminate extrem  values, 
all data were trimmed at the 90th percentile (e.g., if 500 was the 90th percentile for an 
item, any score larger than 500 was converted to 500). Power transformation was used to
treat the skewed data resulting from magnitude scales (Bauer & Fink, 1983): 
 New indicator = (original indicator) λ,
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the researcher tried different values of λ and used the ones that ensured the majority of 
indicators had non-significant statistics in skewness. The values of λ ranged from 0.28 to 
0.55 for the formal study data. Transformed data were used in confirmatory factor 
analyses, principal components analyses, ANOVAs for the manipulation checks, and 
model testing. Appendix L provides descriptive statistics for the indicators used in the 
formal study after transformation.  
Instruments 
 As mentioned above, Appendices A to D listed all the questions that measured the 
following variables.  
Manipulation checks. Manipulation checks involved two variables: perceived 
outcome severity and perceived relational closeness. Perceived outcome severity was 
measured by a 6-item magnitude scale, where 0 indicated not severe at all and 100 
indicated a moderate level of severity. An example question is, “How severely does your 
mistake affect Person B?” A CFA was conducted using LISREL 8.70 (Jöreskog & 
Sörbom, 2004). The results did not support a one-factor structure, χ²(9, N = 236) = 71.16, 
p < .05; NFI = 0.96; CFI = 0.97; SRMR = 0.03. When a principal components analysis 
without rotation was conducted, the results indicated only one component had an 
eigenvalue larger than 1 (eigenvalue = 4.86), explaining 81% of the variance. The 
Cronbach’s alpha for the sum of the six items was .95. The first component was used a
the manipulation check. For model testing, all six items after transformation were used in 
testing the proposed model.  
Perceived relational closeness was also measured by a 6-item magnitude scale, 
where 0 indicated not close at all and 100 indicated a moderate level of relational  
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closeness. An example item was, “How familiar are you with Person B?” CFA results did 
not support a one-factor structure, χ²(9, N = 236) = 88.63, p < .05; NFI = 0.95; CFI = 
0.95; SRMR = 0.03. A principal components analysis without rotation was conducted to 
examine the underlying components. The results indicated that only one component had 
an eigenvalue larger than 1 (eigenvalue = 5.49), explaining 92% of the variance. The 
Cronbach’s alpha for the sum of the six items was .98. The first component was obtained 
for two purposes. First, the first component score of the perceived relational closeness 
was used in ANOVA for assessing whether the manipulation of relational closeness 
(linear coding) was successful. Second, the first component score was used to create a 
manipulation check for quadratic relational closeness. A curvilinear relationship between 
relational closeness and selection of accounts was predicted in Hypothesis 2. To test this 
curvilinear relationship in the model, a manipulation check for the quadratic relaional 
closeness needed to be included to mediate the relationship between relational closeness 
(quadratic coding) and selection of accounts. The following formula was used to create 
the perceived quadratic relational closeness: 
Perceived quadratic relational closeness = (first component score – mean)²,  
where the mean for the first component score equals zero. Thus, the perceived quadratic 
relational closeness simply was created by squaring the first component score of the six 
items that measured the perceived relational closeness. In the model testing, only one 
indicator (i.e., perceived quadratic relational closeness) was included to represent this 
variable.   
Attributions. The current research did not assume the relationships between the 
degree of internal attribution and the degree of external attribution and between 
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controllability and uncontrollability. Four types of attributions were measured separately; 
they are the degree of internal attribution, the degree of external attribution, 
controllability, and uncontrollability. Different reasons regarding the offnder’s behavior 
were listed and participants indicated their perception of how likely each reason 
influenced his or her behavior, using magnitude scales where 0 = not likely at all and 100 
indicated a moderate level of likelihood.    
The degree of internal attribution was measured by a 7-item magnitude scale. For 
example, participants were asked, “How likely is that what has happened was due to yo r 
own carelessness?” CFA results did not support a one-factor structure, χ²(14, N = 236) = 
123.79, p < .05; NFI = 1.00; CFI = 1.00; SRMR = 0.11. A principal components analysis 
without rotation was conducted to examine the underlying components. The results 
indicated two components had eigenvalues larger than 1. The first component’s 
eigenvalue was 2.74, explaining 39% of the variance. The second component’s 
eigenvalue equaled 1.37, explaining 20% of the variance. Item 2 (i.e., “How likely is that
what has happened was due to internal traits, such as your personality?”), item 4 ( .e., 
“How likely is that what has happened was because you did not care about what grade 
you and Person B could get for this assignment?”), and item 7 (i.e., “To what exten do 
you think your personality determines what has happened?”) loaded high on both first 
and second components. After deleting these three items, a CFA with the remaining four 
items had good fit indices but the chi-square value was significant, χ²(2, N = 236) = 7.80, 
p < .05; NFI = 0.97; CFI = 0.98; SRMR = 0.04. A principal components analysis with no 
rotation was conducted on the remaining four items, indicating only one component had 
an eigenvalue larger than 1 (eigenvalue = 2.26) and explaining 56% of the variance. The 
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Cronbach’s alpha for the sum of these four items was .73. These remaining four items 
were used for the model testing. The first component score for the remaining four items 
was saved to examine the relationship between the degree of internal attribution and the 
degree of external attribution.  
The degree of external attribution was measured by a 7-item magnitude scale. An 
example question was, “How likely is that what has happened was due to the professor 
not giving clear instructions for the assignment?” CFA results suggested a 
multidimensional factor structure, χ²(14, N = 236) = 58.17, p < .05; NFI = 1.00; CFI = 
1.00; SRMR = 0.06. A principal components analysis without rotation found that only 
one component had an eigenvalue larger than 1 (eigenvalue = 2.90), explaining 41% of 
the variance. The Cronbach’s alpha for the sum of the seven items was .75. All seven 
items were used in the model testing. The first component score for all seven it ms was 
saved to investigate the relationship between the degree of internal attribution and the 
degree of external attribution. The correlation between the degree of internal att ibution 
and the degree of external attribution was significant, r = .33, p < .01.  
Controllability was measured by a 5-item magnitude scale. For example, 
participants were asked to indicate “How much control do you have over what has 
happened?” Confirmatory factor analysis was conducted using LISREL 8.70 (Jöreskog & 
Sörbom, 2004). Results did not indicate a unidimensional factor structure, χ²(5, N = 236) 
= 27.41, p < .05; NFI = 0.96; CFI = 0.97; SRMR = 0.04. However, a principal 
components analysis without rotation found only one component with an eigenvalue 
larger than 1. The first component’s eigenvalue equaled 3.27, explaining 65% of the 
variance. All five items were used in the model testing. The Cronbach’s alpha for t e sum 
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of the five items was .85. The first component score for the five items was saved to test 
the relationship between controllability and uncontrollability.  
A 5-item magnitude scale was used to measure uncontrollability. An example 
question was, “To what extent do you believe there is not much you could do to prevent 
what has happened?” The CFA did not support a one-factor structure, χ²(5, N = 236) = 
28.72, p < .05; NFI = 1.00; CFI = 1.00; SRMR = 0.05. The principal components analysis 
with no rotation found only one component that had an eigenvalue larger than 1. The first 
component’s eigenvalue equaled 3.12, explaining 62% of the variance. All five items 
were kept for the model testing. The Cronbach’s alpha for the sum of the five items was 
.85. The first component score was used to test the relationship between controllability 
and uncontrollability. The correlation was significant, r = -.13, p < .05.  
Anticipated consequences. Anticipated consequences were represented by two 
variables: expected responsibility assigned to the offender and expected anger felt by 
victims. For expected responsibility, participants were asked to indicate their xp ctation 
about how much responsibility would be assigned to them. A 6-item magnitude scale was 
used with 0 indicated not responsible at all and 100 indicated a moderate level of 
expected responsibility. For example, one item is, “How much responsibility would 
Person B assign to you for what has happened?” CFA results did not support a one-factor 
structure, χ²(9, N = 236) = 34.60, p < .05; NFI = 0.99; CFI = 0.99; SRMR = 0.02. A 
principal components analysis with no rotation found only one component with an 
eigenvalue larger than 1 (eigenvalue = 5.24), explaining 87% of the variance. All six 
items were used in the model testing. The Cronbach’s alpha for the sum of the six item  
was .97.    
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For expected anger, participants indicated the expected anger felt by victims by a 
6-item magnitude scale. For example, an item is, “How annoyed do you expect Person B 
to be?” One-factor structure was not supported by CFA results, χ²(9, N = 236) = 196.93, p 
< .05; NFI = 0.91; CFI = 0.91; SRMR = 0.04. However, only one component with an 
eigenvalue larger than 1 was found in a principal components analysis with no rotation. 
The eigenvalue of the first component was 5.17, explaining 86% of the variance. All six 
items were used for the model testing. The Cronbach’s alpha for the sum of the six i em  
was .97.  
Likelihood of selecting each account. A list of 20 accounts (5 statements for each 
type of accounts) was provided to participants to indicate the likelihood of selecting ach 
account by using a magnitude scale, where 0 indicated not likely at all and 100 indicated 
a moderate level of likelihood. For example, a concession stated, “I am sorry that I 
misunderstood the instruction. Is there any way that I can make it up to you?” An 
example of a justification was like the following, “I am sorry that the grade influenced 
your scholarship. But I worked very hard on this assignment. We should have gotten 
together to edit the paper earlier.” An example excuse was, “I am sorry that I 
misunderstood the instruction. But the wording in the direction was really confusing and 
that may be the reason why I wrote the wrong portion of the paper.” An example refusal 
was, “I know the readings I read were the right material for the paper. I did not find 
anything wrong to what I contributed to the paper.”  
Participants were asked to rate their likelihood of using each account. To convert 
the results into a data set for likelihood (i.e., with a range from 0% to 100%), the original 
data were first trimmed at the 90th percentile and a power transformation was conducted, 
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with λ = 0.45. After transformation, the sum of all transformed likelihood data were 
calculated (named the Ltotal in the following formula) and used as the base for th
likelihood of each account. The likelihood of each account was calculated by dividing the 
transformed data by Ltotal. For example, the likelihood of selecting a concession (named 
the Lc in the following formula) was calculated as: 
 Lci = Ci / Ltotal, 
where C refers to the likelihood of selecting a concession and i ranges from 1 to 5. When 
the likelihood of selecting the five concessions was obtained (i.e., Lc1, Lc2, Lc3, Lc4, and 
Lc5), the average of Lc1 to Lc5 was calculated, resulting the likelihood of selecting 
concessions (Lc). The likelihood of selecting justifications (Lj), excuses (Le) and refusals 
(Lr) were calculated the same way.  
As discussed above, participants indicated how likely it was that they would 
select each account. However, the dissertation’s hypotheses refer to both likelihood of 
selecting each account and the defensiveness level of each account. Only using the data 
collected in the formal study would not be sufficient and not appropriate to test the 
hypotheses. To create an appropriate measure for accounts used in the hypotheses testing, 
the defensiveness level of each type of accounts resulted from Pilot Study 5 was 
combined with the likelihood of selecting a defensive account (i.e., LDA) resulted from 
the formal study. The formula to calculate LDA is as follows:  
 LDA = Σ (Di • Li) / Σ Li,    
where Di refers to the defensiveness level of each type of accounts and Li refers to the 
likelihood of using each type of accounts (i.e., Lc, Lj, Le, and Lr). Based on the results 
from Pilot Study 5, Di for concessions, justifications, excuses, and refusals were 4.58, 
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7.63, 6.22, and 8.29, respectively. Therefore,  
 LDA = (4.58 • Lc + 7.63 • Lj + 6.22 • Le + 8.29 • Lr) / (Lc + Lj  + Le + Lr),  
the LDA value indicates the likelihood of selecting a defensive account. The higher the 
value of LDA, the more likely a more defensive account will be selected.    
 Overall, for manipulation checks, the first components of perceived outcome 
severity and perceived relational closeness were submitted to ANOVA. For hyp thesis 
and model testing, perceived outcome severity had six indicators. Perceived quadratic 
relational closeness had one indicator. Four indicators were used for the degre of 
internal attribution where the degree of external attribution had seven indicators. 
Controllability and uncontrollability each had five indicators. Expected responsibility 
assigned to the offender had six indicators and expected anger had six indicators. The 
composite measure of accounts (LDA) had one indicator. The model had five exogenous 
variables and nine endogenous variables, with forty-six indicators in all.  
Table 5 summarizes the results of principal components analyses of all 
instruments except LDA. Table 6 summarizes the Cronbach’s alpha for all instruments 
except LDA. Table 7 through Table 9 present each indicator’s factor loading from CFA 
and the measurement model fit indices. Loadings and fit indices for perceived outcome 
severity and perceived relational closeness are included in Table 7, loadings and fit 
indices for attributions are included in Table 8, and loadings and fit indices for expect d 
responsibility and expected anger are presented in Table 9. 
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Table 5  
Eigenvalues of the First Principal Components of Endogenous Variables with the 
Proportions of the Variance Explaineda 
Variable     Eigenvalue  % Variance Explained 
Perceived Outcome Severity   4.86   81.04% 
Perceived Relational Closenessb  5.49   91.54% 
Degree of Internal Attributionc  2.26   56.49% 
Degree of External Attribution  2.90   41.38% 
Controllability     3.27   65.43% 
Uncontrollability    3.12   62.49% 
Expected Responsibility   5.24   87.25% 
Expected Anger    5.17   86.23% 
Note.  a. The table listed all endogenous variables except LDA (i.e., the likelihood of 
selecting a defensive account) because LDA only had one indicator and no principal 
components analysis was conducted on a single-indicator variable. 
b. The principal components analysis results reported here are based on the six 
items that measured the perceived relational closeness for the linear relation manipulation 
check.  
c. Degree of internal attribution was measured originally by a 7-item magnitude 
scale. The principal components analyses indicated three items loaded highly on both the 
first and second components (the eigenvalues for both components were larger than 1). 
These three items were deleted from the scale. The statistics reported in this table 
represent the results after deletion. 
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 Table 6 
The Cronbach’s Alpha for the Sum of Measurement Items for All Endogenous Variables 
in the Formal Studya 
Variables    Valid N Cronbach’s α        Number of items 
Perceived outcome Severity  237        .95    6 
Perceived Relational Closenessb 237        .98   6 
Degree of Internal Attributionc 237        .73   4 
Degree of External Attribution 237        .75   7 
Controllability    237        .85   5 
Uncontrollability   237        .85   5 
Expected Responsibility  238        .97   6 
Expected Anger   238        .97   6 
Likelihood of Concessions  237        .80   5 
Likelihood of Justifications  238        .90   5 
Likelihood of Excuses  238        .78   5 
Likelihood of Refusals  238        .87   5 
Note. The indicators for each variable are found in Appendices A to D.  
a. Although model testing used LDA for the choice of accounts, the formal study 
used four scales to measure the likelihood of selecting each type of accounts. Therefore, 
the table also listed the reliability coefficients for these four measurement scales.  
b. The reliability results reported here was based on the six items that measured 
the perceived relational closeness for the linear manipulation check.  
c. Degree of internal attribution was measured originally by a 7-item magnitude 
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scale. The principal components analyses indicated three items loaded highly on both the 
first and second components (the eigenvalues for both components were larger than 1). 
The three items were deleted from the scale. The statistics reported in this table represent 





Manipulation Checks, Indicator Loadings, and Measurement Model Indices 
Manipulation Checks and Indicators                                          Unstandardized Loadings 
(Standardized) 
Outcome Severity 
     To what extent does your mistake influence Person B?   1.00 (.73)** 
     How severe is the outcome of this situation for Person B?  1.78 (.55)** 
     How severely does your mistake affect Person B?   1.57 (.56)** 
     How much influence does your mistake have on Person B’s  2.04 (.61)** 
     scholarship for the next year? 
     How much difficulty does your mistake have on Person B’s  1.67 (.61)** 
     obtaining his or her scholarship for the next year? 
     To what extent do you think the outcome is severe?   1.56 (.60)** 
χ² (9, N = 236) = 71.16, p < .05, RMSEA = .17, SRMR = .03, CFI = .97.  
Relational Closenessa 
     To what extent do you think Person B is a good friend of yours? 1.00 (.58)** 
     To what extent do you think you and Person B are close to each other? 1.08 (.56)**  
     How much knowledge do you have of Person B?   0.95 (.55)** 
     How familiar are you with Person B?   0.94 (.55)** 
     How close are you with Person B?   1.07 (.54)** 
     How well do you know Person B?   1.01 (.52)** 
 χ² (9, N = 236) = 88.63, p < .05, RMSEA = .19, SRMR = .03, CFI = .95.  
* p < .05; ** p < .01.  
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Note. Bold values represent fixed unstandardized loadings for reference indicators.  
a. The confirmatory factor analysis results reported here are based on the six items 





Attributional Processes Variables, Indicator Loadings, and Measurement Model Indices 
Attributional Processes and Indicators                                          Unstandardized Loadings 
(Standardized) 
Degree of Internal Attributionsa 
     How likely…due to your own carelessness?   1.00 (.74)**  
     How likely...due to you not paying enough attention?   1.06 (.96)** 
     How likely…because you did not spend enough time?   0.24 (.43)** 
     To what extent…because of you?    0.96 (.93)** 
χ² (2, N = 236) = 7.80, p < .05, RMSEA = .11, SRMR = .04, CFI = .98.  
Degree of External Attributions 
     How likely…due to the professor?   1.00 (.78)**  
     How likely…caused by other people?   0.86 (.76)** 
     How likely....because the wording was confusing?   0.75 (.86)** 
     How likely…due to some external reasons?   0.55 (.90)** 
     How likely…because of Person B?   0.78 (.91)** 
     To what extent…because of other people?   0.78 (.77)** 
     To what extent…because of environmental reasons?   0.50 (.91)** 
χ² (14, N = 236) = 58.17, p < .05, RMSEA = .00, SRMR = .06, CFI = 1.00.  
Controllability 
     How likely...was avoidable?   1.00 (.73)** 
     How much control do you have…?   0.86 (.84)** 
     How likely…you could have prevented the mistake?   1.14 (.57)** 
 94
 
     To what extent…you could have done otherwise?   0.91 (.66)** 
     To what extent…you could have done differently?   0.69 (.74)** 
χ² (5, N = 236) = 27.41, p < .05, RMSEA = .14, SRMR = .04, CFI = .97.  
Uncontrollability 
     How likely...was out of your control?   1.00 (.81)** 
     To what extent…there is not much you could do?   1.04 (.78)** 
     How likely…you have no control?   1.39 (.67)** 
     To what extent…you cannot prevent…?   1.46 (.63)** 
     To what extent…was inevitable?   1.13 (.77)**  
 χ² (5, N = 236) = 28.72, p < .05, RMSEA = .00, SRMR = .05, CFI = 1.00.  
* p < .05; ** p < .01.  
Note. Bold values represent fixed unstandardized loadings for reference indicators. See 
the complete list of items for attributions in Appendix B.  
a. Degree of internal attribution was measured originally by a 7-item magnitude 
scale. The principal components analyses indicated three items loaded highly on both the 
first and second components (the eigenvalues for both components were larger than 1). 
The three items were deleted from the scale. The statistics reported in this table represent 






Expected Consequences Variables, Indicator Loadings, and Measurement Model Indices 
Expected Consequences and Indicators                                      Unstandardized Loadings 
(Standardized) 
Expected Anger 
     How angry do you expect Person B to be?   1.00 (.58)** 
     How irritated do you expect Person B to be?   0.92 (.62)** 
     How furious do you expect Person B to be?   1.07 (.65)** 
     How mad do you expect Person B to be?   1.01 (.61)** 
     How fuming do you expect Person B to be?   1.03 (.69)** 
     How annoyed do you expect Person B to be?    0.88 (.65)** 
χ² (9, N = 236) = 196.93, p < .05, RMSEA = .30, SRMR = .04, CFI = .91.  
Expected Responsibility 
     How much responsibility…assigned to you?   1.00 (.63)** 
     To what extent…Person B think you are responsible?   0.98 (.61)** 
     To what extent…Person B think you are chargeable?   0.98 (.61)** 
     To what extent…Person B think you are accountable?   0.97 (.61)** 
     To what extent…should be attributed to you?   0.87 (.75)** 
 χ² (9, N = 236) = 34.60, p < .05, RMSEA = .11, SRMR = .02, CFI = .99.  
* p < .05; ** p < .01.  
Note.  Bold values represent fixed unstandardized loadings for reference indicators. See 




Two-way ANOVAs were conducted to see whether manipulations of outcome 
severity and relational closeness were successful. In the first ANOV, the dependent 
variable was perceived outcome severity and the independent variables were the 
manipulations of outcome severity (high vs. low, coded as 1, -1) and relational closeness 
(high vs. moderate vs. low, coded as 1, 0, -1). Results indicated that (a) outcome severity 
had a significant influence on perceived outcome severity, F(1, 231) = 160.35, p < .01, η² 
= .41, (b) relational closeness did not have a significant influence on perceived outcome 
severity, F(2, 231) = 0.13, p = .88, η² = .00, and (c) no significant interaction between 
outcome severity and relational closeness was found, F(2, 231) = 1.28, p = .28, η² = .01. 
Participants in the high severity conditions (M = .62, SD = .84) regarded the outcome to 
be more severe than those in the low severity conditions (M = -.66, SD = .70). The 
manipulation of outcome severity was successful.  
The second ANOVA had perceived relational closeness as the dependent 
variables and the manipulations of outcome severity (high vs. low, coded as 1, -1) and 
relational closeness (high vs. moderate vs. low, coded as 1, 0, -1) as the independent 
variables. The results suggested that (a) the manipulation of relational cl seness 
significantly influenced perceived relational closeness, F(2 231) = 150.54, p < .01, η² = 
.57, (b) the manipulation of outcome severity did not have a significant effect on 
perceived relational closeness, F(1, 231) = 3.58, p = .06, η² = .02, and (c) no significant 
interaction was found between the manipulations of outcome severity and relational 
closeness, F(2, 231) = 0.87, p = .42, η² = .01. Participants in high relational closeness 
conditions (M = 1.00, SD = .77) reported being closest to Person B than those in the 
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moderate closeness conditions (M = -.35, SD = .49) and in the low relational closeness 
condition (M = -.72, SD = .69). A linear relationship between three levels of relational 
closeness was established, F(1, 226) = 238.877, p < .01, η² = .50. The manipulation of 
relational closeness was successful.  
Model Assessment and Hypothesis Testing 
 The hypotheses were tested with structural equation modeling using LISREL 8.70 
(Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2004). The model consists of structural and measurement 
components. The model was tested to see the effect of outcome severity and relational 
closeness on individuals’ account selection processes, mediated by manipulation checks 
(i.e., perceived outcome severity and perceived quadratic relational closeness).  
Model Assessment 
 The model (Figure 2) shows all links that were proposed by the hypotheses. 
Model specifications are listed in Table 10 and the unstandardized structural coefficients 
are reported in Table 11 and Figure 4. The covariance matrix analyzed in LISREL is 
presented in Appendix M. LISREL syntax for model testing can be found in Appendix N. 
Figure 2 only illustrates the structural model. The measurement models are not presented 
in the figure but they were included in the model testing.  
Overall model fit and model comparison. Chi-square results did not indicate a 
good model fit, χ²(966, N = 236) = 2475.89, p < .05, RMSEA = .08 with a 90% CI of 
(.08, .09), SRMR = .21, NFI = .91, GFI = .94. A comparison with the null model was 
conducted. In the null model, no covariance was assumed between any pair of constructs. 
For the null model, χ²(1,035, N = 236) = 30724.93, p < .05. Comparing both models 
resulted in ∆χ²(69, N = 236) = 28249.04, p < .01. The tested model was a significant 
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Table 10 
Structural Equations of the Model Proposed by the Hypotheses 
η  η1 η2 η3 η4 η5 η6 η7 η8 η9 ξ1 ξ2 ξ3 ξ4 ξ5 ζ 
η1 =          γ11     ζ1  
η2 =           γ22    ζ2 
η3 =             γ34  ζ3  
η4 =             γ44  ζ4 
η5 =              γ55 ζ5  
η6 =              γ65 ζ6 
η7 = β71  β73 β74 β75 β76         ζ7  
η8 =   β83 β84 β85 β86 β87        ζ8 
η9 = β91 β92      β98    γ93   ζ9 
Note. η1 and η2 represent the manipulation checks (i.e., perceived outcome severity and perceived quadratic relational 
closeness). η3 through η6 are the degree of  internal attribution, controllability, the degree of external attribution, and 
uncontrollability. η7 is expected responsibility assigned to the offender and η8 is expected anger felt by victims. η9 refers to 
LDA (the composite measure for the likelihood of selecting a defensive account). ξ1 through ξ5 are outcome severity and 
relational closeness manipulations and the interactions variables (see Figur  2 for the explanation of the interaction variables).  
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Table 11 
The Unstandardized Structural Coefficients for the Model 
η   η1 η2 η3 η4 η5 η6 η7 η8 η9 ξ1 ξ2 ξ3 ξ4 ξ5  
η1 =           0.74**      
η2 =            0.31**     
η3 =              0.94   
η4 =              0.30   
η5 =               -0.89  
η6 =               0.03  
η7 =  0.36**  0.09** 0.26** 0.04** -0.12**         
η8 =    -0.01 0.26** -0.01 0.13** 0.57**         
η9 =  0.10** -0.02            -0.12**    -0.02    
 ** p < .01.  
Note. See Figure 2 for the explanation of each label.   
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Figure 4. Structural relations proposed in the hypotheses with unstandardized structural coefficients.  
















improvement over the null model.  
Although the χ² value was used as an indication of model fit, some scholars argue 
that the χ² is not an appropriate measure of model fit with a sample larger than 200 
(Kline, 2005). Kline proposed that the ratio of χ²/df as a more effective measure of fit 
when N > 200; Kline suggested a ratio less than 3.00 was acceptable. For the current 
model, χ²/df = 2.56. The proposed model still could be considered as a good fit based on 
Kline’s suggestion. SEM scholars (e.g., Bollen, 1989; Hu & Bentler, 1998, 1999) also 
have recommended that multiple fit indices should be considered to evaluate the fit of a 
model, given the advantages and disadvantages of each fit index. The goodness-of-fit 
criteria used here are based on Hu and Bentler’s (1998, 1999) recommendation of a two-
index presentation strategy, using SRMR supplemented with other indices such as CFI, 
RNI, and RMSEA. Hu and Bentler (1999) specified that a cutoff value close to .95 for 
CFI, a cutoff value close to .08 for SRMR, a cutoff value close to .95 for RNI, and a 
cutoff value close to .06 for RMSEA. The proposed model had following fit indices: 
SRMR = .21, CFI = .94 and RMSEA = .08 with a 90% CI of (.08, .09). Based on Hu and 
Bentler’s criteria, the proposed model did not have a good fit.  
Hypotheses Testing 
 Ten hypotheses were proposed regarding the attributional processes individuals 
engage in to determine their accounts. The effects of the exogenous variables on their 
relevant endogenous variables were examined. 
 H1 predicts that outcome severity influences the expected responsibility assgned 
to offenders. In particular, when the outcome is severe, offenders expect more 
responsibility assigned to them than when the outcome is not severe. The effect of  
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outcome severity on the expected responsibility was significant, β = 0.36, z = 6.50, p < 
.01. H1 was supported. The positive sign of the coefficient indicated that more 
responsibility was expected to be assigned to offenders when the outcome was severe 
than when the outcome was not severe.  
One research question was proposed regarding the influence of outcome severity 
on the selection of an account. The effect of outcome severity on the selection of an 
account was significant, β = 0.10, z = 3.45, p < .01. As discussed in the construction of 
LDA (the composite measure of the likelihood of selecting a defensive account), the 
higher the value of LDA, a more defensive account will be more likely to be selected. 
The positive sign of the β coefficient indicates that when the outcome was severe, 
offenders were more likely to use a more defensive account than when the outcome was 
not severe. The results are consistent with Schönbach’s (1990) idea. Schönbach argued 
that when facing severe outcome, offenders often fear the pressure to take full 
responsibility for their offenses. To shift some responsibility to reasons other than 
themselves, the offenders tend to take a more defensive stand than when the outcome of 
their behavior is not severe.  
H2 proposed that relational closeness influences people’s choice of accounts 
curvilinearly. It is predicted that a defensive account is less likely to be used wh n two 
parties involved in a conflict have a moderate level of relational closeness than when two 
parties are strangers or when two parties are close friends. The results were not 
significant, β = -0.02, z = -30.77, p > .05. The negative sign of the coefficient implies that 
when conflict occurs between two parties with a moderate level of relational cl seness, 
offenders are more likely to use a defensive account than when the two parties are close 
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friends or strangers. The direction was opposite to the hypothesis. H2 was not supported.  
H3 predicts that outcome severity and relational closeness interact to influence th  
offenders’ selection of accounts in a conflict situation. It is hypothesized that when a 
severe conflict occurs between two close friends, a less defensive account is more likely 
to be used than when the conflict is not severe. However, when a severe conflict happens 
between two strangers, offenders are more likely to use a more defensive account than 
when the conflict is not severe. When two parties involved in a conflict have a moderate 
level of relational closeness, a less defensive account is more likely to be used than when 
the conflict occurs between parties that are distant or close, regardless of outcome 
severity. The independent variable was the interaction variable (ξ3). H3 was not 
supported, r = -0.02, z = -0.44, p > .05. There was no interaction of outcome severity and 
relational closeness on offenders’ selection of accounts.     
H4 had four subsets of hypotheses regarding the attributional processes that 
offenders engage in after a conflict has occurred. It was predicted that when a severe 
conflict occurs between close friends, internal (H4a) and controllable attributions (H4b) 
are more likely than in all other conditions; however, when a severe conflict occurs 
between strangers, offenders tend to attribute their own negative behaviors to external 
(H4c) and uncontrollable reasons (H4d) more than in all other conditions. No significant 
results were found, r = 0.94, z = 1.87, p > .05 for internal attribution; γ = 0.30, z = 1.09, p 
> .05 for controllability; γ = -0.89, z = -1.17, p > .05 for external attribution; and γ = 0.03, 
z = 0.10, p > .05 for uncontrollability. H4 was not supported. Although the results were 
not significant, the signs of the coefficients suggest that when a severe conflict occurs 
between close friends, internal and controllable attributions are more likely to be made by 
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offenders than other conditions. However, when a severe conflict happens between 
strangers, offenders is less likely to make external attribution and more likely to make 
uncontrollable attribution than other conditions.  
 H5 to H8 examined the relationship between attributions and expected 
responsibility and expected anger. Specifically, H5a specified a positive influ nce of 
internal attribution on expected responsibility, and H5b predicted a positive influence of 
internal attribution on expected anger. H5a was supported, β = 0.09, z = 3.72, p < .01. 
The positive sign of the β coefficient indicates that when offenders attribute their 
behaviors more to their internal traits, they expect more responsibility to be assigned to 
them. H5b was not supported, β = -0.01, z = -0.32, p > .05. The negative sign of the 
coefficient suggests an opposite direction to what was predicted in H5b: When offenders 
attribute their behaviors more to their internal characteristics, they expect less anger 
would be felt by the victim. H5 was partially supported.  
H6 predicted that controllability positively influences expected responsibility to 
be assigned to offenders and expected anger felt by the victim. H6a predicted when 
offenders attributed their behavior more to controllable reasons, they expectd more 
responsibility assigned to them. Findings were significant, β = 0.26, z = 6.29, p < .01. The 
positive sign of the β indicates the positive influence of controllability on responsibility 
expected to be assigned to offenders. H6b predicted a positive influence of controllabili y 
on expected anger. Results were significant, β = 0.26, z = 6.85, p < .01. The positive sign 
of the β coefficient suggests that when offenders make more controllable attribution, they 
expect more anger to be felt by the victim. H6 was supported.  
H7 stated that when offenders attributed their behaviors more to external reasons, 
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they expected less responsibility to be assigned to them and less anger felt by victims. 
Significant results were found for expected responsibility, β = 0.04, z = 2.50, p < .01. 
However, the positive sign of the coefficient suggests that the direction of external 
attribution’s influence on expected responsibility is opposite to the prediction in H7a. The 
results showed that when offenders make more external attribution, they expect mor  
responsibility to be assigned to them. No significant results were found for the influence 
of external attribution on expected anger, β = -0.01, z = -0.48, p > .05. The negative sign 
of the coefficient showed that when more external attribution is made, offenders expect 
less anger to be felt by the victim. H7 was not supported.  
As for attributions to uncontrollable reasons, H8 predicted uncontrollability 
negatively influenced expected responsibility (H8a) and anger (H8b). H8a was supported, 
β = -0.12, z = -2.88, p < .01. The negative sign of the coefficient indicates that when 
offenders make more uncontrollable attribution, they expect victims to assign less 
responsibility to them. Significant results were found for H8b, β = 0.13, z = 3.66, p < .01. 
However, the positive sign of the coefficient indicates that when more uncontrollable 
attribution is made, offenders expect more anger felt by victims, which is opposite to the 
prediction in H8b. H8 was partially supported.   
 Expected responsibility was predicted to positively influence expected anger in 
Hypothesis 9. The results supported this relationship, β = 0.57, z = 10.54, p < .05. The 
positive sign of the coefficient indicates that more expected responsibility leads to more 
expected anger. H9 was supported.  
H10 predicted a negative influence of expected anger on offenders’ selection of 
accounts: When offenders expect more anger felt by victims, they will be less likely to 
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use a defensive account. The findings were statistically significant, β = -0.14, z = -4.91, p 
< .01. The negative sign of the coefficient suggests that a defensive account is less l kely 
to be selected when offenders expect more anger felt by the victims. H10 was supported.  
 Overall the model did not have a good fit. Among the ten hypotheses and one 
research question, five hypotheses were supported and two other hypotheses (H5 and H8) 
were partially supported. The two coefficients that tested the manipulations were 
significant also, consistent with the manipulation checks that were conducted outside f 
the model testing, γ = 0.74, z = 10.53, p < .01 for outcome severity manipulation check 
and γ = 0.31, z = 6.03, p < .01 for relational closeness manipulation check (for the 
quadratic relational closeness).  
Post-Hoc Analyses 
 Post-hoc analyses were conducted to further explore the influence of relati nal 
closeness and outcome severity on offenders’ choice of accounts. First, the non-
significant hypotheses in the model testing were examined separately. Second, 
modification indices for the model tested in the above section were examined for 
additional paths to improve the model fit. Third, the model was revised based on the 
results in the first two steps and the revised model was tested using LISREL 8.70 
(Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2004).  
Hypothesis Testing 
The non-significant results in the model testing may be due to multicolinearity 
among the five exogenous variables. The correlation matrix of the five exogenous 
variables in the proposed model had a determinant of .11. Among ten correlations formed 
by these five variables, seven of them were statistically significant. See Table 12 for all 
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Table 12 
Intercorrelations between the Five Exogenous Variables 
Variables  ξ1  ξ2  ξ3  ξ4  ξ5     
   ξ1   1  .01  .03  .46**  .43**     
   ξ2           1  .01  .33**  .31**  
   ξ3       1  .57**  -.55**  
   ξ4         1  -.21** 
   ξ5                  1 
** p < .01.  
Note. ξ1 refers to outcome severity manipulation (low outcome severity was coded as -1 
and high outcome severity was coded 1) and ξ2 refers to relational closeness manipulation 
(quadratic coding: low relational closeness was coded as 1, moderate relational closeness 
was coded as -2, and high relational closeness was coded as 1). ξ3, ξ4, and ξ5 refer to the 
interactions between outcome severity and relational closeness. ξ3 was calculated by 
multiplying the outcome severity manipulation and relational closeness manipul tion. ξ4 
refers to the coding of the high severity and close relationship condition (coded as 1) 
versus all other five conditions (coded as 0). ξ5 refers to the coding of the  high severity 




the correlation coefficients among the five exogenous variables. According to Kline 
(2005), a small determinant of the correlation or covariance matrix can lead to non-
significant structural coefficients, which may partly explain the non-sig ificant results in 
the current research. The paths that were not significant in the model testing were 
examined again separately. Specifically, H2, H3, H4, H5b, and H7b were re-tested.  
H2 hypothesized a curvilinear effect of relational closeness on offenders’ choice 
of accounts. Specifically, when a conflict occurs between two parties who have a 
moderate level of relational closeness, offenders are less likely to use a mordefensive 
account than when the conflict occurs between close friends or between stranger . A 
linear regression was conducted to test H2, where the quadratic relational closeness  
manipulation check was entered as the independent variable and LDA (the composite 
measure of accounts) was entered as the dependent variable. The results were significant, 
β = -0.64, F(1, 233) = 9.68, p < .05, R² = .04. However, the negative sign of the β 
coefficient suggests that when a conflict occurs between two parties that are moderately 
close, offenders are more likely to use defensive accounts than when a conflict occurs 
between friends or between strangers. The direction was opposite to the prediction in the 
hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 3 proposed an interaction between outcome severity and relational 
closeness on offenders’ choice of accounts. When a conflict occurs between close friends,
a less defensive account is more likely to be used in a severe situation than in a not-
severe situation. When the conflict occurs between two parties who have a moderate lev l 
of relationship, a less defensive account will be used regardless of the severity of the 
outcome. When the conflict happens between strangers, a more defensive account is more 
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likely to be used in a severe situation than in a not-severe situation. An ANOVA was 
used to examine H3. LDA, the likelihood of selecting a defensive account, was used as 
the dependent variable and the interaction between outcome severity and relational 
closeness was entered as the independent variable. The interaction variable (i.e., ξ3 in the 
model tested previously) was created by multiplying outcome severity manipul tion (high 
severity coded as 1 and low severity coded as -1) and relational closeness manipulatio  
(linear coding: high relational closeness coded as 1, moderate relational closeness coded 
as 0, and low relational closeness coded as -1).  
The results were significant, F(2, 232) = 4.97, p < .05, η² = .04. The direction of 
the influence was consistent with the hypothesis. When a conflict occurs between high 
relationally close parties, offenders are less likely to use a more defensive account in a 
severe-outcome situation (M = 60.83, SD = 4.53) than in a not severe-outcome situation 
(M = 61.21, SD = 4.51). When the conflict occurs between low relational closeness 
parties, offenders are more likely to use a more defensive account in a severe-outcome 
situation (M = 61.21, SD = 4.51) than in a not-severe-outcome situation (M = 60.83, SD = 
4.53). When the conflict occurs between moderate relational closeness parties, offenders’ 
likelihood of using accounts did not differ by different levels of outcome severity (M = 
62.93, SD = 4.22). H3 was supported.  
 Hypothesis 4 predicted relational closeness and outcome severity interact to 
influence offenders’ attributions. H4 had four subsets of hypotheses. H4a and H4b 
predicted that when a severe conflict occurs between high relationally close parties, 
offenders are more likely to make internal and controllable attributions than in all other 
situations. H4c and H4d hypothesized that when a severe outcome conflict occurs 
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between low relationally close parties, offenders are more likely to makeexternal and 
uncontrollable attributions than in all other conditions. To examine H4, the six 
experimental conditions created by two levels of outcome severity (high vs. low) and 
three levels of relational closeness (high vs. moderate vs. low) were coded into two 
variables. The first variable (i.e., ξ4 in the model tested previously) was coded the 
following way: The high outcome severity and high relational closeness condition was 
coded as 1 and all other five conditions were coded as 0. The second variable (i.e., ξ5 in 
the model tested previously) was coded that the high outcome severity and low relational 
closeness condition was 1 and all other five conditions were 0.  
ξ4 was entered as an independent variable in a MANOVA, the first component 
scores of the degree of internal attribution and controllability being the depen nt 
variables. No significant results were found, F(1, 234) = 3.43, p = .07, η² = .01 for the 
degree of internal attribution and F(1, 234) = 0.68, p = .41, η² = .003 for controllability. 
Another MANOVA was conducted with ξ5 as independent variable and the first 
components of the degree of external attribution and uncontrollability as the dependent 
variables. The results were not significant, F(1, 234) = 1.13, p = .29, η² = .01 for the 
degree of external attribution and F (1, 234) = 0.08, p = .78, η² = .00 for uncontrollability.  
Hypothesis 5b predicted that when offenders make more internal attribution, more 
anger is expected to be felt by the victim. The first components of the degree of internal 
attribution and expected anger were obtained to be used in a regression analysis. A linear 
regression was conducted with the degree of internal attribution as the independent 
variable and expected anger as the dependent variable. The results were significant, β = 
0.56, F(1, 234) = 104.23, p < .01, R² = .31. The positive sign of the coefficient suggests 
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that when offenders made more internal attribution, more anger was expected to be 
elicited by the victim.  
Hypothesis 7b proposed a negative influence of external attribution on expected 
anger. The first components of the degree of external attribution and expected anger were 
used in a regression analysis to test H7b. The results were significant, β = 0.28, F(1, 234) 
= 19.36, p < .01, R² = .08. Although the results were significant, the positive sign of the 
coefficient indicates that when more external attribution is made, more anger is expected, 
which is opposite to the prediction.  
The significant paths that were indicated by the exploratory analyses were kept in 
the model. That is, the influence from perceived quadratic relational closeness on 
people’s choice of accounts, the influence from the degree of internal attribution on 
expected anger, the influence of the degree of external attribution on expected anger, and 
the interaction of outcome severity and relational closeness on people’s choice of 
accounts remained in the model. All the paths that indicated the effect of outcome 
severity and relational closeness on the attributions people make were removed from the 
model due to non-significant results in both the model testing and the exploratory 
analyses.  
Modification Indices 
Modification indices for the proposed model (see Figure 2) suggested the 
maximum χ² change would occur when a path was established from expected 
responsibility to controllable attribution (∆χ² = 168.34). However, it was expected that 
people’s attributions influence their perceptions of expected responsibility and expected 
anger, and then influence their choice of accounts, not vice versa. The study was also 
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conducted in a way that attribution was first made and then participants were asked to 
expect how much responsibility to be assigned. Several other paths that had large va ue 
of modification indices, such as a link that indicated the influence from expected 
responsibility on internal attribution (∆χ² = 158.64), had the same problem. Those paths, 
although they have large modification indices, were not considered in the revised model. 
It was hypothesized that outcome severity and relational closeness interacted to 
influence different attributions. These hypotheses were not supported. However, the 
model’s modification indices suggested that outcome severity alone may influence 
different attributions via perceived outcome severity. If a path is added from perceived 
outcome severity to the degree of internal attribution, the expected change in the χ² value 
is 36.26. If a path is established from perceived outcome severity to controllability 
attribution, the expected χ² change is 64.30. If a path is added from perceived outcome 
severity to the degree of external attribution, the expected ∆χ² equals 26.48. If a path is 
added from perceived outcome severity to uncontrollability attribution, the expect d χ² 
change is 9.05. Those paths were considered in revising the model. Furthermore, 
modification indices suggested a path from perceived outcome severity to expected anger 
(∆χ² = 57.71). It was hypothesized that when an offender perceives the outcome of a 
conflict to be severe, he or she expects more responsibility to be assigned to him or her; 
in turn, more expected responsibility is expected to lead to more expected anger. The 
influence of perceived outcome severity on expected anger is mediated by expected 
responsibility. However, a direct influence is also possible. Thus, the path from perceived 




 Based on the exploratory analyses and modification indices, the following 
changes are made to revise the model: (a) Two interaction variables (ξ4 and ξ5, see Figure 
2 for the detailed description of these two variables) did not influence attributions as 
predicted in Hypothesis 4. The relevant paths were removed from the model. (b) The 
influence of perceived outcome severity on expected responsibility was mediated by 
attributions (i.e., the degree of internal attribution, controllability, the degree of xternal 
attribution, and uncontrollability). Four paths were added to demonstrate the mediation 
by attributional processes. (c) An additional path was added from perceived outcome 
severity to expected anger. See Figure 5 for the revised model. The dotted lines represent 
the paths added to the original model based on exploratory analyses and the modification 
indices.  
Testing the Revised Model 
 The revised model was tested with structural equation modeling using LISREL 
8.70 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2004). The model consisted of structural and measurement 
components. Model specifications are listed in Table 13, and unstandardized structural 
coefficients are reported in Table 14 and Figure 6. The covariance matrix analyzed in 
LISREL is found in Appendix O. LISREL syntax for model testing can be found in 
Appendix P. Figure 5 only illustrates the structural model of the relationship between the 
exogenous and endogenous variables. The measurement models are not included in the 
figure but they were included in the model testing.  
For the revised model, the chi-square was significant, χ²(883, N = 236) = 2210.26, 
p < .01. Compared to the model before revision, chi-square value was improved by  
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Figure 5. Structural relations based on post-hoc analysis.  
Note. All exogenous variables are allowed to covary and all error terms are 
allowed to covary. The dotted lines represent the paths added based on the exploratory 
analyses and modification indices. The labels and coding for each variable can be found 


















Structural Equations of the Revised Model Based on Modification Indices and Exploratory Analyses  
η   η1 η2 η3 η4 η5 η6 η7 η8 η9 ξ1 ξ2 ξ3 ζ 
η1 =           γ11   ζ1  
η2 =            γ22  ζ2 
η3 =  β31            ζ3  
η4 =  β41            ζ4 
η5 =  β51            ζ5  
η6 =  β61            ζ6 
η7 =  β71  β73 β74 β75 β76       ζ7  
η8 =  β81  β83 β84 β85 β86 β87      ζ8 
η9 =  β91 β92      β98    γ93 ζ9 
Note. Bold symbols represent the paths that were added based on exploratory analyses ad modification indices. See Figure 2 
for the labels and coding of each variable.  
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Table 14 
Unstandardized Structural Coefficients for the Revised Model 
η   η1 η2 η3 η4 η5 η6 η7 η8 η9 ξ1 ξ2 ξ3 ζ 
η1 =           0.74**   ζ1  
η2 =            0.31**  ζ2 
η3 =  1.18**            ζ3  
η4 =  0.74**            ζ4 
η5 =  1.30**            ζ5  
η6 =  0.24**            ζ6 
η7 =  0.29**  0.08** 0.29** 0.04** -0.11**      ζ7  
η8 =  0.48**  0.01 0.15** -0.01 0.05 0.37**      ζ8 
η9 =  0.11** -0.02      -0.14**   -0.02 ζ9 
 * p < .05; ** p < .01.  
Note. Bold values represent the paths that were added based on exploratory analyses and modification indices. See Figure 2 for 
the labels and coding of each variable.  
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Figure 6. The revised model with unstandardized structural coefficients.  
** p < .01. See Figure 2 for the labels and coding of each variable.  



















265.63. Given that ∆df equaled 83, the revised model was a significant improvement  
over the original model. For the revised model, the ratio of χ²/d equaled 2.50, which 
indicated a good model fit according to Kline’s (2005) standard. Before the revision, the 
original model had the following fit indices: SRMR = .21, CFI = .94 and RMSEA = .08 
with a 90% CI of (.08, .09). After the revision, model fit indices were improved: SRMR 
= .12, CFI = .95, and RMSEA = .08 with a 90% CI of (.08, .08). Although based on Hu 
and Bentler’s (1999) criteria the revised model still could not be considered a good fit, it 
had been improved from the original model, and the CFI had reached the cutoff standard 
suggested by Hu and Bentler. After examining the χ² value, the ratio of χ²/df, and fit 
indices, the revised model is considered to have a moderate fit. 
Examining the paths in the revised model indicated almost the same pattern as 
shown in the original model: Paths that were significant in the original model wer 
statistically significant in the revised model (except the link between uncontrollability 
and expected anger), and paths that were not significant in the original model testing but 
significant in the exploratory analyses still remained non-significat in the revised model. 
The five paths that were added based on modification indices were significant (see Tabl  
14 for all unstandardized structural coefficients).  
When testing effects outside of the structural equation model, relational clseness 
(quadratic coding) had a significant main effect on offenders’ choice of acc unts and also 
relational closeness interacted with outcome severity to influence offenders’ choice of 
accounts significantly. However, the effect of relational closeness on offenders’ choice of 
accounts was not significant once outcome severity came into the picture. Outcome 
severity influenced offenders’ choice of accounts directly and indirectly via perceived 
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outcome severity, attributions offenders made, and consequences offenders expected. 
Compared with relational closeness, outcome severity is a better predictor about the 




 This chapter consists of four parts. A summary of the study is provided in the first 
part. The second part interprets the results and discusses the study’s implications. The 
third part consists of the study’s limitations and directions for the future resea ch. The 
significance of the study and a conclusion form the last part of the chapter.  
Summary of the Study 
The current research addressed the following question: What attributional 
processes do offenders engage in to determine the account used in a conflict? This s udy 
examined the influence of outcome severity and relational closeness on offenders’ choice 
of accounts, mediated by attributional processes (i.e., internal, external, controllable, and 
uncontrollable attributions) and offenders’ anticipated consequences (i.e., expected 
responsibility and expected anger). Two levels of outcome severity and three levels of 
relational closeness were employed, creating six experimental conditions. In each 
condition, offenders read a hypothetical conflict scenario by imagining they were 
offenders in the conflict and they were interacting with another person.  
Prior to the formal study, six pilot studies were conducted to (a) develop the 
manipulations that would be used in the formal study, (b) develop a measure of accounts 
for the formal study, and (c) test and improve the items that measured all the constru ts. 
The manipulations and instruments that were developed and tested in the pilot studies 
were then used in the formal study.  
The formal study recruited 238 participants enrolled at the University of 
Maryland. Two participants had incomplete data. Pairwise or listwise deletion was used, 
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depending on the type of statistical analyses used. Each participant was randomly 
assigned to one of the six experimental conditions. Questionnaires were employed in the 
study. The questionnaire started with a hypothetical scenario that described a conflict in a 
class project; this scenario was followed by the manipulation checks. The second part of 
the questionnaire asked participants to report their attributions. Participants also reported 
their expectations about the responsibility assigned to them and the anger felt by th  
victim in the scenario. Participants were then asked to report the likelihood of selecting 
each account developed from Pilot Study 4.6 Participants’ demographic information was 
collected in the last part of the questionnaire. After participants completed their 
questionnaire, they were fully debriefed.  
Magnitude scales were used in this study. Items that violated the assumption of 
normality were transformed by a power transformation. Confirmatory factor nalyses 
(CFAs) were conducted to examine the dimensions of each construct. When χ² value and 
fit indices indicated that there was more than one factor for some variables, principal 
components analyses (PCAs) were conducted to explore the potential components. No 
rotation was used in the PCAs. The results from CFAs and PCAs determined the itms 
that were included in the structural equation model. The hypotheses were tested using 
structural equation modeling. Outcome severity, relational closeness, and their 
interactions were dummy coded and entered as exogenous variables (see Figur  2 for the 
details of labels and coding of each variable). Manipulation checks were used as 
mediating variables; offenders’ choice of account was used as an outcome variable; nd 
attributional processes and anticipated consequences were also expected to mediate the 
                                                
6 The likelihood results of the formal study were combined with the defensiveness results collected from 
Pilot Study 5 to create the composite measure (LDA) used in model and hypothesis testing. The details 
about the creation of LDA can be found on pp. 86-88.   
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influence of the independent variables on offenders’ choice of accounts. The post-hoc 
analyses were conducted for model fit improvement and better understanding of accounts 
that offenders use in conflict situations.    
Summary of Results 
Hypothesis 1: Influence of Outcome Severity on Expected Responsibility 
 Outcome severity was predicted to positively affect responsibility assigned to 
offenders (Walster, 1966). Previous research has suggested that victims or observers 
perceive offenders to be less careful when the outcome is severe; therefore, victims or 
observers tend to assign more responsibility to offenders (Walster, 1966). From the 
offenders’ perspective, when they perceive the outcome as severe, offenders would 
expect little chance for them not to be blamed for what has happened. Therefore, 
offenders expect victims to assign more responsibility to them when the outcome is 
severe than when the outcome is not severe. The results showed a significant positive 
effect of outcome severity on expected responsibility. Offenders, when the outcome is 
severe, tend to expect more responsibility to be assigned to them.   
Research Question 1: Effect of Outcome Severity on the Choice of Accounts 
Researchers have argued for opposing possibilities of outcome severity’s effect on 
people’s choice of accounts. McLaughlin, O’Hair, et al. (1983) stated that when an 
outcome is severe, people tend to use less defensive accounts, such as concessions, for 
the purpose of easing the tension aroused by their behaviors and to maintain a good 
image. However, Schönbach (1990) argued that although there is a possibility that 
offenders may use a less defensive account to present a good image in the situation, when 
an outcome is really severe, taking responsibility may be a great burden for offenders. 
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Instead, offenders may reject or deny their responsibility to save their fac. They will 
choose more defensive accounts when the severity of an outcome is more severe. The 
results favored Schönbach’s prediction: When offenders perceived that the outcome was 
severe, offenders were more likely to use a more defensive account, such as a 
justification, than when the outcome is not severe.  
Hypotheses 2: Influence of Relational Closeness on the Choice of Accounts 
 It is argued in H2 that when a conflict occurs between parties that are moderately 
close, offenders are less likely to use a defensive account than when the conflict occurs 
between parties that are close or distant. A curvilinear effect of relational cl seness on 
offenders’ choice of accounts was proposed in H2. However, the path indicated by H2 in 
the structural equation model was not significant. When testing H2 outside of the model,
the results suggested that relational closeness indeed influences offenders’ choice of 
accounts, in a way opposite to the prediction in H2: Offenders were more likely to use a 
defensive account when moderately close to the victim than when relational closeness 
between the offender and the victim was high or low. One possibility is when 
manipulating the moderate relational closeness in the hypothetical conflict scenario, 
participants were told that they have known the other person in the conflict because they 
have taken several courses together but they did not really hang out after school. 
Although participants were told that they had interactions with the other party in the past 
(mostly in class), it did not necessarily indicate that they would take courses together 
again; that is, participants may not perceive a high possibility of future interaction wi h 
the victim. Another possibility is the influence of relational closeness on the choice of 
accounts may depend on how severe the outcome is.  
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Hypotheses3: Influence of Relational Closeness and Outcome Severity on the Choice of 
Accounts 
Hypothesis 3 examined the interaction of relational closeness and outcome 
severity on offenders’ choice of accounts. It was argued that when a severeconflict 
occurs between two parties who are close, offenders are less likely to use a defensive 
account than when the conflict is not severe. When the conflict occurs in a moderate 
relational closeness situation, offenders are less likely to use a defensive account than 
when the conflict is between two parties that are distant or close, regardless of the 
severity of outcome. When a conflict occurs between strangers, offenders are more likely 
to use a defensive account than when the conflict is not severe. So offenders select their 
account depending on the interaction between outcome severity and relational closeness. 
Similar as Hypothesis 2, when H3 was tested in the structural equation model, the path 
was not significant. However, when testing the hypothesis outside of the model, 
significant results suggested that outcome severity and relational closeness interact to 
influence offenders’ choice of accounts.   
Hypotheses 4: Attributional Processes 
Hypothesis 4 specified the effect of outcome severity and relational closeness on 
offenders’ attributional processes. The findings did not support the predictions in H4. The 
interaction variables created by outcome severity and relational closeness did not 
influence the attributions offenders made. In the post-hoc analysis, the modification 
indices suggested that outcome severity alone may influence the attributions offenders 
make and then influence the expectation of consequences and the choice of accounts. 
Additional paths were added to the model to test the influence of outcome severity and 
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attributions offenders make. The findings of the revised model suggested that when the 
outcome is severe, offenders tend to make more attributions (more internal attribution, 
more controllability attribution, more external attribution, and more uncontrollability 
attribution) than when outcome is not severe. Maybe when offenders perceive that their 
behavior leads to a severe outcome, they search for any possible reason for the behavior 
in question so that they can decide which reason works best to explain their behavior to 
the victim.  
Hypotheses 5: Internal Attribution and Anticipated Consequences 
H5 proposed that the attributions offenders make influences their expectations 
about the responsibilities to be assigned to them and expected anger: When causes are 
perceived to be internal, offenders acknowledge that they are the major causes of the 
conflict; thus, they expect more responsibility assigned to them by victims (H5a). 
Furthermore, when offenders make more internal attributions, they expect victims to feel 
angrier toward their wrong-doings (H5b). The findings indicated that when offenders 
make more internal attribution, they expect more responsibility to be assigned to them. 
However, the degree of internal attribution made by offenders does not influence th  
expectation of anger felt by the victim. Given that the expected responsibility 
significantly influences the expected anger, as indicated by the results for Hypothesis 9, 
it’s possible that the direct influence of internal attribution on the expected anger is 
cancelled out by the mediating effect.  
Hypotheses 6: Controllability and Anticipated Consequences 
H6 proposed a positive influence of controllability attribution on anticipated 
consequences: When offenders perceive that they have control over what has happened, 
 126
they expect the victims to assign more responsibility to them because offenders could 
have done otherwise to prevent the conflict. Furthermore, offenders expect that the 
victims have more anger as well. The findings suggested that the controllability 
attribution positively affected the amount of responsibility that was expected to be 
assigned to offenders and the amount of anger expected to be felt by victims. When 
offenders realize that they could have prevented what has happened, they need to watch 
out for the anger from the victim.  
Hypotheses 7: External Attribution and Anticipated Consequences 
H7 specified a negative influence of external attribution on expected 
consequences. When an external attribution is made by offenders, they expect victims to 
assign less responsibility to them and feel less angry. The results did not tell such a story: 
External attributions did not significantly influence offenders’ expected responsibility 
and expected anger; furthermore, the positive sign of β c efficient implied that when 
offenders make more external attribution, they expect the victims to assign more 
responsibility to them, which was opposite to the prediction. As discussed by Konovsky 
and Jaster (1989), external attribution may not work all the time. When offenders 
attribute their wrong-doings to external causes, they may be perceived as lacking in the 
ability to take care of their own behaviors or to be simply dishonest about what they have 
done. When victims believe that the offenders are not sincere, they may assign more 
responsibility to the offenders as a punishment.  
Hypotheses 8: Uncontrollability and Anticipated Consequences 
 H8 specified that when offenders make more uncontrollability attribution, they 
believe there is nothing much they could have done to prevent what has happened. 
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Therefore, offenders do not see themselves as being responsible for the conflict and they 
expect less responsibility to be assigned to them and less anger to be felt by victims. It 
was found that when the causes are uncontrollable, offenders do not expect themselves to 
be held responsible for their wrong-doings. However, the results indicated that even when 
uncontrollable reasons are believed to lead to the conflict, offenders still expect victims to 
be angry, which is opposite to the prediction. An explanation of these results is that 
although uncontrollable reasons could shift some amount of responsibility from the 
offenders, what has happened does negatively influence the victims. Offenders may still 
expect certain negative emotions, such as anger, could arise naturally as the consequence 
of the offenders’ wrong-doing.  
Hypothesis 9: Expected Responsibility and Expected Anger 
Judgment of responsibility was believed to positively influence the feeling of 
anger (Allred et al., 1997; Liu & Yao, 2007). H9 stated that when offenders expect more 
responsibility to be assigned to them by victims, they also expect victims to be angri r. 
These findings were consistent with the hypothesis. When one is judged to be responsible 
for a negative incident, more feelings of anger are expected.  
Hypothesis 10: Expected Anger and the Choice of Accounts 
When offenders expected more anger to be felt by victims, to reduce the negative 
emotion and possibly decrease the responsibility, they are less likely to use a defensive 
account. The findings supported this hypothesis. Offenders apparently determin  their 
accounts based on their expectations of the victims’ anger. If they sense the victims get 
furious because of their behaviors, they tend to be nice and be less defensive; however, if 
they believe victims are not so angry about their behavior, they are more likely to take a 
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defensive stand when explaining their behaviors.  
How do People Decide the Accounts to Use in Conflict Situations? 
When people know that their behaviors lead to a conflict, how will they explain 
their behaviors? According to the findings of the current research, people choose t eir 
accounts mainly based on how serious the outcome is. The relationship between the 
parties involved in a conflict may also play a role in how offenders explain their 
behaviors. For example, if a conflict happens between two acquaintances, e.g., 
classmates, offenders tend to choose a more defensive account to explain their wrong-
doings, compared to when the conflict occurs between two close friends or between two 
strangers.  
But none of this matters if the conflict has severe consequences. When offenders 
perceive that a severe outcome has been caused by their behaviors, no matter with whom 
they have the conflict, offenders may think about defending themselves, perhaps as a 
method to protect their own images. But the determination of accounts is well calculated. 
When offenders perceive that their behaviors lead to a severe outcome, they seek outall 
possible reasons, internal, external, controllable, or uncontrollable, and they imagine how 
much responsibility the victim may assign to them and how angry the victim may be. 
After deliberately considering the causes of the conflict and the reaction from the victim, 
offenders will select the account that they think benefits them most.  
How do offenders know which account works best? They imagine how angry the 
victim may be and how much responsibility the victim is willing to assign to them. If 
offenders believe that the victims will assign more responsibility to them and the victims 
will become angry, the offenders will then be nice and use a less defensive account, such 
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as admitting their wrong-doings or offering some compensation. On the other hand, if 
offenders think that the victims are not so angry about the wrong-doing, they tend to take 
a more defensive stand, such as pointing to external reasons as the cause of the conflict or 
denying their connection to the behavior in question.  
Limitations of the Study and the Direction for Future Research 
This study has several limitations regarding the conceptualization of accounts, the 
measure for the accounts, and the hypothetical scenario used in the formal study.  
Limitation Regarding the Conceptualization of Accounts 
 The current research examined four types of accounts: concession, justification, 
excuse, and refusal. Offenders’ actions were assumed to be self-serving: Offe ders 
choose different types of accounts to defend themselves. Therefore, the four types of 
accounts represent the extent to which offenders defend themselves in a conflict situation. 
As indicated by the results from Pilot Study 5, concession was found to be the leas 
defensive type of accounts and refusal was found to be the most defensive type of 
accounts. The defensiveness levels of justification and excuse were in the middl  and 
justification was more defensive than excuse, which was opposite to what Schönbach 
(1990) proposed. However, one caveat to this assumption is that not all accounts are self-
serving. An offender may use an account to honestly describe what has occurred in a 
conflict situation, so that the account is not intended to defend oneself at all. The 
defensiveness continuum of accounts cannot be applied to all types of accounts. Future 
research may explore other continua to describe different types of accounts and may 
consider other types of accounts other than the four types investigated in the current 
research.  
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 Further, the current research argues that offenders use different types of accounts 
to maintain their self image or maintain the relationship with others. However, the goals 
of different types of accounts are assumed, not tested, in this dissertation. Offenders may 
consider different goals in different relationships, rather than simply trying to maintain 
the relationship. Future research should scrutinize the different goals offenders may try to 
fulfill and examine the account-making process through a goal perspective.  
Limitation Regarding the Dependent Measures  
Each construct proposed in the theoretical model was measured by 5 to 7 items, 
which were developed and tested in several pilot studies. Reliability coefficients for all 
the measures were acceptable and in some cases good. However, fit indices from the 
majority of the measurement models indicate non-unidimensional factor structures. Fo  
example, the measures for the four types of attributions all had more than one underlying 
factors, which may contribute to the non-significant results about attributional processes.  
Previous research on accounts often asked participants to self-report the actual 
accounts they used in an incident and use coders to code these responses. The current 
research took a different approach. A list of accounts was developed and provided to 
participants to indicate their likelihood of choosing each account. Although this approach 
provides a measure that can be adopted in other conflict situations, it has its limita ion. 
The accounts people make in a conflict situation may be much more complicated than the 
list of accounts provided in the measure. Also people often use more than one type of 
accounts. The measure used in the current research constrained participants to only a
limited amount of accounts. Future research may use both methods (i.e., self report of 
actual accounts and selection from a list of provided accounts) to better understand 
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people’s choice of accounts and may consider examining the sequences of accounts, 
instead of a single account.  
Further, this study only focused on the offenders’ perspective for selecting 
accounts. To determine the accounts to be used in a conflict situation, offenders seem to
go through a series of calculations: They consider the reasons that lead to their wrong-
doing and they imagine the victims’ reactions, such as how much responsibility the 
victims will assign to the offenders and how angry the victims will be. But all these 
variables were assessed only from the offenders’ perspective. Whether the accounts 
offenders select will work out (i.e., accepted by the victims) remains a question. The 
acceptance of accounts is beyond the scope of the study but is an important topic for the 
future research.   
Limitation Regarding the Hypothetical Conflict Scenario 
 This study used one hypothetical conflict scenario and asked participants to 
imagine they were the offenders in the conflict. Although using hypothetical scenarios 
had its advantages, the problems with hypothetical scenarios bring cautions about 
interpreting and applying the study’s results. The current research is based on th  
assumption that people deliberately process information at the time of conflict a d they 
are engaged in making attributions, expecting consequences for their communication, and 
selecting an account. However, Nisbett and Wilson (1977) pointed out that “in 
dissonance and attribution studies…people appear to be unable to report that a cognitive 
process has occurred” (p. 246), which may explain why the paths to the attributions in the 
original model were not significant. It is also possible that the processes described in an 
experiment may be different from the processes people experience in an actual 
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interaction. Future research may consider using actual interactions to examin  the 
processes offender may experience in a conflict situation.  
Future Directions: Cultural Differences in Accounts  
The current research only studied the attributional processes involving accounts in 
the United States. Although some hypotheses were not supported, overall the model had a 
moderate fit. The question is whether the model can be extended to different cultures. 
Some features of account-giving and attributional processes provided foundations for 
possible cultural differences in the proposed model.   
First, McLaughlin, Cody et al. (1983), Gonzales, Manning, and Haugen (1992), 
and Takaku (2000) have argued that accounts have implications for face concerns: In 
general, different types of accounts pose different degrees of threats to offenders’ and 
victims’ face. Given the consistent findings on cross-cultural difference in face concerns 
(e.g., Cai & Fink, 2002; Ting-Toomey & Oetzel, 2002), it is expected that culture will 
influence people’s choice of accounts.  
McLaughlin, Cody et al. (1983) and Gonzales et al. (1992) argued that 
concessions, an explanation that admits responsibility and offers compensation, mke 
offenders vulnerable to others’ blame. But using concessions indicates that offenders f el 
sorry about their behaviors and are willing to do something to compensate the victims, 
which saves the victims’ face.  McLaughlin, Cody et al. and Gonzales et al. specifically 
argued that using concessions, among all four types of accounts, poses a maximum threat 
to offenders’ face but a minimum threat to the victims’ face. Excuses also threaten 
offenders’ self face because excuses, like concessions, admit offenders’ responsibility for 
the behavior that led to a conflict. However, when people use excuses, they can point to 
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external reasons as the causes of the behavior in question, the level of threat to offnders’ 
face is less than that posed by a concession. On the other hand, when offenders use 
external reasons to explain their behavior, although offenders admit that they need to take 
responsibility for their behavior, they are not so guilty because they don’t have too much 
control over what has happened. Excuses pose a greater threat to victims’ face than do 
concessions.  
Further, justifications suggest that offenders believe that their behaviors are 
consistent with a higher goal. Therefore, offenders’ self face is protected because 
offenders perceive that they do not have much freedom when it comes to the behavior in 
question; they have to behave in a certain way to fulfill a superordinate goal. Although 
justifications acknowledge offenders’ wrong-doing, offenders do not intend to accept that 
they violate a social norm, which poses a higher threat to victims’ face than eier 
concessions or excuses. McLaughlin, O’Hair, et. al. (1983) and Gonzales et al. (1992) 
stated that when refusals are used, offenders could deny their connection with the 
behavior in question or deny that the behavior in question is inappropriate; as a result, 
refusals protect offenders’ face to the maximum degree but pose the greatest threat to 
victims’ face.   
Studies on conflict management styles have suggested that face concerns vary as a 
function of culture (e.g., Ting-Toomey & Oetzel, 2002). Most of the literature on face 
concerns and conflict management has focused on Chinese and Americans (e.g., Brew & 
Cairns, 2004) and has suggested that Chinese have a higher concern for others’ face than 
Americans do;on the other hand, the literature has argued that Americans’ concern is 
more with self face than others’ face (Ting-Toomey & Oetzel, 2002). Although there are 
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some arguments against this conclusion in research (e.g., Cai & Donohue, 1997), given 
this discussion on face concern and accounts, Chinese offenders are expected to be more 
likely to use a less defensive account in a conflict situation whereas American offenders 
may be more likely to use a more defensive account to handle conflict.  
 A second reason for cultural differences in account use is that attributional 
patterns are different across cultures. For example, the fundamental attribution error 
(FAE, i.e., a tendency to overestimate the influence of personal traits and underestimate 
the influence of situational factors; Ross, 1977) is found in the United States but the
generality of the FAE cross-culturally is arguable. Studies have found that Chinese, as 
compared to Americans, are more likely to rely on external factors to explain an actor’s 
behaviors (e.g., Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999). However, when a negative event 
occurs, Asians are more likely to attribute their own failure to internal reasons (e.g., lack 
of effort) whereas Americans attribute the failure to environmental factors (e.g., the 
difficulty of an exam) (Salili, Maehr, & Gillmore, 1976).  
Findings from those attribution studies suggest that when a conflict occurs, 
Chinese are more likely to make internal attributions about their own behavior whereas 
Americans are more likely to make external attributions. Consequently, to reduce the 
responsibility assigned by victims and alleviate the anger that accompanies a conflict, 
Chinese are less likely to use a defensive account than Americans. Future research may 
test the model in different cultures and examine cultural influences on attributional 
processes involved in the selection of accounts.  
Significance of the Study and Conclusion 
This study attempted to answer one question: What attributional processes do 
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offenders engage in to determine the account to use in a conflict situation? A model was 
established to examine the influence of outcome severity and relational closeness on 
offenders’ choice of accounts, mediated by the attributions offenders make and offenders’ 
anticipation of the victim’s reactions. The data moderately supported the model and 
showed that when the outcome of a conflict is severe, offenders tend to make more 
attributions, expect more responsibility assigned to them, and expect more anger felt by 
the victim, compared to when the outcome is not severe. Based on the expected reaction 
from the victim, offenders will choose an account to explain their wrong-doings (i.e., the 
more expected anger felt by victims, the less likely a defensive account would be 
chosen).  
The driving force for this study came from the discrepancy between the 
significant role of accounts in conflict management and the research that has been done to 
explore this area. When looking at a simple interpersonal conflict (e.g., the vignette at the 
beginning of the current research), explaining one’s behavior constitutes a major part of 
the conflict process. Offenders’ explanation of their behaviors actually lay the foundation 
for how a conflict will be resolved. Offenders’ accounts directly influence victims’ 
perceptions of the causes of the conflict, the offenders’ intentions, the amount of 
responsibility that can be assigned to offenders, and in general, the way the conflict can 
be handled (Sitkin & Bies, 1993). Although accounts play an important role in conflict 
management, relatively little research has explored this simple way of handling conflict 
(e.g., McLaughlin, O’Hair et al., 1983). The current research, one of few studie  
examining how offenders select their accounts, adds to the understanding of account-
development processes.   
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The current research contributes to the literatures of conflict management and 
communication in general because it provides a theoretical model for understanding he 
account-giving processes via an attributional perspective. The current study foc sed on 
interpersonal conflict; however, the results can be cautiously applied to other c nt xts, 
such as organizational communication. In addition, the model can be revised and 
evaluated in diverse ethnicities and cultures, contributing to the cross-cultural 
communication literature. The current research has not explored the account-giving 
process in different cultural contexts; but the discussion of face concerns and attributions 
points to possible cross-cultural studies on accounts in the future.  
The current research contributes to the account literatures in three different 
aspects. First, it changes the focus of account studies from typology development to 
understanding the account-selecting processes. For a long time, McLaughlin et al. (1992) 
have promoted greater understanding of how people create accounts, in addition to 
developing different types of accounts. Researchers have been looking into this issue but 
not many studies have been generated. The current research answers the call to examine 
one account-making process and provides important information about how offenders 
determine the accounts used in a conflict situation.  
Second, the current research took an approach to examine accounts that was 
different from past research. Traditionally, participants are asked to self report a negative 
event and provide the actual accounts they used at that time. After that, trained coders 
code the accounts into different categories. Although this method may have more 
external validity, it limits researchers’ ability to examine specific antecedent conditions 
of interest. The current research employed an experimental design to study the variables 
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of interest and, instead of asking participants to report their accounts, provided a list of
accounts to which they responded. This technique is easy to administer and can be 
adapted to different conflict situations.  
Third, researchers have been mapping types of accounts on different continua; for 
example, Schönbach (1990) used a defensiveness continuum to describe concessions, 
justifications, excuses, and refusals. Schönbach argued that concessions are least
defensive, followed by justifications, and excuses are more defensive than justifications 
but less defensive than refusals. However, Schönbach did not provide any empirical 
evidence for this proposition. One pilot study for the current research actually tested the 
defensiveness levels of these four types of accounts and found that concessions, indeed, 
are the least defensive account whereas refusals are the most defensive. The 
defensiveness of justifications and excuses are significantly different from each other and 
justifications are more defensive than excuses, which is opposite to Schönbach’s original
proposition. Whether Schönbach’s proposition is wrong cannot be determined by results 
from a single study. The current research provides certain empirical f ndings on the 
defensiveness of each type of accounts but more studies are needed for an affirm tive 
answer in the future.   
Different types of accounts have their own features. When used in an 
interpersonal conflict, each type of accounts reflects different expectations offenders have 
about victims’ reactions and possibly implies different goals offenders try to achieve. The 
current research found that offenders will take a less defensive stand to explain their 
behavior when they expect the victim to be angry and to assign more responsibility to 
them, in another word, when offenders expect the victim to be tough. However, when 
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offenders expect the victim to be soft, that is to say, offenders do not expect the victim to 
be so angry and to assign much responsibility to them, offenders then will play hard. A 
Chinese idiom describes it well, qi ruan pa ying (bully the soft ones but be afraid of the 




Instruments for Manipulation Checks in the Formal Study 
Scale:    0 = not at all 
100 = moderate amount 
Use any number from zero on up
Perceived Outcome Severity 
1. To what extent does your mistake influence Person B?     ______ 
2. How severe is the outcome of this situation for Person B?   ______ 
3. How severely does your mistake affect Person B?      ______ 
4. How much influence does your mistake have on Person B’s scholarship for the next 
year?           ______ 
5. How much difficulty does your mistake have on Person B’s obtaining his or her 
scholarship for the next year?        ______ 
6. To what extent do you think the outcome is severe?    ______ 
Perceived Relational Closeness 
1. To what extent do you think Person B is a good friend of yours?   ______ 
2. To what extent do you think you and Person B are close to each other?  ______ 
3. How much knowledge do you have of Person B?      ______ 
4. How familiar are you with Person B?      ______ 
5. How close are you with Person B?       ______ 
6. How well do you know Person B?       ______ 
Note. The labels (i.e., perceived outcome severity and perceived relational closeness) are 
for readers’ convenience. They were not shown in the actual questionnaire. The same 
idea was followed for all the items listed below in Appendices B, C, D, and E.  
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Appendix B 
Instruments for Attributions in the Formal Study 
Scale:    0 = not at all 
100 = moderate amount 
Use any number from zero on up 
Degree of Internal Attributions 
1. How likely is that what has happened was due to your own carelessness? ______ 
2. How likely is that what has happened was due to internal traits, such as your 
personality?          ______ 
3. How likely is that what has happened was due to you not paying enough attention 
when the readings were assigned?       ______ 
4. How likely is that what has happened was because you did not care about what grade 
you and Person B could get for this assignment?        ______ 
5. To what extent do you believe what has happened was because you did not spend 
enough time on the assignment?       ______ 
6. To what extent do you think what has happened was because of you?  ______ 
7. To what extent do you think your personality determines what has happened? ______ 
Controllability 
1. How likely is that what has happened was avoidable?      ______ 
2. How much control do you have over what has happened?   ______ 
3. How likely is it that you could have prevented this mistake?   ______ 
4. To what extent do you believe you could have done otherwise to prevent what has 
happened?            ______ 
5. To what extent do you think you could have done differently to avoid what has 
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happened?          ______ 
Degree of External Attributions 
1. How likely is that what has happened was due to the professor not giving clear 
instructions for the assignment?       ______ 
2. How likely is that what has happened was caused by other people instead of you? 
           ______ 
3. How likely is that what has happened was because the wordings in the instruction were 
confusing?          ______ 
4. How likely is that what has happened was due to some external reason (for example, 
someone mistakenly took your notes away so you had nothing to rely for the instructions 
for the project)?          ______ 
5. To what extent do you think what has happened was due to Person B’s decision to 
meet the night before the due date?         ______ 
6. To what extent do you think what has happened was because of other people? ______ 
7. To what extent do you think environmental reasons determine what has happened? 
            ______ 
Uncontrollability 
1. How likely is that what happened was out of your control?   ______ 
2. To what extent do you believe there is not much you could do to prevent what has 
happened?          ______ 
3. How likely is that you have no control over what has happened?    ______ 
4. To what extent do you think you cannot prevent what has happened?    ______ 
5. To what extent do you think what has happened was inevitable?   ______ 
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Note. Based on results from confirmatory factor analysis and principal components 
analysis, not all seven items that measured the degree of internal attribution were 
included in the model that was tested. The four items used in the model that was tested 




Instruments for Anticipated Consequences in the Formal Study 
Scale:    0 = not at all 
100 = moderate amount 
Use any number from zero on up 
Expected Responsibility 
1. How much responsibility would Person B assign to you for what has happened? 
           ______ 
2. To what extent would Person B think you are responsible for what has happened? 
           ______ 
3. To what extent would Person B think you are chargeable for what has happened? 
           ______ 
4. To what extent would Person B think you are accountable for what has happened? 
           ______ 
5. To what extent would Person B think you should take full responsibility for what has 
happened?             
           ______ 
6. To what extent would Person B think what has happened should be attributed to you?   
           ______ 
Expected Anger 
1. How angry do you expect Person B to be?      ______ 
2. How irritated do you expect Person B to be?     ______ 
3. How furious do you expect Person B to be?     ______ 
4. How mad do you expect Person B to be?      ______ 
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5. How fuming do you expect Person B to be?     ______ 
6. How annoyed do you expect Person B to be?     ______ 
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Appendix D 
Instruments for the Likelihood of Selecting an Account in the Formal Study 
Scale:    0 = not at all 
100 = moderate amount 
Use any number from zero on up 
Concessions 
Concession 1. I am sorry that I misunderstood the instructions. Is there any way that I can 
make it up to you?         ______ 
Concession 2. I am sorry that I misunderstood the instruction. I will take the full 
responsibility and it’s all my fault.       ______ 
Concession 3. I am sorry that I misunderstood the instruction. I will talk with the 
professor to see whether we can come up with a possible solution.   ______ 
Concession 4. I am sorry that I misunderstood the instruction. I hope you know that I am 
shocked about this grade and feel horrible about bringing your grade down. ______ 
Concession 5. I am sorry that I misunderstood the instruction. Could I possibly write a 
letter to complement your scholarship application to explain what happened? ______ 
Justifications 
Justification 1. I am sorry that the grade influenced your scholarship. But I honestly 
thought I was doing the correct work.      ______ 
Justification 2. I am sorry that the grade influenced your scholarship. You know that I 
am a good student and I would never want this grade myself. It’s a complete 
misunderstanding.         ______ 
Justification 3. I am sorry that the grade influenced your scholarship. I knew how 
important the grade was to you but I did try my best to get a good grade.   ______ 
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Justification 4. I am sorry that the grade influenced your scholarship. But I worked very 
hard on this assignment. We should have gotten together to edit the paper earlier. ______ 
Justification 5. I am sorry that the grade influenced your scholarship. But I thought I did 
on the correct readings and I did a thorough job on the readings that I reported on. ______ 
Excuses 
Excuse 1. I am sorry that I misunderstood the instruction. But the wording in the 
direction was really confusing and that may be the reason why I wrote the wrong portion 
of the paper.          ______ 
Excuse 2. I am sorry that I misunderstood the instruction. I was being careless and 
confused with all the paper work.       ______ 
Excuse 3. I am sorry that I misunderstood the instruction. It’s just ……there were other 
things that contributed to the mistake.      ______ 
Excuse 4. I am sorry that I misunderstood the instruction. I was so nervous about this 
course and tried to do well on this assignment; but maybe my nervousness led me to write 
the wrong portion of the paper.       ______ 
Excuse 5. I am sorry that I misunderstood the instruction. My sister accidently took my 
notes away and I did not have anything to rely on to write the paper. I thought I 
remembered the instruction correctly.      ______ 
Refusals 
Refusal 1. I know the readings I read were the right material for the paper. I did not find 
anything wrong to what I contributed to the paper.     ______ 
Refusal 2. I have to say I did more work than you and I don’t think the grading is fair. 
           ______ 
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Refusal 3. If this course means a lot to you, you should have put more focus on the 
collaboration.          ______ 
Refusal 4. You made me do all the work and not call me on what the paper should be 
about.           ______ 
Refusal 5. I told you we should not wait until the last minute. We deserve the grade we 
got. It’s all your fault not contributing to the paper and we got a poor grade. ______ 
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 Appendix E 
Pilot Study 1: Questionnaire for Collecting Conflict Scenarios 
CONFLICT STRATEGY STUDY 
Department of Communication 
University of Maryland, College Park 
Spring, 2007 
 
PLEASE READ CAREFULLY 
 
In this study, we are interested in learning what you say when you have to account for 
yourselves: That is, what you say when you feel that, for one reason or another, you have 
to answer to someone else b cause of something you did or failed to do, which resulted 
into a conflict between you and another person. For example, you might have to account 
to your girlfriend or boyfriend for the fact that when you used his or her laptop to surf 
online, the web page you visited contained virus that wiped out all his or her important 
documents; or your classmate might expect you to account for your failure to return the 
lecture notes to her, which left her little time to prepare for the final and she got an 
overall low grade for that class. Sometimes we give accounts even if no one asks for one, 
because we think that our behavior needs explanations, or because we think that the other 
person thinks that our behavior was questionable. For example, you were responsible for 
making powerpoint slides for a group presentation. In the middle of the presentation, one 
of your slides accidentally made weird noises from the animation you forgot to delete. 
Although your group members did not say anything, you felt you ought to say something 
to explain that weird noise.  
 
So, we would like you to recall a recent conflict you had with another person resulted 
from something you did, and answer the following questions on the next page.  
 
Please read all instructions carefully before you answer each question. At the very end, 
you will have an opportunity to comment on our study.  
 
Please do not leave any questions out. This would cause that we have to exclude your 
answers from our study.  
 
Please note that there are no correct or incorrect answers. We are simply interested in 
what your account was in the situation you recall.    
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1. In the table, please recall a situation in which a conflict occurred recently btween 
you and another person because of something YOU did. You should know that 
conflicts do not always have satisfactory endings. So you can describe any 
conflict you actually had due to something you did. Make sure to describe the 
occurrence in detail.  
 




Relationship between you 
and the other person in 
the conflict. 
 
What happened (please 
describe the incidence in 
detail, from the start of 
the conflict to its 
solutions)?   
 
To your knowledge, what 
was/were the cause(s) of 
the conflict (please list all 







To your knowledge, what 
did you expect the other 
person would think the 
cause(s) was/were (please 
all reasons that you 
expect the other person 
would think of)? 
 
What was your emotion 
during the conflict (e.g., 
did you feel angry)? 
Please list all emotions 
you experienced at the 








What was your 
expectation of the other 
person’s emotion at the 
time of conflict (e.g., did 
you expect the other 
person feel angry)? Please 
list all emotions you 
expected the other person 
might have experienced at 









2. When the conflict described in question 1 happened, did the other person say 




If there was a 
verbalized request for 
an explanation,  
Please recall as best as 
you can the actual 





























If no verbalized request 
for an explanation was 
presented, please recall 
as best as you can why 
































3. Please recall, in as close to the exact words as possible, what you said to explain 
your behavior to the other person in the conflict described in question 1.  
 















4. Are you satisfied with the endings of the conflict mentioned in question 1 (circle 
one):           
 
YES           NO 
 
5. If given a second chance, what else would you say other than the explanation you 
provided above? 
 













We would also like to know a little more about you. Please complete the following 
information. 
1. What is your gender? (circle one)          MALE                 FEMALE 
2. What is your age? I am ________ years old.  
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3. Which race/ethnicity label describes you best? (circle one) 
 African-American / Black                      Hispanic / Latino 
 
 Asian-American / Asian                        Native American 
 
 Caucasian / White                                 Other (Please specify): _____________ 
 
4. What is your nationality (which country issues you a passport)? _____________ 
5. Is English your native (first) language? (circle one)            YES             NO 
If not, what is your native language?   _____________________ 
6. What is your major in college?  ____________ 
7. What year are you in college? (circle one) 
 FRESHMAN                              SOPHOMORE      
 JUNIOR                                     SENIOR       
GRADUATE                              OTHER (Please specify): ___________________  

















Pilot Study 2: Questionnaire for Sorting Task  
Sorting out Conflict Information 
Department of Communication 
University of Maryland, College Park 
August, 2007 
 
Purpose: The study contains information from another study.  You will read about 
different conflicts.  Your task is to sort those conflicts according to the severity of the 
conflict (severe vs. not severe) and the closeness of the relationship between the p ople in 
that conflict (not close at all, somewhat close, very close). Remember, there is no right or 











Instructions: You will receive 93 numbered index cards. On each card there is one 
conflict. Some of them are described in detail and some are less detailed.  
 
 Step 1:  
 
Please read over all 93 conflicts carefully, getting familiar with them and making 
sure you understand each of them. If you have any questions, please feel free to 






After you get familiar with these 93 conflicts, please sort them into the sorting 
table on the next page (Table 1).  
 
You will sort these conflicts based on two criteria: the severity of the conflict and 
closeness of the relationship between the participants to the conflict. 
 
*Severity of the conflict refers to how serious the consequence might be 
because of the conflict mentioned on the card. 
 
*Closeness of the Relationship refers to the extent that the people in the 
conflict are close to each other. 
 
Please put the number of the card in the most appropriate cell. And remember: 
Each conflict can be put in ONE AND ONLY ONE CELL in the table.  
 
If you are not sure which cell to put a conflict into, please write down the card 
number in Table 2 (Other) and explain the reason why you cannot determine 
which cell the conflict should be in. 
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of the  
 
Relationship 
 Severity of the Conflict 
Severe Not severe 
 

















Please specify the reason why you cannot determine the cell from Table 1 



























Step 3: Now you have finished sorting all 93 conflicts. Before we move to the 







Step 4: We would also like to know a little more about you. Please complete 
the following information. 
 
1. What is your gender? (circle one)          MALE                 FEMALE 
2. What is your age? I am ________ years old.  
3. Which race/ethnicity label describes you best? (circle one) 
 African-American / Black                      Hispanic / Latino 
 
 Asian-American / Asian                        Native American 
 
 Caucasian / White                                 Other (Please specify): _____________ 
 
4. What is your nationality or citizenship? _____________ 
5. Is English your native (first) language? (circle one)            YES             NO 
If not, what is your native language?   _____________________ 
6. What is your major in college?  ____________ 
7. What year are you in college? (circle one) 
 FRESHMAN                              SOPHOMORE      
 JUNIOR                                     SENIOR       
GRADUATE                              OTHER (Please specify): ___________________  







Conflict Incidents Reported in Pilot Study 1 
How sorters sorted the 93 conflicts reported in Pilot Study 1 was examined and the 
following five incidents were applicable in all six experimental conditions.  The first 
incident was selected to develop the hypothetical conflict scenario used in the formal 
study because the conflict occurred in a context familiar to future participants.  
Incident 1: “There were five students including me that decided to form a virtual 
study group.  I was not in class the day that everyone decided who would outline what 
chapters.  I was given the wrong chapters so I did the same work as another student!” 
Incident 2: “Basically my roommate was angry at me because I didn't 
‘completely’ wake him up to study for his finals exam. I believe it was him that caused 
the conflict because he made a huge deal about it. I came back at 12pm and I woke him 
up then but he was angry.”  
Incident 3: “Even though my boyfriend told me he was coming to pick me up, I 
wasn’t ready and we missed the movie that he had really wanted to see. He was mad 
because he had given me over an hour to get ready and I had been doing other things 
instead. I apologized many times.” 
Incident 4: “I copied my work schedule down incorrectly, so I showed up to work 
an hour late.  I ended up showing up late, excused by my manager, but I felt like I'd 
disappointed him.”  
Incident 5: “It happened about two weeks ago. I was sitting directly opposite to 
the air conditioner in the office and I was freezing to death. So I reset the t mp rature. 
However, one of my officemates immediately stood up and turned the AC temperature 
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back, which upset me. I said that I could not handle the room that cold, and he pretended 
not to hear my complaints.” 
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Appendix H 
Hypothetical Conflict Scenarios Used in the Formal Study 
1. Scenario for the condition of close relationship and high outcome severity: 
You and Person B grew up together and attended the same university. The two of 
you have been best friends for many years. You and Person B took a tough course 
together last semester. You were teamed together and assigned to writea pap r to 
summarize readings for the class. According to the syllabus, the paper counts for 40% of 
the overall grade. Both group members would receive the same grade for this assignment. 
The professor assigned the work evenly for each member. Person B told you that if the 
grade for this course was not good, his or her scholarship for the next year would 
definitely be in jeopardy. You and Person B worked independently and combined your 
work the night before the due date and turned it in as one group assignment. When you 
and Person B received the graded paper, you were shocked to learn that you had earned a 
score of only 60%. It turned out that you had misunderstood the directions and had 
written your part of the paper on the wrong readings. Person B was very upset because 
such a low grade resulted in him or her not getting next year's scholarship.  
 
2. Scenario for the condition of close relationship and low outcome severity: 
You and Person B grew up together and attended the same university. The two of 
you have been best friends for many years. You and Person B took a tough course 
together last semester. You were teamed together and assigned to writea pap r to 
summarize readings for the class. According to the syllabus, the paper counts for 10% of 
the overall grade. Both group members would receive the same grade for this assignment. 
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The professor assigned the work evenly for each member. Person B told you that if the 
grade for this course was not good, there is a possibility that his or her scholarship for t e 
next year will be influenced. You and Person B worked independently and combined 
your work the night before the due date and turned it in as one group assignment. When 
you and Person B received the graded paper, you were shocked to learn that you had 
earned a score of only 70%. It turned out that you had misunderstood the directions and 
had written your part of the paper on the wrong readings. Person B was not happy but he 
or she did great on other assignments and believed it would not influence his or her 
getting next year's scholarship. 
 
3. Scenario for the condition of somewhat close relationship and high outcome severity: 
You and Person B were in couple of classes together before. Although the two of 
you know each other, you only see each other in class. You and Person B took a tough 
course together last semester. You were teamed together and assigned to write a paper to 
summarize readings for the class. According to the syllabus, the paper counts for 40% of 
the overall grade. Both group members would receive the same grade for this assignment. 
The professor assigned the work evenly for each member. Person B told you that if the 
grade for this course was not good, his or her scholarship for the next year would 
definitely be in jeopardy. You and Person B worked independently and combined your 
work the night before the due date and turned it in as one group assignment. When you 
and Person B received the graded paper, you were shocked to learn that you had earned a 
score of only 60%. It turned out that you had misunderstood the directions and had 
written your part of the paper on the wrong readings. Person B was very upset because 
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such a low grade resulted in him or her not getting next year's scholarship.  
 
4. Scenario for the condition of somewhat close relationship and low outcome severity: 
You and Person B were in couple of classes together before. Although the two of 
you know each other, you only see each other in class. You and Person B took a tough 
course together last semester. You were teamed together and assigned to write a paper to 
summarize readings for the class. According to the syllabus, the paper counts for 10% of 
the overall grade. Both group members would receive the same grade for this assignment. 
The professor assigned the work evenly for each member. Person B told you that if the 
grade for this course was not good, there is a possibility that his or her scholarship for t e 
next year will be influenced. You and Person B worked independently and combined 
your work the night before the due date and turned it in as one group assignment. When 
you and Person B received the graded paper, you were shocked to learn that you had 
earned a score of only 70%. It turned out that you had misunderstood the directions and 
had written your part of the paper on the wrong readings. Person B was not happy but he 
or she did great on other assignments and believed it would not influence his or her 
getting next year's scholarship. 
 
5. Scenario for the condition of not–close-at–all relationship and high outcome severity: 
You and Person B do not really know each other. You happened to sit next to 
each other on the first day of class. You and Person B took a tough course together last 
semester. You were teamed together and assigned to write a paper to summarize readings 
for the class. According to the syllabus, the paper counts for 40% of the overall grade.
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Both group members would receive the same grade for this assignment. The professor 
assigned the work evenly for each member. Person B told you that if the grade fo  this 
course was not good, his or her scholarship for the next year would definitely be in 
jeopardy. You and Person B worked independently and combined your work the night 
before the due date and turned it in as one group assignment. When you and Person B 
received the graded paper, you were shocked to learn that you had earned a score of only 
60%. It turned out that you had misunderstood the directions and had written your part of 
the paper on the wrong readings. Person B was very upset because such a low grade 
resulted in him or her not getting next year's scholarship.  
 
6. Scenario for the condition of not-close-at–all relationship and low outcome severity:  
You and Person B do not really know each other. You happened to sit next to 
each other on the first day of class. You and Person B took a tough course together last 
semester. You were teamed together and assigned to write a paper to summarize readings 
for the class. According to the syllabus, the paper counts for 10% of the overall grade.
Both group members would receive the same grade for this assignment. The professor 
assigned the work evenly for each member. Person B told you that if the grade for this 
course was not good, there is a possibility that his or her scholarship for the next year will 
be influenced. You and Person B worked independently and combined your work the 
night before the due date and turned it in as one group assignment. When you and Person 
B received the graded paper, you were shocked to learn that you had earned a scor  of 
only 70%. It turned out that you had misunderstood the directions and had written your 
part of the paper on the wrong readings. Person B was not happy but he or she did great 
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Pilot Study 3: Questionnaire for Manipulation Checks 
Scenario Assessment 
Department of Communication 
  University of Maryland, College Park 
Spring, 2008 
 
Note. The same instructions were used in Pilot Studies 3, 5, 6, and the formal study.  
 
Researchers at the University of Maryland are interested in knowing how people explain 
themselves in interactions.  
 
What do you need to do in this study? 
1. Read a hypothetical incident. There are two persons (Person A and Person B) 
involved in the incident. Please image you were Person A.  
2. Provide possible explanations by imagining you were Person A.   





*Part I: Situation * 
You and Person B grew up together and attended the same university. The two 
of you have been best friends for many years. You and Person B took a tough course 
together last semester. You were teamed together and assigned to writea pap r to 
summarize readings for the class. According to the syllabus, the paper counts for 40% 
of the overall grade. Both group members would receive the same grade for this 
assignment. The professor assigned the work evenly for each member. Person B told 
you that if the grade for this course was not good, his or her scholarship for the next 
year would definitely be in jeopardy. You and Person B worked independently and 
combined your work the night before the due date and turned it in as one group 
assignment. When you and Person B received the graded paper, you were shocked to 
learn that you had earned a score of only 60%. It turned out that you had 
misunderstood the directions and had written your part of the paper on the wrong 
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Part II: Providing explanations 
 
Imagine that you were the one that worked with Person B on this group project. What 
would you say to Person B to explain what you did (i.e., you wrote your portion of the 
review paper on wrong readings, which contributed to receiving a 40% for the review 
paper)? 
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Part III: Questions about the Situation 
 
Still imagine yourself in the situation. Read the instructions and answer the following 
questions.  
 
Please use the following instructions to answer the questions: Use a number from 0 (zero) to 
infinity to respond to each question. Zero means not at all and 100 means a moderate amoun ; you 
may use numbers from zero to infinity but please use a specific number. For example, suppose 
you were asked the question “how much do you like chocolate?” If you like chocolate a moderte 
amount, then you would rate your answer as 100.  If you like chocolate only a little, then you ma  
rate your answer as 20; but if you really like chocolate, you may rate your answer as 300.  For 
each question, you would rate your answer using any numbers based on the following scale: 
 0 = not at all  
100 = moderate amount 
Use any number from zero on up 
 
To ensure you understand how to use the scale, first practice using two questins that are 
not relevant to the situation you just read.  
 
Question Scale Your Rating 
1. How much do you like the food offered 
at the dining hall of your school?  
0 = not at all 
100 = moderate amount 
Use any number from zero on up  
 
2. How much do you like the service at 
the main library of your school?  
0 = not at all 
100 = moderate amount 





When you feel ready to use the scale you just practiced, turn to the next page.  
Please remember: Answer questions by  




Question Scale Your 
Rating 
1. How severe is the outcome of this situation?  0 = not at all 
100 = moderate amount 
Use any number from zero on up 
 
2. How severely did your mistake affect Person 
B?   
0 = not at all 
100 = moderate amount 
Use any number from zero on up 
 
3. How much influence would your mistake have 
on Person B’s fellowship application?  
0 = not at all 
100 = moderate amount 
Use any number from zero on up 
 
4. How much difficulty would your mistake have 
on Person B’s ability to achieve his or her goals? 
0 = not at all 
100 = moderate amount 
Use any number from zero on up 
 
5. How close are you with Person B? 0 = not at all 
100 = moderate amount 
Use any number from zero on up 
 
6. How much knowledge do you have of Person 
B?   
0 = not at all 
100 = moderate amount 
Use any number from zero on up 
 
7. How familiar are you with Person B?  0 = not at all 
100 = moderate amount 
Use any number from zero on up 
 
8. How well do you know Person B?  0 = not at all 
100 = moderate amount 
Use any number from zero on up 
 
 
1. My age is ____________ years.  
2. I am (circle one)  FEMALE  MALE 
3. I am a citizen of _______________________ (country).  
4. My ethnicity is or most closely to  
 African-American / Black                      Hispanic / Latino 
 
 Asian-American / Asian                        Native American 
 
 Caucasian / White                                 Other (Please specify): _____________ 
 
5.  My native language is   ENGLISH  
(circle one) Other (please specify): 
______________________ 
 
6. I am a(n) (circle one)    
FRESHMAN   SOPHOMORE 
JUNIOR   SENIOR 
 170
GRADUATE STUDENT OTHER (please specify): ___________________. 
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Appendix J 
Instruments for Defensiveness of Accounts in Pilot Study 5 
Scale:    0 = not at all 
100 = moderate amount 
Use any number from zero on up 
Defensiveness 
1. To what extent were you being self-protective?     ______ 
2. To what extent were you being guarded?      ______ 
3. To what extent were you sticking out for yourself?       ______ 
4. To what extent were you being assertive?       ______ 
5. To what extent were you trying to shift responsibility?    ______ 
6. To what extent were you being defensive?     ______ 
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Appendix K 
List of Open-Ended Questions Used in Pilot Study 6 
Note. The purpose of using the following questions was to obtain comments from 
participants regarding the clarity of the questionnaire that measured all dependent 
variables.  
1. Could you describe your general impression of the questionnaire? 
2. What do you think the purpose of the study is? 
3. What do you think the researchers want to measure? 
4. Do you feel the questions are clear? 
5. Are there any questions you found confusing or difficult to answer?  Please explain. 
6. Do you have any other comments on the study? 
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Appendix L 
Descriptives of the Indicators in the Formal Study after Transformation 
      
Indicators               Mean      SD     Range    Trim Value    λ     Skewness    Standard Error  
SEV1          6.59 1.50 8.81 501        0.35 -0.23 0.16   
SEV2          6.63        2.06 9.06 900             0.35 0.52 0.16   
SEV3          6.56        1.84 7.66 700             0.35      0.32 0.16   
SEV4          6.31        2.54 11.22 1000           0.35      0.31 0.16                              
SEV5          6.04        2.06 9.49     620             0.35      -0.16 0.16   
SEV6          6.00        1.91 8.80     500             0.35      -0.31 0.16   
REL1          4.88        2.32 8.80     500             0.35      -0.18 0.16                  
REL2          4.67        2.45     8.80     500             0.35      -0.09 0.16 
REL3          4.99        2.12     8.80     500             0.35      0.22 0.16 
REL4          5.06        2.08     8.80     500             0.35      0.22 0.16 
REL5          4.73        2.36     8.80     500             0.35      0.07 0.16 
REL6          4.91        2.19     8.80     500             0.35      0.26 0.16 
IA1          10.87      3.45     16.39   500             0.45      -0.14 0.16   
IA2          5.85        3.58     10.85   200             0.45      -0.40 0.16   
IA3          10.35      3.49     16.39   500             0.45      0.15 0.16   
IA4          2.53        3.01     7.94     100             0.45      0.61 0.16       
IA5          7.23        3.44     13.02   300             0.45      -0.22 0.16 
IA6          10.42      3.38     16.68   520             0.45      0.30 0.16         
IA7          4.85        3.61     10.85   200             0.45      -0.05 0.16   
CON1          6.84        2.10     10.47   1000           0.34      0.37 0.16   
CON2          6.09        2.33     10.47   1000           0.34      -0.01 0.16   
CON3          6.77        1.87     6.69     1000           0.34      0.84 0.16   
CON4          6.13        1.70     7.52     800             0.34      0.67 0.16   
CON5          5.93        1.46     8.27     500             0.34      -0.26 0.16   
EA1          11.81      6.02     23.04   300             0.55      0.11 0.16   
EA2          6.04        4.91     12.59   100             0.55      -0.03 0.16   
EA3          12.48      5.66     23.04   300             0.55      0.31 0.16 
EA4          6.77        4.78     12.59   100             0.55      -0.27  0.16   
EA5          14.13      7.32     27.72   420             0.55      0.26 0.16   
EA6          6.88        4.52     12.59   100             0.55      -0.26 0.16   
EA7          5.95        4.70     12.59   100             0.55      0.01 0.16   
UNCON1         2.79        2.45     6.31     100             0.40      0.03 0.16   
UNCON2         3.35        2.35     6.31     100             0.40      -0.37 0.16  
UNCON3         2.93        2.58     6.41     100             0.40      0.01 0.16   
UNCON4         3.10        2.55     6.31     104             0.40      -0.10 0.16   
UNCON5         2.47        2.51     6.31     100             0.40      0.30 0.16   
RES1          4.83        1.26     6.92     1000           0.28      0.04 0.16   
RES2          4.91        1.21     6.92     1000           0.28      -0.03 0.16  
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Indicators               Mean      SD     Range    Trim Value    λ     Skewness    Standard Error  
 
RES3          4.86        1.20 6.92 1000         0.28 0.19 0.16   
RES4          4.90        1.20     6.92     1000         0.28 0.23 0.16   
RES5          4.60        1.33     6.92     1000         0.28 -0.16 0.16   
RES6          4.75        1.30     6.92     1000         0.28  -0.16 0.16   
ANG1          4.96        1.21     5.46     1000         0.29 0.70 0.16   
ANG2          4.95        1.17     7.19     900           0.29 0.26 0.16   
ANG3          4.59        1.40     7.19     900           0.29 -0.08 0.16   
ANG4          4.88        1.23     7.41     1000         0.29 0.43 0.16  
ANG5          4.44        1.43     6.97     810           0.29 -0.28 0.16   
ANG6          5.06        1.16     7.19     900           0.29 0.09 0.16   
Concession1           10.39       3.96     16.39   500           0.45 -0.16 0.16 
Concession2         9.41 4.07     16.39 500           0.45 0.09 0.16     
Concession3         13.07 4.72 18.54 1000         0.45 0.76 0.16 
Concession4         10.42 3.87 16.39 500           0.45 -0.12 0.16 
Concession5         8.28 4.61 16.39 500           0.45 0.08 0.16 
Justification1           9.10 4.26 16.39 500           0.45 0.07 0.16 
Justification2         9.22 4.34 16.39 500           0.45 -0.08 0.16 
Justification3         7.69 4.06 14.21 364      0.45 -0.23 0.16 
Justification4         8.20 4.65 16.39 500           0.45 0.06 0.16 
Justification5         8.12 4.51 16.39 500        0.45 0.08 0.16 
Excuse1         6.99 3.70 13.02 300      0.45 -0.20 0.16 
Excuse2         5.86 3.63 10.85 200      0.45 -0.42 0.16 
Excuse3         3.77 3.31 8.64 120.5      0.45 0.04 0.16 
Excuse4         3.56 3.19 7.98 100      0.45 0.08 0.16 
Excuse5         2.25 2.88 7.75 94.6      0.45 0.77 0.16 
Refusal1         1.89 2.75 7.10 80.1      0.45 0.95 0.16 
Refusal2         1.30 2.20 5.81 50      0.45 1.27 0.16 
Refusal3         2.74 3.16 7.94 100      0.45 0.57 0.16 
Refusal4         1.50 2.35 5.85 50.7      0.45 1.08 0.16 
Refusal5         1.85 2.73 7.18 80      0.45 1.03 0.16 
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[See the table below for item label used above]. 
 
Indicator Label    Description 
SEV1      Perceived Outcome Severity Item 1 
SEV2      Perceived Outcome Severity Item 2 
SEV3      Perceived Outcome Severity Item 3 
SEV4      Perceived Outcome Severity Item 4 
SEV5      Perceived Outcome Severity Item 5 
SEV6      Perceived Outcome Severity Item 6 
REL1      Perceived Relational Closeness Item 1 
REL2      Perceived Relational Closeness Item 2 
REL3      Perceived Relational Closeness Item 3 
REL4      Perceived Relational Closeness Item 4 
REL5      Perceived Relational Closeness Item 5 
REL6      Perceived Relational Closeness Item 6 
IA1      Internal Attribution Item 1 
IA2      Internal Attribution Item 2 
IA3      Internal Attribution Item 3 
IA4      Internal Attribution Item 4 
IA5      Internal Attribution Item 5 
IA6      Internal Attribution Item 6 
IA7       Internal Attribution Item 7 
CON1      Controllability Item 1 
CON2      Controllability Item 2 
CON3      Controllability Item 3 
CON4      Controllability Item 4 
CON5      Controllability Item 5 
EA1      External Attribution Item 1 
EA2      External Attribution Item 2 
EA3      External Attribution Item 3 
EA4      External Attribution Item 4 
EA5      External Attribution Item 5 
EA6      External Attribution Item 6 
EA7      External Attribution Item 7 
UNCON1     Uncontrollability Item 1 
UNCON2     Uncontrollability Item 2 
UNCON3     Uncontrollability Item 3 
UNCON4     Uncontrollability Item 4 
UNCON5     Uncontrollability Item 5 
RES1      Expected Responsibility Item 1 
RES2      Expected Responsibility Item 2 
RES3      Expected Responsibility Item 3 
RES4      Expected Responsibility Item 4 
RES5      Expected Responsibility Item 5 
RES6      Expected Responsibility Item 6 
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Indicator Label    Description 
ANG1      Expected Anger Item 1 
ANG2      Expected Anger Item 2 
ANG3      Expected Anger Item 3 
ANG4      Expected Anger Item 4   
ANG5      Expected Anger Item 5 
ANG6      Expected Anger Item 6 
Concession1     Concession 1 
Concession2     Concession 2 
Concession3     Concession 3 
Concession4     Concession 4 
Concession5     Concession 5 
Justification1     Justification 1 
Justification2     Justification 2 
Justification3     Justification 3 
Justification4     Justification 4 
Justification5     Justification 5 
Excuse1     Excuse 1 
Excuse2     Excuse 2 
Excuse3     Excuse 3 
Excuse4     Excuse 4 
Excuse5     Excuse 5 
Refusal1     Refusal 1 
Refusal2     Refusal 2 
Refusal3     Refusal 3 
Refusal4     Refusal 4 






Covariance Matrix in LISREL for the Proposed Model in Figure 2 
Covariance Matrix        
 
  Item  SEV1       SEV2 SEV3       SEV4 SEV5       SEV6    
                 --------       --------    --------       --------    --------      ---- - 
 
SEV1        2.24 
SEV2        2.09           4.27 
SEV3       2.04           3.39        3.40 
SEV4       2.38           4.30        3.73            6.51 
SEV5       2.04           3.40        3.06            4.51        4.26 
SEV6       1.90           3.37        2.92            3.69        3.18            3.66 
QREL      0.38           0.49        0.41            0.61        0.44            0.34 
IA1          2.12           2.62        2.26            3.36        2.79            2.45 
IA2        2.26           2.42        2.15            3.05        2.57            2.23 
IA3        0.61           0.36        0.42            1.04        0.71            0.75 
IA4       1.89           1.69        1.79            1.92        2.08            2.06 
CON1   1.30           1.70        1.48            2.27        1.74            1.65 
CON2        1.05           1.27        1.14            1.64        1.19            1.20 
CON3        1.46           1.76        1.67            2.18        1.67            1.59 
CON4        1.11           1.26        1.05            1.47        1.17            1.17 
CON5        0.81           1.01        0.85            1.20        1.08            1.02 
EA1        2.49           3.39        3.20            4.16        3.72            2.78 
EA2        1.26           1.20        0.95            1.96        1.36            1.25 
EA3        2.75           2.99        3.17            3.22        3.22            2.66 
EA4        0.45           0.40       0.76            0.80        0.86            0.54 
EA5        2.82           5.51        4.84            6.96        4.42            3.83 
EA6        1.15           1.63        1.45            2.21        1.81            1.32 
EA7        0.17           0.24        0.75            0.16        0.49            0.65 
UNCON1        0.44           0.30        0.30            0.79        0.62            0.39 
UNCON2      0.30           0.08        0.33            0.49        0.45            0.29 
UNCON3      0.64           0.68        0.69            0.95        0.99            0.76 
UNCON4      0.65           0.85        0.83            1.13        0.97            0.78 
UNCON5      0.24           0.22        0.34            0.60        0.56            0.36 
RESP1        0.95           1.38        1.24            1.62        1.22            1.17 
RESP2        0.93           1.30        1.18            1.55        1.19            1.10 
RESP3        0.90           1.32        1.15            1.55        1.22            1.13 
RESP4        0.89           1.31        1.17            1.50        1.20            1.11 
RESP5        0.95           1.31        1.27            1.25       1.15            1.17 
RESP6        1.00           1.47        1.29            1.58        1.30            1.25 
ANGER1       1.09           1.81        1.58            2.17        1.60            1.53 
ANGER2       1.00           1.56        1.39            1.90        1.40            1.31 
ANGER3       1.16           2.01        1.81            2.43        1.82            1.71 
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  Item  SEV1       SEV2 SEV3       SEV4 SEV5       SEV6    
                 --------       --------    --------       --------    --------      ---- - 
 
ANGER4       1.18           1.87        1.74            2.23        1.73            1.58 
ANGER5       1.09           1.91        1.72            2.31        1.76            1.66 
ANGER6       1.06           1.54        1.34            1.82        1.40            1.33 
LDA       -0.06          -0.02       -0.02           0.03       -0.03           -0.04 
OS        0.63           1.36        1.13            1.47        1.22            1.18 
RC      0.03           0.02        0.09            0.05        0.12            0.13 
INTER1     -0.03          -0.07       -0.01           -0.13       -0.02           -0.10 
INTER2     0.13           0.24        0.21            0.25        0.23            0.20 
INTER3     0.09           0.25        0.19            0.32        0.23            0.24 
 
          
Covariance Matrix 
 
  Item  QREL       IA1 IA2       IA3 IA4       CON1    
                 --------       --------    --------       --------    --------      ---- - 
 
QREL        1.42 
IA1        0.70           12.04 
IA2        0.38           6.69       12.26 
IA3        0.14           2.77        4.05            11.88 
IA4        0.64           6.84        6.25            2.11       11.40 
CON1        0.52           3.94        3.93            1.91        3.71            4.41 
CON2        0.00           3.19        2.53            1.59        2.75            2.34 
CON3        0.37           3.77        3.96            1.15        3.91            2.71 
CON4        0.18           3.22        3.29            1.08        3.39            1.90 
CON5        0.04           2.70        2.72            1.62        2.85            1.67 
EA1        0.44           7.06        7.87            3.59        3.77            2.68 
EA2       -0.26          0.42        1.06            0.72       -0.41           0.59 
EA3        0.32           2.88        6.44            1.99        3.33            1.70 
EA4       -0.52          -0.35        0.94            1.08       -1.08           -1.17 
EA5       -0.21          2.31        3.38            5.34        0.62            2.18 
EA6       -0.57          0.74        0.99            1.44       -0.59           0.46 
EA7       -0.88          0.77        0.81            2.03        0.93            -0.16 
UNCON1      0.06           0.06        0.32            0.46       -0.06           -0.32 
UNCON2      -0.29         0.19        0.50            0.89       -0.19           -0.26 
UNCON3      -0.19          0.18        0.21            0.95       -0.29           -0.22 
UNCON4      -0.19          0.21        0.23            1.11       -0.07           -0.24 
UNCON5      -0.06         -0.30       -0.09           0.44      0.33            -0.26 
RESP1        0.37           2.11        1.98            0.07        1.96            1.21 
RESP2        0.33           2.02        2.12            0.17        2.05            1.25 
RESP3        0.30           1.96        1.97            0.05        1.95            1.27 
RESP4        0.30           1.99        1.98            0.12        2.00            1.20 
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  Item  QREL       IA1 IA2       IA3 IA4       CON1    
                 --------       --------    --------       --------    --------      ---- - 
 
RESP5  0.23           1.46        2.12            0.09        2.03            0.89 
RESP6        0.25           1.85        2.11            0.15        2.15            1.20 
ANGER1        0.28           2.08        2.12            0.33        1.82            1.33 
ANGER2        0.23           1.98        2.15            0.60        1.81            1.25 
ANGER3        0.17           1.84        2.26            0.29        1.67            1.12 
ANGER4        0.20           2.01        2.03            0.25        1.78            1.28 
ANGER5        0.15           1.76        2.09            0.29        1.66            0.97 
ANGER6        0.14           2.11        2.45            0.76        1.68            1.17 
LDA       -0.03          -0.45       -0.42           -0.11       -0.66           -0.26 
OS        0.12           0.09        0.26            -0.06       -0.05           0.12 
RC        0.61           0.59        0.38            0.40        0.73            0.18 
INTER1     0.02          -0.01        0.02            0.29        0.11           -0.10 
INTER2     0.14           0.16        0.12            0.09        0.16           0.07 
INTER3     0.03           0.03        0.04           -0.06       -0.01          0.08 
 
         COVARIANCE MATRIX        
 
  Item  CON2       CON3 CON4       CON5 EA1       EA2    
                 --------       --------    --------       --------    --------      ---- - 
 
CON2  5.46 
CON3        2.21           3.51 
CON4        0.85           2.34        2.88 
CON5        1.17           1.72        1.67            2.13 
EA1        4.31           2.19        2.12            1.26       36.06 
EA2        2.11           0.20       -0.31           0.20       13.83           24.04 
EA3        1.64           2.47        2.46            1.19       17.51           6.77 
EA4        0.18           -0.90       -0.85           -0.78        8.89             6.27 
EA5        2.60           3.59        2.98            2.53       13.84           9.71 
EA6        0.39           0.17        0.11            0.34        8.25            12.28 
EA7        0.03           -0.01       -0.39           0.17        6.66            7.94 
UNCON1      0.15           -0.45       -0.27           -0.16        5.75            6.81 
UNCON2      -0.36          -0.61       -0.68           -0.34        4.78            4.61 
UNCON3      -0.84          -0.52       -0.60           -0.11        4.11            3.85 
UNCON4      -0.70          -0.34       -0.54           -0.20        4.45            3.95 
UNCON5      -0.73         -0.39       -0.39           -0.05        4.17            3.82 
RESP1        1.07           1.49        1.04            0.71        1.82            0.73 
RESP2        1.07           1.56        1.10            0.76        2.11            0.47 
RESP3        1.02           1.46        0.98            0.75        1.97            0.68 
RESP4        1.04           1.47        0.99            0.70        1.97            0.43 
RESP5        0.73           1.18        0.75           0.61        1.56            0.92 
RESP6        1.10           1.51        1.03           0.83        1.76            0.71 
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  Item  CON2       CON3 CON4       CON5 EA1       EA2    
                 --------       --------    --------       --------    --------      ---- - 
 
ANGER1 1.02           1.50        1.12            0.86        1.71            0.56 
ANGER2        0.96           1.42        1.07            0.85        1.95            0.74 
ANGER3        1.07           1.47        1.12            0.80        2.23            0.67 
ANGER4        1.06           1.50        1.12            0.81        1.95            0.52 
ANGER5        1.15           1.36        1.02            0.80        2.04            0.81 
ANGER6        0.98           1.37        1.20            0.87        2.59            1.03 
LDA       -0.20          -0.17       -0.16           -0.16        0.07            0.28 
OS        0.02           0.12        0.12            0.06        0.55            0.24 
RC        0.08           -0.08       -0.09           -0.03        0.57           -0.28 
INTER1     -0.02          -0.06        0.01            -0.03        0.74            0.53 
INTER2     0.04           0.04        0.06            0.01        0.50            0.12 
INTER3     0.03           0.03        0.01            0.04       -0.25           -0.15 
 
         Covariance Matrix        
 
  Item  EA3       EA4 EA5       EA6 EA7       UNCON1    
                 --------       --------    --------       --------    --------      ---- - 
 
EA3         31.79 
EA4        6.94           22.90 
EA5        9.49           6.28       53.65 
EA6        8.77           7.47       11.51          20.49 
EA7        3.69           5.58        5.61            6.76       22.16 
UNCON1      4.59          2.65        1.81            3.48        3.20            5.98 
UNCON2      3.39           4.36        2.32            3.33        4.32            2.97 
UNCON3      3.66           3.57        5.47            4.67        3.47            2.92 
UNCON4      4.01           3.74        5.16            5.20        4.64            3.04 
UNCON5      2.99           3.16        3.75            3.50        2.99            2.66 
RESP1        1.72           -0.35        1.71            0.76        0.11            0.03 
RESP2        1.90           -0.06        1.85            0.71       -0.08           -0.09 
RESP3        1.70           -0.03        1.66            0.83       -0.05           -0.02 
RESP4        1.66           -0.05        1.56            0.62       -0.15           -0.07 
RESP5        1.88           0.11        1.09            0.58        0.08            0.05 
RESP6        1.56           -0.66        1.28            0.54        0.03            0.00 
ANGER1       1.76           -0.45        2.56            0.67        0.06            0.15 
ANGER2       1.97           -0.16        2.72            0.67        0.43            0.28 
ANGER3       1.94           -0.23        3.57            0.76        0.44            0.15 
ANGER4       1.84           -0.37        3.02            0.70        0.06            0.14 
ANGER5       1.64           -0.15        3.32            0.81        0.32            0.23 
ANGER6       2.38           -0.01        3.27            1.17        0.56            0.24 
LDA        0.19           0.14        1.18            0.41        0.03            0.07 
OS        0.85           0.42        1.64            0.57       -0.16           0.18 
RC        0.23           -0.16       -0.42           -0.49       -0.08           -0.02 
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  Item  EA3       EA4 EA5       EA6 EA7       UNCON1    
                 --------       --------    --------       --------    --------      ---- - 
 
INTER1     0.08           0.28        0.29            0.22        0.42            0.22 
INTER2      0.36           -0.04        0.24            0.15        0.10            0.09 
INTER3      -0.13          -0.05        0.35            -0.05       -0.17           -0.03 
 
         Covariance Matrix     
    
  Item  UNCON2 UNCON3 UNCON4 UNCON5 RESP1       RESP2    
                 --------       --------    --------       --------    --------      ---- - 
 
UNCON2      5.53 
UNCON3      2.99           6.69 
UNCON4      3.22           5.07        6.48 
UNCON5      2.89           3.42        3.67             6.30 
RESP1       -0.07          -0.11       -0.02            -0.08        1.61 
RESP2       -0.17          -0.11       -0.14            -0.18        1.36            1.47 
RESP3       -0.11          -0.08       -0.05            -0.13        1.42            1.35 
RESP4      -0.15          -0.15       -0.14            -0.16        1.39            1.34 
RESP5        0.02           0.11        0.22             0.17        1.20            1.18 
RESP6       -0.33          -0.18       -0.06            -0.25        1.40            1.34 
ANGER1       -0.04          0.14        0.20             0.03        1.16            1.14 
ANGER2        0.19           0.20        0.23             0.24        1.07            1.07 
ANGER3        0.19           0.28        0.39             0.25        1.09            1.08 
ANGER4       -0.05          0.20        0.26             0.16        1.01            1.03 
ANGER6        0.17           0.23        0.26             0.20        1.01            1.00 
LDA        0.09           0.12        0.14             0.19       -0.08           -0.09 
OS        0.18           0.31        0.40             0.16        0.21            0.18 
RC        0.23           -0.01        0.09             -0.15        0.03            -0.02 
INTER1      0.20           0.19        0.20             0.28       -0.06           -0.10 
INTER2      0.09           0.10        0.13             0.10        0.03            0.01 
INTER3     -0.03          0.00        0.03             -0.04        0.06            0.06 
 
         Covariance Matrix        
 
  Item  RESP3       RESP4 RESP5       RESP6 ANGER1 ANGER2    
                 --------       --------    --------       --------    --------      ---- - 
 
RESP3        1.46 
RESP4        1.38            1.42 
RESP5        1.21            1.17        1.78 
RESP6        1.36            1.35        1.35             1.73 
ANGER1     1.10            1.10        0.97             1.17        1.45 
ANGER2     1.02            1.01        0.90             1.10        1.26             1.36 
ANGER3     1.05            1.03        0.98             1.15        1.45             1.33 
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  Item  RESP3       RESP4 RESP5       RESP6 ANGER1 ANGER2    
                 --------       --------    --------       --------    --------      ---- - 
 
ANGER4     1.07            1.07        0.98             1.13        1.41             1.23 
ANGER5     1.00            0.99        0.91             1.09        1.41             1.26 
ANGER6      0.95            0.95        0.83             1.01        1.16             1.12 
LDA       -0.08           -0.09       -0.12            -0.11       -0.09            -0.08 
OS        0.21            0.19        0.24             0.27        0.47             0.37 
RC        -0.04           0.01        0.04             -0.05       -0.07            -0.06 
INTER1      -0.11           -0.09       -0.07            -0.01       -0.02            0.01 
INTER2      0.02            0.02        0.03             0.04        0.08             0.06 
INTER3      0.06            0.06        0.05             0.06        0.08             0.06 
 
         Covariance Matrix        
 
  Item              ANGER3  ANGER4 ANGER5  ANGER6   LDA         OS  
                 --------       --------    --------       --------    --------      ---- - 
 
ANGER3        1.97 
ANGER4        1.56            1.61 
ANGER5        1.89            1.49        2.05 
ANGER6        1.26            1.20        1.22             1.34 
LDA       -0.04           -0.08       -0.04            -0.07        0.20 
OS        0.67            0.52        0.64             0.35        0.05             1.00 
RC        -0.09           -0.07       -0.09            -0.10       -0.13            0.00 
INTER1      0.02            0.00       -0.01            0.04       -0.01            0.02 
INTER2      0.12            0.09        0.11             0.08       -0.01            0.18 
INTER3      0.11            0.07        0.11             0.04        0.01             0.16 
 
         Covariance Matrix        
 
       Item          RC       INTER1     INTER2     INTER3    
             --------        --------     --------       -------- 
 
RC        1.98 
INTER1      0.01            0.68 
INTER2      0.18            0.18        0.15 
INTER3      0.16            -0.17       -0.03             0.14 
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[See the table below for item label used in the study and indicator label used in the 
LISREL program. Note all the indicators except LDA are found in Appendices A to D. 
LDA is a composite measure of the likelihood of each account and the defensiveness of 
each account. The detailed discussion regarding the development of LDA can be found 
on pp. 85-87] 
 
Indicator Label used in LISREL  Item Label used in the study 
SEV1      Perceived Outcome Severity1 
SEV2      Perceived Outcome Severity2 
SEV3      Perceived Outcome Severity3 
SEV4      Perceived Outcome Severity4 
SEV5      Perceived Outcome Severity5 
SEV6      Perceived Outcome Severity6 
QREL      Perceived Quadratic Relational Closeness 
IA1      Internal Attribution1 
IA2      Internal Attribution2 
IA3      Internal Attribution3 
IA4      Internal Attribution4 
CON1      Controllability1 
CON2      Controllability2 
CON3      Controllability3 
CON4      Controllability4 
CON5      Controllability5 
EA1      External Attribution1 
EA2      External Attribution2 
EA3      External Attribution3 
EA4      External Attribution4 
EA5      External Attribution5 
EA6      External Attribution6 
EA7      External Attribution7 
UNCON1     Uncontrollability1 
UNCON2     Uncontrollability2 
UNCON3     Uncontrollability3 
UNCON4     Uncontrollability4 
UNCON5     Uncontrollability5 
RES1      Expected Responsibility1 
RES2      Expected Responsibility2 
RES3      Expected Responsibility3 
RES4      Expected Responsibility4 
RES5      Expected Responsibility5 
RES6      Expected Responsibility6 
ANG1      Expected Anger1 
ANG2      Expected Anger2 
ANG3      Expected Anger3 
ANG4      Expected Anger4   
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Indicator Label used in LISREL  Item Label used in the study 
ANG5      Expected Anger5 
ANG6      Expected Anger6 
LDA      Composite Measure of Accounts 
OS      Outcome Severity Manipulation (ξ1)  
RC Quadratic Relational Closeness 
manipulation (ξ2) 
INTER1     Interaction1 (ξ3) 
INTER2     Interaction2 (ξ4) 
INTER3     Interaction3 (ξ5) 
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Appendix N 
LISREL Syntax for Testing the Proposed Model in Figure 2 
 
Testing the proposed model 
 DA NI=46 NO=236 MA=CM 
 CM=C:\origin1116.psf 
 LA 
 sev1 sev2 sev3 sev4 sev5 sev6 quadrel ia1 ia2 ia3 ia4 con1 con2 con3 con4 con5 ea1 ea2 
ea3 ea4 ea5 ea6 ea7 uncon1 uncon2 uncon3 uncon4 uncon5 resp1 resp2 resp3 resp4 resp5 
resp6 anger1 anger2 anger3 anger4 anger5 anger6 LDA ex1 ex2 ex3 ex4 ex5 
 MO NX=5 NK=5 NY=41 NE=9 FI LY=FU,FI LX=ID TE=DI,FR TD=ZE TH=ZE,FI 
BE=FU,FI GA=FU,FI PS=DI,FR TH=ZE,FI 
 FR GA 1 1 GA 2 2 GA 9 3 GA 3 4 GA 4 4 GA 5 5 GA 6 5 
 FR BE 9 1 BE 7 1 BE 9 2 BE 9 8 BE 8 7 BE 7 3 BE 8 3 BE 7 4 BE 8 4 BE 7 5 BE 8 5 
BE 7 6   FR BE 8 6 
 FR LY 2 1 LY 3 1 LY 4 1 LY 5 1 LY 6 1 LY 9 3 LY 10 3 LY 11 3 LY 13 4 LY 14 4 LY 
15 4 
 FR LY 16 4 LY 18 5 LY 19 5 LY 20 5 LY 21 5 LY 22 5 LY 23 5 LY 25 6 LY 26 6 LY 
27 6  
FR LY 28 6 
 FR LY 30 7 LY 31 7 LY 32 7 LY 33 7 LY 34 7 LY 36 8 LY 37 8 LY 38 8 LY 39 8 LY 
40 8 
 FI TE 41 41 TE 7 7 
 VA 1 LY 1 1 LY 7 2 LY 8 3 LY 12 4 LY 17 5 LY 24 6 LY 29 7 LY 35 8 LY 41 9 
 PD 
 OU AL MI AD=OFF 
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Appendix O 
Covariance Matrix in LISREL for the Revised Model in Figure 6 
Covariance Matrix        
 
  Item  SEV1       SEV2 SEV3       SEV4 SEV5       SEV6    
                 --------       --------    --------       --------    --------      ---- - 
 
SEV1        2.24 
SEV2        2.09            4.27 
SEV3       2.04            3.39        3.40 
SEV4       2.38            4.30        3.73            6.51 
SEV5        2.04            3.40        3.06            4.51        4.26 
SEV6        1.90            3.37        2.92            3.69        3.18            3.66 
QREL       0.38            0.49        0.41            0.61        0.44            0.34 
IA1        2.12            2.62        2.26            3.36        2.79            2.45 
IA2        2.26            2.42        2.15            3.05        2.57            2.23 
IA3        0.61            0.36        0.42            1.04        0.71            0.75 
IA4        1.89            1.69        1.79            1.92        2.08            2.06 
CON1        1.30            1.70        1.48            2.27        1.74            1.65 
CON2        1.05            1.27        1.14            1.64        1.19            1.20 
CON3        1.46            1.76        1.67            2.18        1.67            1.59 
CON4        1.11            1.26        1.05            1.47        1.17            1.17 
CON5        0.81            1.01        0.85            1.20        1.08            1.02 
EA1        2.49            3.39        3.20            4.16        3.72            2.78 
EA2        1.26            1.20        0.95            1.96        1.36            1.25 
EA3        2.75            2.99        3.17            3.22        3.22            2.66 
EA4        0.45            0.40       0.76            0.80        0.86            0.54 
EA5        2.82            5.51        4.84            6.96        4.42            3.83 
EA6        1.15            1.63        1.45            2.21        1.81            1.32 
EA7        0.17            0.24        0.75            0.16        0.49            0.65 
UNCON1      0.44            0.30        0.30            0.79        0.62            0.39 
UNCON2      0.30            0.08        0.33            0.49        0.45            0.29 
UNCON3      0.64            0.68        0.69            0.95        0.99            0.76 
UNCON4      0.65            0.85        0.83            1.13        0.97            0.78 
UNCON5      0.24            0.22        0.34            0.60        0.56            0.36 
RESP1        0.95            1.38        1.24            1.62        1.22            1.17 
RESP2        0.93            1.30        1.18            1.55        1.19            1.10 
RESP3        0.90            1.32        1.15            1.55        1.22            1.13 
RESP4        0.89            1.31        1.17            1.50        1.20            1.11 
RESP5        0.95            1.31        1.27            1.25       1.15            1.17 
RESP6        1.00            1.47        1.29            1.58        1.30            1.25 
ANGER1       1.09            1.81        1.58            2.17        1.60            1.53 
ANGER2       1.00            1.56        1.39            1.90        1.40            1.31 
ANGER3       1.16            2.01        1.81             2.43        1.82            1.71 
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  Item  SEV1       SEV2 SEV3       SEV4 SEV5       SEV6    
                 --------       --------    --------       --------    --------      ---- - 
 
ANGER4       1.18            1.87        1.74            2.23        1.73            1.58 
ANGER5       1.09            1.91        1.72            2.31        1.76            1.66 
ANGER6       1.06            1.54        1.34            1.82        1.40            1.33 
LDA       -0.06           -0.02       -0.02           0.03       -0.03           -0.04 
OS        0.63            1.36        1.13            1.47        1.22            1.18 
RC      0.03            0.02        0.09            0.05        0.12            0.13 
INTER1     -0.03           -0.07       -0.01           -0.13       -0.02           -0.10 
          
Covariance Matrix 
 
  Item  QREL       IA1 IA2       IA3 IA4       CON1    
                 --------       --------    --------       --------    --------      ---- - 
 
QREL        1.42 
IA1        0.70            12.04 
IA2        0.38            6.69       12.26 
IA3        0.14            2.77        4.05            11.88 
IA4        0.64            6.84        6.25            2.11       11.40 
CON1        0.52            3.94        3.93            1.91        3.71            4.41 
CON2        0.00            3.19        2.53            1.59        2.75            2.34 
CON3        0.37            3.77        3.96            1.15        3.91            2.71 
CON4        0.18            3.22        3.29            1.08        3.39            1.90 
CON5        0.04            2.70        2.72            1.62        2.85            1.67 
EA1        0.44            7.06        7.87            3.59        3.77            2.68 
EA2       -0.26           0.42        1.06            0.72       -0.41           0.59 
EA3        0.32            2.88        6.44            1.99        3.33            1.70 
EA4       -0.52           -0.35        0.94            1.08       -1.08           -1.17 
EA5       -0.21           2.31        3.38            5.34        0.62            2.18 
EA6       -0.57           0.74        0.99            1.44       -0.59           0.46 
EA7       -0.88           0.77        0.81            2.03        0.93            -0.16 
UNCON1      0.06            0.06        0.32            0.46       -0.06           -0.32 
UNCON2      -0.29           0.19        0.50            0.89       -0.19           -0.26 
UNCON3      -0.19           0.18        0.21            0.95       -0.29           -0.22 
UNCON4      -0.19           0.21        0.23            1.11       -0.07           -0.24 
UNCON5      -0.06           -0.30       -0.09           0.44        0.33          -0.26 
RESP1        0.37            2.11        1.98            0.07        1.96            1.21 
RESP2        0.33            2.02        2.12            0.17        2.05            1.25 
RESP3        0.30            1.96        1.97            0.05        1.95            1.27 
RESP4        0.30            1.99        1.98            0.12        2.00            1.20 
RESP5        0.23            1.46        2.12            0.09        2.03            0.89 
RESP6        0.25            1.85        2.11            0.15        2.15            1.20 
ANGER1        0.28            2.08        2.12            0.33        1.82            1.33 
ANGER2        0.23            1.98        2.15            0.60        1.81            1.25 
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  Item  QREL       IA1 IA2       IA3 IA4       CON1    
                 --------       --------    --------       --------    --------      ---- - 
      
ANGER3        0.17            1.84        2.26            0.29        1.67            1.12 
ANGER4        0.20            2.01        2.03            0.25        1.78            1.28 
ANGER5        0.15            1.76        2.09            0.29        1.66            0.97 
ANGER6        0.14            2.11        2.45            0.76        1.68            1.17 
LDA       -0.03           -0.45       -0.42           -0.11       -0.66           -0.26 
OS        0.12            0.09        0.26            -0.06       -0.05           0.12 
RC        0.61            0.59        0.38            0.40        0.73            0.18 
INTER1     0.02            -0.01        0.02            0.29        0.11            -0.10 
 
         COVARIANCE MATRIX        
 
  Item  CON2      CON3 CON4       CON5 EA1       EA2    
                 --------       --------    --------       --------    --------      ---- - 
 
CON2        5.46 
CON3        2.21            3.51 
CON4        .85              2.34        2.88 
CON5        1.17            1.72        1.67            2.13 
EA1        4.31            2.19        2.12            1.26       36.06 
EA2        2.11            0.20       -0.31           0.20       13.83            24.04 
EA3        1.64            2.47        2.46            1.19       17.51            6.77 
EA4        0.18            -0.90       -0.85           -0.78        8.89              6.27 
EA5        2.60            3.59        2.98            2.53       13.84            9.71 
EA6        0.39            0.17        0.11            0.34        8.25              12.28 
EA7        0.03            -0.01       -0.39           0.17        6.66              7.94 
UNCON1      0.15            -0.45       -0.27           -0.16        5.75              6.81 
UNCON2      -0.36           -0.61       -0.68           -0.34        4.78              4.61 
UNCON3      -0.84           -0.52       -0.60           -0.11        4.11              3.85 
UNCON4      -0.70           -0.34       -0.54           -0.20        4.45              3.95 
UNCON5      -0.73           -0.39       -0.39           -0.05        4.17              3.82 
RESP1        1.07            1.49        1.04            0.71        1.82              0.73 
RESP2        1.07            1.56        1.10            0.76        2.11              0.47 
RESP3        1.02            1.46        0.98            0.75        1.97              0.68 
RESP4        1.04            1.47        0.99            0.70        1.97              0.43 
RESP5        0.73            1.18        0.75            0.61        1.56              0.92 
RESP6        1.10            1.51        1.03            0.83        1.76              0.71 
ANGER1        1.02            1.50        1.12            0.86        1.71              0.56 
ANGER2        0.96            1.42        1.07            0.85        1.95              0.74 
ANGER3        1.07            1.47        1.12            0.80        2.23              0.67 
ANGER4        1.06            1.50        1.12            0.81        1.95              0.52 
ANGER5        1.15            1.36        1.02            0.80        2.04              0.81 
ANGER6        0.98            1.37        1.20            0.87        2.59              1.03 
LDA       -0.20           -0.17       -0.16           -0.16        0.07              0.28 
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  Item  CON2      CON3 CON4       CON5 EA1       EA2    
                 --------       --------    --------       --------    --------      ---- - 
  
OS        0.02            0.12        0.12            0.06        0.55              0.24 
RC        0.08            -0.08       -0.09           -0.03        0.57              -0.28 
INTER1     -0.02           -0.06        0.01            -0.03        0.74              0.53 
 
         Covariance Matrix        
 
  Item  EA3            EA4 EA5       EA6         UNCON1    UNCON2    
                 --------       --------    --------       --------    --------      ---- - 
 
EA3         31.79 
EA4        6.94            22.90 
EA5        9.49            6.28       53.65 
EA6        8.77            7.47       11.51            20.49 
EA7        3.69            5.58        5.61              6.76       22.16 
UNCON1      4.59            2.65        1.81              3.48        3.20             5.98 
UNCON2      3.39            4.36        2.32              3.33        4.32             2.97 
UNCON3      3.66            3.57        5.47              4.67        3.47             2.92 
UNCON4      4.01            3.74        5.16              5.20        4.64             3.04 
UNCON5      2.99            3.16        3.75              3.50        2.99             2.66 
RESP1        1.72            -0.35        1.71              0.76        0.11             0.03 
RESP2        1.90            -0.06        1.85              0.71       -0.08            -0.09 
RESP3        1.70            -0.03        1.66              0.83       -0.05            -0.02 
RESP4        1.66            -0.05        1.56              0.62       -0.15            -0.07 
RESP5        1.88            0.11        1.09              0.58        0.08             0.05 
RESP6        1.56            -0.66        1.28              0.54        0.03             0.00 
ANGER1       1.76            -0.45        2.56              0.67        0.06             0.15 
ANGER2       1.97            -0.16        2.72              0.67        0.43             0.28 
ANGER3       1.94            -0.23        3.57              0.76        0.44             0.15 
ANGER4       1.84            -0.37        3.02              0.70        0.06             0.14 
ANGER5       1.64            -0.15        3.32              0.81        0.32             0.23 
ANGER6       2.38            -0.01        3.27              1.17        0.56             0.24 
LDA        0.19            0.14        1.18              0.41        0.03             0.07 
OS        0.85            0.42        1.64              0.57       -0.16            0.18 
RC        0.23            -0.16       -0.42             -0.49       -0.08            -0.02 
INTER1     0.08            0.28        0.29              0.22        0.42             0.22 
 
         Covariance Matrix        
 
  Item  UNCON2 UNCON3 UNCON4 UNCON5 RESP1       RESP2    
                 --------       --------    --------       --------    --------      ---- - 
 
UNCON2      5.53 
UNCON3      2.99            6.69 
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     Item UNCON2 UNCON3 UNCON4 UNCON5 RESP1       RESP2    
                 --------       --------    --------       --------    --------      ---- - 
 
UNCON4      3.22            5.07        6.48 
UNCON5      2.89            3.42        3.67             6.30 
RESP1       -0.07           -0.11       -0.02           -0.08        1.61 
RESP2       -0.17           -0.11       -0.14           -0.18        1.36             1.47 
RESP3       -0.11           -0.08       -0.05           -0.13        1.42             1.35 
RESP4      -0.15           -0.15       -0.14           -0.16        1.39             1.34 
RESP5        0.02            0.11        0.22            0.17        1.20             1.18 
RESP6       -0.33           -0.18       -0.06           -0.25        1.40             1.34 
ANGER1       -0.04           0.14        0.20            0.03        1.16             1.14 
ANGER2        0.19            0.20        0.23            0.24        1.07             1.07 
ANGER3        0.19            0.28        0.39            0.25        1.09             1.08 
ANGER4       -0.05           0.20        0.26            0.16        1.01             1.03 
ANGER6        0.17            0.23        0.26            0.20        1.01             1.00 
LDA        0.09            0.12        0.14            0.19       -0.08            -0.09 
OS        0.18            0.31        0.40            0.16        0.21             0.18 
RC        0.23            -0.01        0.09            -0.15        0.03             -0.02 
INTER1      0.20            0.19        0.20            0.28       -0.06            -0.10 
 
         Covariance Matrix        
 
  Item  RESP3      RESP4       RESP5      RESP6      ANGER1  ANGER2    
                 --------       --------    --------       --------    --------      ---- - 
 
RESP3        1.46 
RESP4        1.38            1.42 
RESP5        1.21            1.17        1.78 
RESP6        1.36            1.35        1.35            1.73 
ANGER1     1.10            1.10        0.97            1.17        1.45 
ANGER2     1.02            1.01        0.90            1.10        1.26            1.36 
ANGER3     1.05            1.03        0.98            1.15        1.45            1.33 
ANGER4     1.07            1.07        0.98            1.13          1.41            1.23 
ANGER5     1.00            0.99        0.91            1.09        1.41            1.26 
ANGER6      0.95            0.95        0.83            1.01        1.16            1.12 
LDA       -0.08           -0.09       -0.12           -0.11       -0.09           -0.08 
OS        0.21            0.19        0.24            0.27        0.47            0.37 
RC        -0.04           0.01        0.04            -0.05       -0.07           -0.06 
INTER1      -0.11           -0.09       -0.07           -0.01       -0.02           0.01 
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Covariance Matrix        
 
  Item  ANGER3 ANGER4 ANGER5 ANGER6 LDA      OS    
                 --------       --------    --------       --------    --------      ---- - 
 
ANGER3        1.97 
ANGER4        1.56            1.61 
ANGER5        1.89            1.49        2.05 
ANGER6        1.26            1.20        1.22            1.34 
LDA       -0.04           -0.08       -0.04           -0.07        0.20 
OS        0.67            0.52        0.64            0.35        0.05            1.00 
RC        -0.09           -0.07       -0.09           -0.10       -0.13           0.00 
INTER1      0.02            0.00       -0.01           0.04       -0.01           0.02 
       
         Covariance Matrix        
 
       Item          RC         INTER1           
             --------    --------     
 
RC        1.98 
INTER1      0.01        0.68 
       
 
Note. See the labels of variables in Appendix M.  
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Appendix P 
LISREL Syntax for Testing the Revised Model in Figure 6 
Testing the revised model 
 DA NI=44 NO=236 MA=CM 
 CM=C:\revise1117.psf 
 LA 
 sev1 sev2 sev3 sev4 sev5 sev6 quadrel ia1 ia2 ia3 ia4 con1 con2 con3 con4 con5 ea1 ea2 
ea3 ea4 ea5 ea6 ea7 uncon1 uncon2 uncon3 uncon4 uncon5 resp1 resp2 resp3 resp4 resp5 
resp6 anger1 anger2 anger3 anger4 anger5 anger6 LDA ex1 ex2 ex3  
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